Gemara: Behold, regarding tearing, that it is written "for Sha'ul..."

Explanation: And we should have said that "Al" is precise, that he tears for the Mes, and not that he errs about someone else...

And even so, it was taught that if they told a man that his father died, and he tore, and later it was found that it was his son who died, he fulfilled the Mitzvah of tearing;

Inference: "Al" is not precise. Also here, we should say that "Osah" is not precise!

Gemara: This is not difficult. Here is Stam, and here is when he specified.

Explanation: The Beraisa of when they told a man that his father died, and he tore, he was Yotzei, this is not truly when they told him explicitly that his father died;

Rather, it is when they told him Stam 'he died', and he thought that it was his father, and it was found to be his son. In this case, he was Yotzei tearing;

Distinction: However, in an explicit case, that they told him that his father died, and he tore with this intent, he was not Yotzei, for "Al" is precise. What was taught 'they told him that his father died' is not precise.

Gemara: And a Beraisa teaches.

Explanation: This is b'Nichusa (not in astonishment). He was Yotzei only in a case of Stam, but explicitly [they said that his father died], he was not Yotzei;

Our Mishnah, which taught 'he returns to annul', is in an explicit case. They explicitly said that his wife vowed, and it was found that his daughter [vowed]. In such a case, his Hafarah does not help.

Explanation: Rav Ashi does not come to argue with this law of Stam. Surely, he agrees that he was Yotzei tearing. This is clear from the Beraisa, that Stam he was Yotzei;

In such a case also in Nedarim, Hafarah and Hakamah help!

Explanation (cont.): Rather, to avoid giving a difficult explanation, that the Beraisa that teaches "they told him that his father died" is not precise, he gives a different answer;

[He teaches that] we find this also explicitly (they told him who died), that he was Yotzei, as long as they informed him [who truly died] Toch Kedei Dibur of his tearing.

In such a case also regarding Hafarah and Hakamah [it is valid]. Our Mishnah, which says that he returns and annuls (i.e. the first Hafarah or Hakamah was invalid) is when they told him after Kedei Dibur of his first Hafarah that it was his daughter.

Gemara: And a Beraisa teaches.

Explanation: This is b'Nichusa (not in astonishment).

Gemara: However, Toch Kedei Dibur, he does not return and tear.

Explanation: Even though when he tore, he still did not die, and it was not a [Mitzvah of] tearing at all, since he died Toch Kedei Dibur, it is as if he tore now.

Also when he tore mistakenly, that he thought that a different [relative] died, or he affirmed or annulled mistakenly, since he found out Toch Kedei Dibur, it helps.

Implied question: In Bava Basra (129b), we list only two, i.e. except for idolatry and Kidushin!

Answer: They do not argue. Blasphemy is included in idolatry, and divorce is included in Kidushin, for divorce is equated to Kidushin.

Explanation: [The case of] blasphemy is when he blasphemed and retracted Toch Kedei Dibur. It is not a [valid] retraction.

[The case of] idolatry is when he said to an idolatry "you are my god", and retracted. It is not a [valid] retraction.

[The case of] Kidushin and divorce is when he was Mekadesh or divorced, and retracted Toch Kedei Dibur. He cannot retract.

Question: Why are these [four] different? What is Rabanan's source for them?

Answer #1: Other matters are not so severe. When a person does them, he does not resolve in his mind. He intends that he can retract Toch Kedei Dibur;

However, these, since they are so severe, one does them only with total resolve. Therefore retraction does not help, even Toch Kedei Dibur.

Answer #2 (Ramban, Bava Basra 129b DH v'Hilchesa, citing R. Tam): Toch Kedei Dibur is like Dibur due to an enactment. Rabanan enacted this due to a Talmid buying something, and he encounters his Rebbi, so he can greet him with Shalom [without losing his purchase];

Chachamim made a uniform law for everything except for these [four matters].

Objection: Do Beis Din (i.e. Chachamim) enact to uproot Torah law permanently, through an action, regarding Nedarim?! (If a man annulled mistakenly, and Toch Kedei Dibur found out who really vowed or what they vowed about, we validate his Hafarah, and she may transgress her vow.) Rather, surely it is like I said.

Mishnah: If she said 'Konam are these figs and grapes that I will taste', if he affirmed for figs, the vow is totally affirmed.

Explanation: Even for grapes. He cannot return to annul.

Mishnah: It is not annulled until he annuls even for grapes.

Explanation #1: It is not annulled for grapes until he explicitly annuls for them, but for figs, which he annulled, it is annulled.

Explanation #2: It is not annulled at all, even for figs. He cannot annul part of it.

Mishnah: If she said 'Konam is a fig that I will taste, and a grape that I will taste', these are two vows.

Explanation: This does not mean that he must annul each by itself, for two vows, one Hafarah suffices for them;

Citation (Tosefta): If she had five vows, one Hafarah suffices for all of them.

Rather, this teaches that if he annulled or affirmed one of them, he can affirm or annul the second.

Gemara: If annulled for figs, it is not annulled until he annuls even for grapes.

Explanation #1: The entire vow is not annulled. [This is not] like we say about Kiyum, that if he affirmed partially, he totally affirmed.

Explanation #2: It is not annulled at all, even for figs, like I wrote in our Mishnah (87a DH Eino).

Gemara: What do we learn from "Yekimenu"? Mimenu (part of it).

