[a - 54 lines; b - 50 lines]

1)[line 3]ùôöòä áôðéäSHE'PATZ'AH B'FANEHA- [the Petza for which Rebbi Yochanan rules that Nezek is paid to her father is one] in which he wounded her in her face [in such a manner that she is permanently disfigured]

2)[line 5]îàé èòîà ãøáé éäåãä?MAI TAIMA D'REBBI YEHUDAH?- what is the reasoning of Rebbi Yehudah [behind his ruling that one who embarrasses an Eved Kena'ani is exempt from paying Boshes]?

3)[line 5]"ëÌÄé éÄðÌÈöåÌ àÂðÈùÑÄéí éÇçÀãÌÈå, àÄéùÑ åÀàÈçÄéå...""KI YINATZU ANASHIM YACHDAV, ISH V'ACHIV..."- "When men fight together, one man and his brother..." (Devarim 25:11). This verse goes on to rule that if the wife of one of the men saved her husband by embarrassing the other, then she must pay. This is the source of the obligation to pay for Boshes (see 86a and BACH to the Mishnah on 86b).

4)[line 7]àçåäACHAVAH- lit. brotherhood. This refers to a) the permissibility to marry into the Jewish people (RASHI); b) Halachic relationship to one's siblings such that he may not marry his sister or sister-in-law (RASHI, second explanation that was removed by the censor); c) that which one's children are Halachically related to one another such that they may not marry one another (TOSFOS DH Yatza in clarification of the second explanation of RASHI)

5)[line 7]àçéå äåà áîöåúACHIV HU B'MITZVOS- he is "his brother" in that which he is obligated in [those] Mitzvos [in which a woman is obligated]

6)[line 7]æåîîé òáã ìà éäøåâåZOMEMEI EVED LO YAHAROGU- witnesses proven to be testifying falsely (see Background to 86:28) [that] an Eved [is deserving of the death penalty] should not be put to death themselves (see Insights)

7)[line 9]"åÇòÂùÒÄéúÆí ìåÉ ëÌÇàÂùÑÆø æÈîÇí ìÇòÂùÒåÉú ìÀàÈçÄéå, [åÌáÄòÇøÀúÌÈ äÈøÈò îÄ÷ÌÄøÀáÌÆêÈ]""VA'ASISEM LO KA'ASHER ZAMAM LA'ASOS L'ACHIV, [U'VI'ARTA HA'RA MI'KIRBECHA"- "And you shall do unto him as he plotted to do to his brother, [and you shall purge the evil from your midst]" (Devarim 19:19). This verse, written regarding Edim Zomemin, instructs Beis Din to punish the Edim for their plot as if they themselves had performed the action that they had accused the defendant of.

8)[line 12]òáã éäà ëùø ìîìëåúEVED YEHEI KASHER L'MALCHUS- a Nochri slave should be a valid candidate to become king. A Jewish king must have been born to a woman who was born Jewish. This is derived from that which he must come "from the midst of your brethren" (Devarim 17:15).

9)[line 13]úé÷ùé ìê âø ìãáøé äëìTIKSHI LACH GER L'DIVREI HA'KOL- ask [why one conceived and born to two] convert[s cannot become king] according to everybody [since even the Rabanan should agree that he is a valid candidate since he is obligated in Mitzvos]

10)[line 14]"îÄ÷ÌÆøÆá àÇçÆéêÈ"; îîåáçø ùáàçéê"MI'KEREV ACHECHA"; MI'MUVCHAR SHEB'ACHECHA- "... from the midst of your brethren [set a king over yourself ...]" (Devarim 17:15); [this implies] from the choicest (i.e., those of the purest lineage) of your brethren

11)[line 16]"[åÀãÈøÀùÑåÌ äÇùÌÑÉôÀèÄéí äÅéèÅá;] åÀäÄðÌÅä òÅã ùÑÆ÷Æø äÈòÅã, ùÑÆ÷Æø òÈðÈä áÀàÈçÄéå]""[V'DARSHU HA'SHOFTIM HEITEV;] V'HINEI ED SHEKER HA'ED, SHEKER ANAH V'ACHIV"- "[And the judges shall inquire fully;] and if it transpires that the witness is a false witness, who has answered falsely against his brother" (Devarim 19:18).

