Explanation #2 (cont.): Just the contrary! It is fine, for here and there he holds that partial knowledge is unlike full knowledge;

However, R. Meir contradicts himself. In the Reisha R. Meir agrees that he can annul on a later day, even though there is partial knowledge, i.e. he knows that there are vows [that can be annulled];

Inference: Partial knowledge is unlike full knowledge.

Implied question: He says in the Seifa "he cannot annul"! (This shows that partial knowledge is like full knowledge.)

Answer: [No. Rather,] since he knows that there is Hafarah, this is considered full knowledge. However, when he has only partial knowledge, like in the Reisha, this is not considered [full] knowledge;

And here (regarding Galus), he says that "b'Lo Re'os" includes a Suma. This shows that partial knowledge is like full knowledge!

Question: What was the difficulty? Here (Galus) is different, for the verse connotes like this!

Suggestion: We ask that we should learn from it (Galus).

Rejection: If so, what did Rava answer "here we learn from the context of the verse"?

Answer: We hold that R. Yehudah and R. Meir did not derive from the verse, for the verse has both connotations;

Rather, he said his own reasoning, and he said his own reasoning. Each one's support from the verse is a mere Asmachta. Therefore, we ask from this (their opinions about Galus, against our Mishnah);

Rava answers that it is not like we thought, that their argument depends on their reasoning. Rather, we learn from the context of the verse.

Implied question: We should learn [Hafarah] from it (Galus)!

Answer: Vows and Galus do not pertain to each other at all (so we do not learn one from the other).

Remark: The text does not say "here we learn from the context of the verse, and here we learn from the context of the verse." This is not the primary text;

According to the one who has this text, initially we ask that we should learn from it, and we answer that there the verses imply this, and here they imply oppositely.

Gemara: Here [we learn] from the context of the verse.

Explanation: Really, R. Meir does not hold that partial knowledge is like full knowledge. Here, a Suma who killed b'Shogeg, is different, for the verse included him.

Gemara: "Without seeing" excludes a blind person.

Explanation: It implies that here he did not see, but elsewhere he can see.

Gemara: A blind person cannot know.

Explanation: He cannot know the exact place where his colleague is.

Gemara: If you will say that "without seeing" excludes a blind person, [this cannot be, for] "without knowing" excludes him!

Explanation: Therefore, it is an exclusion after an exclusion, which is only to include.

Remark: This Sugya is opposite to the Sugya in Makos (the opinions are switched).

Explanation: It taught coins, because if he gives to her food, he need not say to her anything, for the husband has no rights in it.

Support: A Mishnah above (38a) teaches that [even if Shimon is Mudar Hana'ah from Reuven], Reuven may feed Shimon's wife. We do not obligate him to say "as long as your husband has no rights in it"!

Since he feeds her in place of the husband, the husband has no rights in that food;

Even if the husband gave her quota of food to her, and she skimped and left over, the husband has no rights to the excess; like it says in Nazir (24b) about one who skimped [and saved] from her dough;

All the more so, when someone else feeds her, the husband has no rights in that food allotted for her;

Therefore, it taught that he wants to give to his daughter coins, which can be spent on her desires. In such a case the husband has rights in them, like it says in Bava Basra (51b);

Note: There, it discusses one who gives to his own wife, like the Ran says on Amud B (DH Modeh)! The Ramban (Kidushin 23b DH Ein) brings from the Yerushalmi in Kesuvos similar to what the Ran cites here from Bava Basra.

We say there that he buys land with the money, and the husband eats the Peros. It turns out that he benefits from his father-in-law, who forbade him to benefit from him!

Therefore, he must say "this money is given to you for a gift, on condition that your husband has no Reshus over it. It is only for what [you buy food with it and] put into your mouth."

Limitation: This is only when he said both of these. However, if he said only "your husband has no rights in them", it does not help;

This is because our Mishnah is R. Meir, who says that a woman's Yad (power of acquisition) is like her husband's Yad (what she acquires, she acquires for him), like the Gemara establishes it.