Explanation: It implies that via part of it, i.e. Mimenu, all of if is affirmed. So "Yekimenu" implies;

Also "Yeferenu", even though the word does not imply so, even so [the same law applies, for] there is a Hekesh [to equate them].

Version #1: This is the text in Seforim. Based on this, what the Mishnah taught "if he annulled for figs, it is not annulled" means the entire vow, but what he annulled is annulled;

If it were not annulled at all, why did Rabanan say "just like Hafarah, what he annulled is annulled", which connotes that all agree about Hafarah, and Rabanan needed only to equate Hakamah to Hafarah?

Regarding Hafarah itself, the first Tana of our Mishnah argues!

Rather, surely this text connotes that all agree that what he annulled is annulled.

Question: The Tosefta connotes unlike this. It teaches there "if she vowed from figs and grapes, if he annulled for figs, but not for grapes, and it became dark, she is forbidden both figs and grapes";

Inference: [The Mishnah] means that it is not annulled at all!

Version #2: Therefore, the minority text of Seforim seems primary. The text says "but Chachamim say, just like Hafarah, what he annulled is not annulled, also Hakamah, what he affirmed is not affirmed.

Support: This is the text of the Ramban in his Halachos.

Citation (Shevuos 36b - Mishnah): If five claimed from him, and he said "Shevu'ah that I do not owe you, and not you, and not you" (and he lied), he is liable for each;

Citation (cont.): R. Shimon says, [he is liable for each] only if he said Shevu'ah to each of them.

Also here, [R. Shimon] considers it to be two vows only if she says "that I taste" to each of them;

However, if she said "Konam, I will not taste not figs and not grapes", according to R. Shimon this is one vow, and according to Rabanan it is two vows.

Ruling: I already wrote above (66a DH ul'Inyan) that we hold like R. Shimon.

Mishnah: I know that there are vows.

Explanation: That what my wife vowed is an absolute vow.

Gemara: But I do not know that there is Hafarah.

Explanation: That a husband can annul any vow - not of Inuy Nefesh, and not between him and her.

Mishnah: He can annul.

Explanation: Afterwards, when the husband learned, he can annul that day that it becomes known to him. Until that day, it is not called "the day that he heard."

Mishnah: I know that there is Hafarah.

Explanation: That there are some vows that husbands can annul them.

Mishnah: But I do not know that this is a vow.

Explanation: That this is among the vows that a husband can annul.

Opinion #1: He cannot annul at all, not today, and not after they inform him that he can annul today. (If he thinks that he cannot annul, why would he try?! Perhaps he objected to them in an expression that would annul, had he intended for Hafarah. Or, he heard many vows, and thought that he can annul only some of them, and said 'I annul all those vows that I can annul.')

It is called Yom Shom'o (the day that he hears) regarding that he can annul, only when he knows that he can annul;

Also after they inform him that he can annul [such vows], he cannot annul, because the first knowledge [of the vow] is called Yom Shom'o, regarding that he cannot annul afterwards, and that day already passed.

Opinion #1 (cont.): Chachamim say that he can annul this day (that he heard the vow). They hold that partial knowledge is like all knowledge.

However, once the day passed, he cannot annul, for the first day is called the day he heard regarding that he can annul that day, and that he cannot annul afterwards.

Opinion #2: There is an opinion that R. Meir taught that he cannot annul, only on the latter day [when he learned that he can annul], but that day [that he heard] itself, he can annul through this knowledge;

He holds that since he knows that there are Nedarim, and there is Hafarah, this is called full knowledge, even though he does not know that this is a vow [that he can annul];

Chachamim say that he can annul, i.e. on the latter day [when he finds out]. They hold that since on the first day he did know that this is a vow, this is not called knowledge.

Gemara: They asked a contradiction. "Without seeing" excludes a Suma (blind person).

Explanation: If he killed a person b'Shogeg, he is not exiled. Since it says "without seeing", this implies that here he did not see, but elsewhere he can see.

Explanation: Since [a blind person] has some knowledge, that he senses when [another] person comes near him, even so he does not have total knowledge, for he cannot know his precise place, since he does not see him. Even so, it is considered like full knowledge (and he is exiled if he kills b'Shogeg).

Explanation #1: According to Version #1 that I explained in our Mishnah, we ask contradictions in R. Meir and in R. Yehudah;

Here, R. Meir says that "b'Lo Re'os" includes a Suma, even though he does not have full knowledge. He holds that partial knowledge is like full knowledge;

In our Mishnah he taught that he cannot annul through this knowledge on this day. This shows that partial knowledge is not like full knowledge!

Here, R. Yehudah says that "b'Lo Re'os" excludes a Suma. This shows that partial knowledge is not like full knowledge;

In our Mishnah, Rabanan, i.e. R. Yehudah, who [normally] argues with R. Meir, say that he can annul on that day through this knowledge. We infer that he holds that partial knowledge is like full knowledge!

Implied question: The Reisha says that he can annul afterwards [when he finds out. This connotes that partial knowledge is not like full knowledge to be called Yom Shom'o!]

Answer: This is not difficult. We hold that whenever he did not know that there is Hafarah, this is not considered even partial knowledge.

Explanation #2: According to Version #2 that I explained in our Mishnah, R. Meir, who says that he cannot annul, discusses afterwards, and Rabanan who argue with him also discuss afterwards, because partial knowledge is not like full knowledge;

There is no contradiction in R. Yehudah. (This Dibur continues on the coming Daf.)