12)[line 17]àúéàASYA- lit. bring; i.e., learn

13)[line 18]äéà øàåéä ìáà á÷äìHI RE'UYAH LA'VO BA'KAHAL- she is fit to marry into the Jewish people

14)[line 19]ôñåìä ìòãåúPESULAH L'EDUS- she is invalid as a witness [since the verse mentions "men" when referring to witnesses (Devarim 19:17)]

15)[line 22]éåëéç... åçæø äãéï; ìà øàé æä ëøàé æä... äöã äùåä ùáäïYOCHI'ACH... V'CHAZAR HA'DIN; LO RE'I ZEH KI'RE'I ZEH... HA'TZAD HA'SHAVEH SHEBA'HEN - Deriving Halachos from a Common Denominator (TZAD HA'SHAVEH)

(a)In a Beraisa found in the introduction to the Sifra (the Halachic Midrash on Vayikra), Rebbi Yishmael lists the thirteen methodologies employed by Chazal when determining Halachah from the verses of the Torah. One of them is called "Binyan Av" or "Mah Matzinu" ("just as we have found"). A Binyan Av - literally "building through a father" - refers to establishing a certain law in one area of the Torah, and then applying it to other comparable circumstances.

(b)Two sections of the Torah may be compared only if there is no logical argument against comparing the two sections. If such an argument, known as a "Pirchah", exists, then the Binyan Av may not be applied.

(c)In the case of a Pirchah, the Gemara will sometimes attempt to reestablish the Mah Matzinu through a "Yochi'ach"/"Tochi'ach (fem.)". Literally a proof, this involves showing that the Halachah that we wish to apply is in effect in a third section of the Torah -- one to which the Pirchah is not applicable.

(d)Usually, the Gemara will respond with a second Pirchah, this time one that draws a distinction between the Yochi'ach and the target of the Mah Matzinu. If this Pirchah does not apply to the first attempted source, then it itself becomes the Yochi'ach.

(e)The Gemara then forms a "Mah ha'Tzad" or "Tzad ha'Shaveh" - a common denominator. This involves finding a property shared by the two prospective sources, aside from the Halachah that we wish to derive. We may then conclude that since the target subject shares the common denominator, the Halachah in question applies to it as well.

(f)The terminology of the Gemara in such a situation is "v'Chazar ha'Din" - the ruling returns [back and forth]; "Lo Re'i Zeh k'Re'i Zeh" - the characteristics of this one are unlike the characteristics of this one, and vice versa; but the "Tzad ha'Shaveh" - the common denominator - teaches us that the derivation is valid. This process can continue, with the Gemara asking a Pirchah upon the common denominator and attempting to introduce yet a third comparison that will solidify the Tzad ha'Shaveh.

16)[line 31]ùäåà àéùSHE'HU ISH- for he is a man [and the reason why a woman and a minor are invalid is due to that which the verse specifies that witnesses must be men (Devarim 19:17)]

17)[line 31]âæìïGAZLAN- a thief [who is invalid as a witness as long as he has not repented (Sanhedrin 27a)]

18)[line 32]îòùéå âøîå ìåMA'ASAV GARMU LO- his actions caused him [to lose his validity as a witness]

19)[line 33]úéúé îâæìï åîçã îäðêTEISI MI'GAZLAN V'CHAD ME'HANACH- learn from a thief and one of [either a woman or a minor, through a Tzad ha'Shaveh, that anyone who does not fulfill all of the Mitzvos - either because he is not obligated in them or by choice - is invalid as a witness]

20)[line 33]îø áøéä ãøáéðà àîøMAR BREI D'RAVINA AMAR- Mar the son of Ravina says [that the reason why a Nochri slave is invalid as a witness is]

21)[line 34]"ìÉà éåÌîÀúåÌ àÈáåÉú òÇì áÌÈðÄéí, åÌáÈðÄéí ìÉà éåÌîÀúåÌ òÇì àÈáåÉú; [àÄéùÑ áÌÀçÆèÀàåÉ éåÌîÈúåÌ]""LO YUMESU AVOS AL BANIM, U'VANIM LO YUMESU AL AVOS; [ISH B'CHET'O YUMASU]"- "Fathers shall not die due to sons, and sons shall not die due to fathers; [each man shall die only as a result of his own sins]" (Devarim 24:16). The Gemara in Sanhedrin (27b) derives from this verse that one is not accepted as a witness to testify for or against his relative.

22)[line 35]ìà éåîúå òì ôé àáåú ùàéï ìäí çééñ áðéíLO YUMSU AL PI AVOS SHE'EIN LAHEM CHAYIS BANIM- they shall not [be put to] death based upon the testimony of fathers who have no Halachic relationship with their children (i.e., slave) (see Insights)

23)[line 42]âøGER- a convert [who has no Halachic relationship with his Nochri father] (see Yevamos 62a)

24)[line 42]äëé äùúà?HACHI HASHTA?- now [is this] so?