Question: If so, when he said to her also "only what you put into your mouth", why does it help?

Answer #1: Since the woman does not acquire the property at all until she puts it in her mouth, at that time the husband cannot acquire it.

Consequence: Based on this, it is only when he said to her "only what you put it your mouth", but if he said "what you wear" or similar matters, it does not help and the husband acquires.

Answer #2: Some say that the same applies when he designated any matter. The husband does not acquire it, since even she did not acquire totally, rather, only for that matter.

Explanation: He must say like the text of our Mishnah. He said both, "on condition that your husband has no Reshus over it" [and] "only what you put into your mouth."

Only in such a case, her husband does not acquire;

This is because "what you want, do" does not help more than "your husband has no Reshus over it";

Just like "your husband has no Reshus over it" alone does not help, also when he says both it does not help, for they are the same matter.

Explanation: Shmuel does not argue with Rav about the Perush of our Mishnah. Surely he agrees to him that in our Mishnah, if he said "what you want, do" it does not help;

Rather, he argues with Rav about the Halachah. Rav establishes our Mishnah like R. Meir, who says that a woman's Yad is like her husband's Yad, and [Rav] holds like him (R. Meir);

Therefore, he rules and says that if he said to her "what you want, do" her husband acquires.

Shmuel surely agrees to him that Mishnah says so. However, he argues with [Rav] about the Halachah, for he holds that the Halachah follows Rabanan, who hold that a woman's Yad is unlike her husband's Yad;

Therefore, [even] if he said to her only "what you want, do" or "on condition that your husband has no Reshus over it", for these are equivalent, it helps.

Gemara: Like whom is this teaching of Rav? It is like R. Meir

Explanation: He said in Kidushin (23a) regarding an Eved Kena'ani that a slave's Yad is like his master's Yad, and similarly, a woman's Yad is like her husband's Yad.

Gemara: How do we join in a Mavuy (alley)?

Explanation: A Mavuy that Chatzeros open to it. Each one forbids to take out Kelim that were Shoves (began Shabbos) in the house, to the Mavuy, via the Chatzer, until all the Chatzeros join in the Mavuy.

Gemara: He leaves the barrel.

Explanation: Of wine, so all will be partners in it, so that the Mavuy will be one Reshus for all of them.

Gemara: Behold, this is for all members of the Mavuy.

Explanation: That they will have a portion and rights in that barrel.

Gemara: Jewish [slaves].

Explanation: They have a Yad. (Only for an Eved Kena'ani, a slave's Yad is like his master's. - PF)

Gemara: If you will say that a husband acquires [all that his wife acquires], the Eruv did not leave his Reshus!

Explanation: Since a wife has no Yad without her husband, the barrel is still in his Reshus, and the members of the Mavuy did not acquire in it.

Explanation: Granted, R. Meir said that a woman cannot acquire without her husband [having rights to the Peros]. However, this is only when another gave a gift to her;

However, he agrees that a husband who gave a gift to his wife that she acquires and her husband does not eat the Peros, like it says in Bava Basra (51b). We do not find that R. Meir argues about this!

Therefore, also here (regarding Eruv), since the husband in any case removes it from his Reshus, even though he does not really give it to her, only to acquire for others, he admits that she acquires. So it seems to me.

Gemara: Ravina asked to Rav Ashi.

Explanation: He did not come to refute Rav, for also without Rav, the Mishnayos are difficult for each other!

Rather, he comes to reject Rava's answer, for also without Rav, the Mishnayos are difficult for each other!

Gemara: His minor son or daughter.

Explanation: They have no Yad. Also his male and female Kena'ani slaves and his wife, their Yad is like his Yad;

Question: What is the reason? Rava said that whenever the husband is Mezakeh for others via her, she has a Yad!

