QUESTION: The Gemara discusses a case of a Korban Todah sacrificed for someone other than its owner. Rabah rules that the Korban is valid and fulfills the obligation of the owner. Rav Chisda rules that it is valid but does not fulfill the obligation of the owner.

Rashi (DH Todah) emphasizes that the case is not where Reuven's Korban was slaughtered for Shimon, since this would constitute a Shinuy Ba'alim, a change of intent for a different owner. Rather, the Gemara refers to a case of Shinuy Kodesh, changing the intent from this type of Korban to a different type of Korban, "as one of the Korbanos was slaughtered for the other one." Rashi explains that this case is similar to a case of a person who slaughters a Chatas, which he originally designated to atone for his sin of eating forbidden fat, with intention to atone for his sin of eating blood.

Rashi's words are difficult to understand.

1. What is the case of the Gemara according to Rashi? Rashi says that the Korban was slaughtered for its proper owner, but there is a problem of Shinuy Kodesh. How can there be a problem of Shinuy Kodesh if both Korbanos were Korbenos Todah?

2. Rashi writes that the Gemara's case is one in which both Reuven and Shimon had Korbenos Todah. If the problem is, as Rashi explains, that the Korban was offered with intent that it was a different Korban, then why is it necessary for that the case involve two separate Korbenos Todah? A Shinuy Kodesh occurs when an animal is offered with intent that it is a different type of Korban, but not necessarily with intent that it is a different animal. Why does Rashi stipulate that the intent is for an actual animal?


(a) Many Acharonim (see BIRKAS HA'ZEVACH and CHOK NASAN) explain that Rashi means that both Reuven and Shimon set aside Korbenos Todah, each due to a different miracle that occurred to him. (There are four main reasons for bringing a Korban Todah: being released from prison, safely crossing an ocean, safely traversing a desert, and recovering from a serious illness; see Shulchan Aruch OC 219:1.) Rashi means that Reuven's Korban Todah that was designated, for example, for his release from prison was brought instead for his recovery from illness. Shimon's Korban Todah that was designated for his recovery from illness was brought instead for his release from prison. This is considered a Shinuy Kodesh.

The KEREN ORAH, SEFAS EMES, YAD BINYAMIN and others ask that it is not clear how this answers the question. The Halachah is that if one designates a Korban Todah for a certain salvation that he experienced, but it ends up being offered with intent for a different salvation, it is not a Shinuy Kodesh. Why does the fact that Shimon designated another Korban Todah for this second form of salvation make the change of intent for Reuven's Korban into a Shinuy Kodesh?

(b) The KEREN ORAH focuses on the last part of Rashi. Rashi says that slaughtering a Chatas for a different sin invalidates the Korban, even if it is for the owner's own different sin. This is because when a person designates a Chatas for a specific sin, he "locks" it into its purpose to atone solely for that particular sin. Changing the sin for which the Chatas was designated to atone is considered a Shinuy Kodesh.

While this is not always the law in the case of a Korban Todah, because, as mentioned above, if one designates a Korban Todah for one miracle but it ends up being offered with intent for another miracle, it is not a Shinuy Kodesh, this is only because a Todah is brought as a freewill offering. Since it is a freewill offering, the Korban is not considered "locked in" like a Chatas such that it should be invalid if brought for a different miracle. However, if a person has intent for a different miracle for which an actual Korban is being brought by someone else, it is enough to render it a Shinuy Kodesh.

(It should be noted that TOSFOS (DH Hagahah Rav Chisda) writes that the reason for this law is that the verse says, "Zevach Todas Shelamav" -- "his Korban Todah peace-offering," implying that the Torah is stringent that a Todah must be brought for his own purpose. According to this reason, this law should apply only to a Korban Todah, and not to any other Korban brought for the purpose of someone else's similar Korban.) (Y. MONTROSE)



QUESTION: The Gemara discusses whether or not Shinuy Ba'alim (offering a Korban with intent that it atone for someone other than the owner) applies after the demise of the person who originally designated the Korban. Rava says that although there may be a problem of Shinuy Kodesh (changing intent from this type of Korban to a different type of Korban), there is no problem of Shinuy Ba'alim, because the owner of the Korban died. Rav Pinchas, the son of Rav Ami, says that there is still a problem of Shinuy Ba'alim. Rashi explains that the heirs are considered the owners.

Rav Ashi asks whether, according to Rav Pinchas, the heirs are the actual owners, and thus they must bring another Korban if their Korban was slaughtered with intent for someone else (the YAD BINYAMIN notes that they would have to bring a Korban from their father's estate, not from their own money), or whether Rav Pinchas means to say that due to the change of intent, the heirs would not gain atonement with this Korban for their transgressions of any Mitzvos Aseh. This would mean that they are not obligated to bring another Korban to fulfill their father's obligation.

If the heirs are considered owners, this should constitute a Shinuy Ba'alim that requires a new Korban to be brought for their father. If they are not owners, the Korban should be completely valid and it should atone for the heirs as well!

ANSWER: The SHI'UREI IYUN HA'TALMUD explains that in order to answer this question, it is necessary to understand how a Korban Olah atones for the heirs' transgressions of Mitzvos Aseh. The Gemara earlier states that although the Korban does not atone for the heirs "mi'Kiv'a," in a "permanent," normal procedural manner, it does atone "mi'Kufya," "as an aside." This means that a regular Korban designated by the sinner provides a direct atonement, while heirs who bring a Korban of their father indirectly attainment atonement. This indirect atonement is a result of their financial stake in the Korban.

Rav Pinchas agrees with Rava that there is no Shinuy Ba'alim that will stop the Korban from fulfilling the deceased person's obligation, since he did what he could; namely, he designated the Korban to atone for his sin. While the original purpose of the Korban remains, there is the added benefit that the one (the heir) who has a financial stake in the Korban also achieves atonement, since he owns the animal. However, if one brings the Korban with intent for a different owner, he changes the one detail of the Korban which would possibly give the heirs atonement, but he does not change the basic designation of the Korban (that it should atone for a particular sin). This is why it may be valid for its original owner, but not give atonement to the heirs.

This approach explains the difference between the atonement of the heirs, which is lost as a result of the Shinuy Ba'alim, and the ability of the Korban to fulfill the obligation of the deceased, which is not lost as a result of the same Shinuy Ba'alim. The Korban has no owner for whom it is being sacrificed, because the original owner died and the heirs attain atonement only "mi'Kufya."

On this point, Rav Pinchas agrees with Rava that there is no Shinuy Ba'alim to stop the Korban from fulfilling the obligation of the deceased. However, there still is the ownership of the heirs in the Korban which links them to the Korban enough to receive atonement "mi'Kufya" even without the Korban being brought specifically for them. If one offers the Korban with intent of changing the ownership, he changes a detail in the Korban such that the heir's ownership is no longer effective to provide them with atonement via this Korban. Through the Shinuy Ba'alim, the heirs do not attain atonement even "mi'Kufya." Nevertheless, this is not a Shinuy Ba'alim to ruin the effect of the Korban for the father, since the father no longer owns it, and thus it still fulfills his obligation. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker, Y. MONTROSE)