25)[line 43]ðäé ãàéï ìå çééñ ìîòìäNEHI D'EIN LO CHAYIS L'MA'ALAH- while it is true that he has no Halachic relationship above (i.e., with his father)

26)[line 46]ãùîòú îéðä úøéD'SHAM'AS MINAH TREI- in which case we would have been able to derive two [derivations]

27)[line 52]àééãéAIDI- since

28)[line 53]àéîéäIMEI- the mother of

29)[last line]äåú ðñéáà ìéä ìø' àáàHAVAS NESIVA LEI L'REBBI ABA- she was [re]married to Rebbi Aba (who was not the same person as her earlier husband, Rebbi Aba me'Hegronya)

30)[last line]ëúáúéðäå ìðëñé ìøá ùîåàì áø àáà áøäKASVESINHU L'NICHSEI L'RAV SHEMUEL BAR ABA BRAH- she wrote [a contract transferring ownership of] her property (Nichsei Milug; see below, entry #34) to her son [from her previous husband] Shmuel the son of Aba [me'Hegronya]

31)[last line]áúø ãùëéáàBASAR DI'SHECHIVA- after she died

88b----------------------------------------88b

32)[line 1]àæìAZAL- he went

33)[line 2]àå÷îéä áðëñéUKMEI B'NICHSEI- [Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba] placed him with the property; i.e., he ruled that the Shmuel bar Aba was the rightful owner

34)[line 5]ðëñé îìåâNICHSEI MILUG - property that a woman brings into a marriage (NICHSEI MILUG / NICHSEI TZON BARZEL)

(a)All possessions belonging to a married woman fall into one of two categories: Nichsei Milug or Nichsei Tzon Barzel.

1.NICHSEI MILUG - In return for that which a husband is obligated to redeem his wife should she fall into captivity, the Chachamim decreed that he reaps the profits of any property belonging to his wife. Although the principle is hers, her husband reaps any gains that it produces as long as they are married. He may not, however, actively diminish the principle. For example, he owns any produce harvested from her field and the right to work her beast of burden, but he may not dig trenches in the field nor slaughter the ox. These possessions are called "Nichsei Milug" - "possessions that are plucked" - since he "plucks" the benefits from his wife's property (RA"V to Yevamos 7:1 and ARUCH Erech Malag). Nichsei Milug are not recorded, nor their values estimated, in a woman's Kesuvah (marriage contract). If her husband divorces her or dies before she does, then her Nichsei Milug are returned to her as is, regardless of any appreciation, depreciation, or deterioration that occurred through the intervening years.

2.NICHSEI TZON BARZEL - Property belonging to one's wife that are recorded and their values estimated in her Kesuvah are called "Nichsei Tzon Barzel" - lit. "iron sheep possessions." In the Kesuvah, her husband takes full responsibility for these items. Should he divorce her or die before she does, then his estate must see to it that she receives their value at the time of the marriage. Because he has a higher degree of responsibility for Nichsei Tzon Barzel than he does for Nichsei Milug, her husband has a higher degree of ownership in them as well.

35)[line 6]ì÷åçåúLEKUCHOS- they who purchased [them]

36)[line 8]äëåúá ðëñéå ìáðå ìàçø îåúåHA'KOSEV NECHASAV LI'VNO L'ACHAR MOSO- one who wrote [a contract transferring ownership of the principle (Guf) of] his property to his son [such that the son should receive the profits (Peiros)] after his death

37)[line 11]îëåøéí òã ùéîåúMECHURIM AD SHE'YAMOS- [the Peiros] are sold until his death

38)[line 13]ëé îééú àá îéäà àéú ìéä ììå÷çKI MAYIS AV MIHA IS LEI L'LOKE'ACH- (the Gemara now infers) when the father dies, however, the purchaser does acquire it

39)[line 26]÷ðéï ôéøåú ë÷ðéï äâåó ãîé / ìàå ë÷ðéï äâåó ãîéKINYAN PEIROS K'KINYAN HA'GUF DAMI / LAV K'KINYAN HA'GUF DAMI - Whether or Not the Acquisition of the Profit is Akin to That of the Principle

(a)Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree in a case in which one owns "Peiros" (profits), but not the "Keren" (principle). Examples of this include one who purchases that which is produced by a certain field or children who will be born to a particular maidservant, but not the field or the maidservant themselves. Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the ownership of the Peiros grants a certain degree of ownership in the principle as well, whereas Reish Lakish disagrees (see also Bava Basra 136a).