Explanation: When it taught that he acquires for them through his wife, this is only when she owns a Chatzer in that Mavoy;

E.g. she inherited it while [or before] she was Arusah, and he wrote to her while she was an Arusah "I do not have Din u'Devarim (any claims) in your property";

In such a case, it helps [to avoid acquiring it], like it says in Kesuvos (83a).

Gemara: Migo (since) she acquires for herself.

Explanation: To permit her Chatzer, for regarding a husband who gave to his wife, even R. Meir agrees that she has a Yad, like I wrote above (88a DH ha'Noder).

Gemara: She acquires also for others.

Explanation: For everyone in that Mavoy.

Opinion #1: The Nagid R. Shmuel ha'Levi, citing Rav Amram Gaon, rules like Shmuel.

Implied question: Here they argue about Isur, and we hold like Rav in Isurim (when he argues with Shmuel)!

Answer #1: Even so, since their argument depends primarily on a monetary law, whether or not we say that a woman's Yad is like her husband's Yad, we hold like Shmuel, for the Halachah follows him in monetary laws.

Answer #2: Rav holds like R. Meir, and Shmuel holds like Rabanan. Therefore, we hold like them (the Rabim).

Answer #3: Elsewhere, the Gemara is like Shmuel, that "on condition that your husband has no Reshus over it" alone, helps;

This is like it says in Nazir (24b) regarding a woman who separated an animal [for her Nezirus]. If it was hers...

The Gemara asks "what a woman acquired, her husband acquired!", and answers that she economized on her food (the savings are hers), or someone else was Makneh to her 'on condition that your husband has no Reshus over it.'

Also in Sanhedrin (71a), we say that [a Ben Sorer u'Moreh] is liable only if he eats from his father and from his mother;

We ask "how does his mother [own anything]? What a woman acquired, her husband acquired!", and answer that someone was Makneh to her "on condition that your husband has no Reshus over it."

Support: The Ramban rules like this.

Consequence: When he said only "on condition that your husband has no Reshus over it", it helps.

Opinion #2: R. Tam and the Ra'avad rule like Rav, because the argument here is regarding vows, which is Isur, and we hold like the Halachah follows Rav regarding Isurim.

Consequence: According to this, it helps only if he said "on condition that your husband has no Reshus over it, only what you put into your mouth."

Opinion #3: The Rambam has an intermediate opinion. He rules like Shmuel, but he wrote that also according to Shmuel, we require two [expressions], "on condition that your husband has no Reshus over it", and "what you want, do."

He explains that Rav and Shmuel argue as follows. Rav holds that the Mishnah mentioned "what you put into your mouth" specifically. Other words do not help;

Even if he said also "what you want, do", the husband acquires.

Shmuel holds that we do not require the precise words ["what you put into your mouth"]. The same applies if he said "what you want, do."

However, all agree that we require two expressions.

Question: What does it add to say also "what you want, do"? This is like saying only "on condition that your husband has no Reshus over it"!

Answer: It seems to me that when he said only "what you want, do", also to her he did not totally give it, that we would say that the husband acquires immediately;

Rather, he is like one who said to her "it is yours only for the matter that you want to do with it, at every time";

Shmuel holds that just like designation for one particular matter helps, also here that he designates it for the matter she wants to do with it, at every time, it helps;

The Kinyan is only at that time that she wants to do something, only for that matter.

Explanation: Surely, the verse comes for this;

If it were for when she did not marry, why do we need the verse to teach that the vow stands? This is obvious. Who can annul it?!

Rather, surely we need it for when she married, to teach that since she vowed when she was still a widow, even though she said that it will take effect after 30 days, when she married afterwards, he cannot annul;

This is because we follow the time of the utterance. She vowed before she married, and the husband cannot annul Kodmim (vows from before he married her).

Mishnah: If she vowed while in the husband's Reshus... he can annul.

Explanation: We follow [her status at] the time that she said [the vow], whether this is a leniency or stringency.