40)[line 26]ëé æáéï, ìàå ãéãéä æáéïKI ZAVIN, LAV DIDEI ZAVIN- when [the son] sold [the principle], what he sold was not [fully] his [to sell]

41)[line 35]ëø' ùîòåï áï ì÷éù ñáéøà ìäåK'REBBI SHIMON BEN LAKISH SEVIRA LEHU- rule according to the opinion of Rebbi Shimon ben Lakish [since the Halachah follows his opinion (Yevamos 36b)]

42)[line 40]ùîò îéðä ÷ðéï ôéøåú ìàå ë÷ðéï äâåó ãîéSHEMA MINA KINYAN PEIROS LAV K'KINYAN HA'GUF DAMI- we see that the acquisition of the profit is not akin to that of the principle [and a woman should therefore be able to sell her Nichsei Milug even when her husband is alive, since she owns the principle]

43)[line 41]àäãøåäAHADRUHA- they returned [this question]

44)[line 42]æå àéðä ãåîä ìîùðúðåZO EINAH DOMEH L'MISHNASEINU- this [case of a woman who sells her Nichsei Milug] is not comparable to our Mishnah [cited by Rebbi Yirmiyah bar Aba]

45)[line 43]àéôëàIPCHA- the opposite

46)[line 43]àéëà ìîôùè îéðäIKA L'MIFSHAT MINAH- we would have been able to determine from that [which the sale of the father remains valid even if he dies before his son]

47)[line 44]îùåí ãøàåé ìéåøùå äåàMISHUM D'RA'UY L'YORSHO HU- [the reason why the sale of the son remains valid even if he dies before his father is that we may assume that the father transferred this ability to his son even though it is not normally included with a Kinyan ha'Guf. This is] because [the son] is fit to inherit [the property of his father after his death anyway, and what other purpose would there have been to his father's gift?]

48)[line 45]àèå áøà éøéú àáà; àáà ìà éøéú áøà?ATU BRA YARIS ABA; ABA LO YARIS BRA?- is it true a son inherits his father; a father does not inherit his son? [The same argument could be made for the opposite case as well!]

49)[line 46]ìàáøåçéðäå ìðëñé îáøéä ÷à àúéL'AVRUCHINHU L'NICHSEI MI'BREI KA ASI- [the reason why a son would write his property over to his father would be] to keep his property away from his sons [who would inherit him before his father]

50)[line 47]àçåäACHVAH- his brothers [who would have otherwise split the inheritance with him]

51)[line 47]ú÷ðú àåùàTAKANAS USHA- that which was enacted [by the Sanhedrin when they were] in Usha (a city in the lower western Galilee, which was one of the ten locations to which the Sanhedrin was exiled following the destruction of the Second Beis ha'Mikdash)

52)[line 49]äáòì îåöéà îéã äì÷åçåúHA'BA'AL MOTZI MI'YAD HA'LEKUCHOS- her husband may remove it from they who purchased it [so that her actions not lead to marital discord]

53)[last line]ëúåáúäKESUVASAH - her marriage contract (KESUVAS ISHAH)

(a)When a man marries (Nisu'in) a woman who was a Besulah (virgin) at the time of her Kidushin (betrothal), he must give her a marriage document stipulating that she is to receive 200 Zuz from him or his estate should he divorce her or die. 200 Zuz are equivalent to the value of 960 grams of silver. This document is called a Kesuvah (lit. "written"). Tana'im disagree as to whether this obligation is mid'Oraisa (Biblical) or mid'Rabanan (Rabbinic) in origin (Kesuvos 10a).

(b)If the bride had been widowed or divorced and is therefore a Be'ulah (not a virgin) than she receives a different Kesuvah. The Kesuvah of a Be'ulah guarantees only 100 Zuz to the bride in the case of the dissolution of the marriage. There is no question that the obligation to give this document is mid'Rabanan in origin (Kesuvos 10b). A widow is termed an "Almanah" due to that which her Kesuvah is written for the amount of a "Maneh" (one hundred Zuz) (ibid.).

(c)If a woman is younger than three at the time of her Kidushin, she always receives 200 Zuz. This is because her hymen grows back even when broken at this young age, and she is therefore by definition a Besulah.

(d)The amounts detailed above are only the minimum required to be written into a Kesuvah. One may voluntarily add any amount onto his wife's Kesuvah, and doing so is considered a way of honoring her.