1) REBBI YOSI'S OPINION IN THE CASE OF "TEMURAH"
OPINIONS: The Gemara quotes the Mishnah in Temurah (25b) that discusses a case in which the owner of two Korbanos of different types declares that a third animal is Temurah for the two different Korbanos. When the owner says that the animal should become "a Temurah for the Olah, a Temurah for the Shelamim," Rebbi Meir rules that we follow his first statement, and the animal becomes the Temurah of an Olah. Rebbi Yosi says that we assume that the owner had in mind to make the animal a blend of two Korbanos, and he merely was unable to say both at once. As a result, he must keep the animal until it becomes unfit to be a Korban, sell it, and use half of the money to buy an animal that he must offer as an Olah and half to buy an animal that he must offer as a Shelamim. Rebbi Yosi adds that if the reason for his double statement of Temurah was that after he said that he wanted the animal to be a Temurah for the Olah he changed his mind and decided that it should be a Shelamim, he agrees with Rebbi Meir that the animal is an Olah.
According to Rebbi Yosi, how are we to know what the person's intention was? Moreover, why do we not apply the rule of "Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami" and allow the person to change his mind and make the animal a Temuras Shelamim, even though he originally pronounced it a Temuras Olah?
(a) TOSFOS (DH Amar Rebbi Yosi) quotes the Gemara in Bava Kama (73b) which implies that Rebbi Yosi maintains that a person's intention cannot be determined by examining the time frame of his words.
The Gemara there states that Rebbi Yosi agrees with the concept of "Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami" -- within the small amount of time of "Toch Kedei Dibur" an act or speech is not considered complete and still continues. The Gemara challenges this from the Mishnah in Temurah; Rav Papa learns that the case in which Rebbi Yosi agrees that the Temurah is only an Olah refers to a case of Toch Kedei Dibur. If Rebbi Yosi maintains that "Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami," then why does the owner's second statement, which was made within Toch Kedei Dibur of the first, not take effect as well, making the animal a blend of Temuras Olah and Temuras Shelamim? The Gemara there answers that the time period of Toch Kedei Dibur can be one of two amounts. It can be the length of time that it takes for a student to say a greeting to his teacher ("Shalom Alecha Rebbi u'Mori"), or it can be the amount of time that it takes a Rebbi to greet his student ("Shalom Alecha"). Rebbi Yosi maintains that "Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami" applies only when the two statements are made within the shorter span of time ("Shalom Alecha"), and not the longer span of time.
Tosfos deduces from the Gemara that Rebbi Yosi maintains as follows. When the owner says "Temuras Olah and Temuras Shelamim" within the shorter time frame of Toch Kedei Dibur, it is apparent that his original intention was to state the two together. Even if, afterwards, he insists that this was not his intention, we assume from the proximity of his words that this was his intention. If, on the other hand, he paused more than the shorter Toch Kedei Dibur ("Shalom Alecha") but less than the longer Toch Kedei Dibur ("Shalom Alecha Rebbi u'Mori"), then this shows a break in his intent, and we assume that his second statement reflects a change of mind. Even if, afterwards, he insists that his intention from the beginning was to state both phrases together, we assume that he wanted to change his mind.
(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Temurah 2:4) seems to disagree with Tosfos and maintains that the person's intention is determined based entirely on his claimed intent, and not on how much time passed between each statement. The Rambam writes that "if there was intent to say both phrases, then both are binding. If he originally intended only to make a Temuras Olah and then he said 'Temuras Shelamim,' then even if he stated ['Temuras Shelamim'] within a period of Toch Kedei Dibur [of his original statement of 'Temuras Olah'], we accept only the first statement and it is only a Temuras Olah."
It is apparent from the Rambam's wording that the second ruling of Rebbi Yosi is applicable only when the person admits that he intended to say just "Temuras Olah," but then he changed his mind and added "Temuras Shelamim." This is unlike Tosfos, who says that even if he insists that his intention was also to make a Temuras Shelamim, as long as his second statement was said more than the short Toch Kedei Dibur after his first statement, we ignore his attempt to clarify what he intended.
The Gemara in Bava Kama that Tosfos cites seems to disprove the view of the Rambam. How does the Rambam understand that Gemara?
The MISHNEH L'MELECH (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 15:1) answers that the Rambam was bothered by a question which Tosfos asks in Bava Kama there. The Gemara in Makos (6a) quotes Rav Acha mi'Difti as saying that the rule of "Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami" applies even to the longer period of Toch Kedei Dibur. How can that be? The Gemara in Bava Kama states that the Rabanan do not agree with the concept of "Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami" at all, and Rebbi Yosi maintains that it applies only to the shorter period of Toch Kedei Dibur. What Tana supports the statement of Rav Acha mi'Difti?
The Rambam learns that according to Rav Acha mi'Difti, the Gemara's answer in Bava Kama is not the Halachic conclusion. Rather, Rav Acha mi'Difti maintains that Rebbi Yosi indeed rules that "Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami" applies even to the longer period of Toch Kedei Dibur. Why can the person not change his mind and make the animal a Temuras Shelamim if it is still Toch Kedei Dibur of his original statement, in which he pronounced it a Temuras Olah? The answer is that, according to the Rambam, the rule of "Toch Kedei Dibur k'Dibur Dami" never applies in cases of Hekdesh. (See Rambam in Perush ha'Mishnayos to Temurah 5:2, where he states this explicitly.)
(The NESIVOS HA'MISHPAT (CM 255:3) concurs with this explanation of the Rambam. See also KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN CM 255:2, and PNEI YEHOSHUA to Bava Kama 73b.) (Y. MONTROSE)
2) "TEMURAS OLAH, TEMURAS SHELAMIM"
QUESTION: Rav Dimi (30a) states that Rebbi Meir's opinion in the Mishnah in Temurah (28b) is consistent with Rebbi Yehudah's opinion in the Mishnah here (29b). Rebbi Meir rules that when the owner of two Korbanos (an Olah and a Shelamim) designates a third animal as a "Temuras Olah, Temuras Shelamim," the animal acquires the Kedushah of an Olah, in accordance with the first statement the owner made. Rebbi Yehudah in the Mishnah here maintains that when one has several wrongful thoughts (Chutz l'Zemano, Chutz l'Mekomo) about a Korban, the animal is considered invalidated with the first thought that the person had. Abaye questions Rav Dimi's assertion from the teaching of Rabah bar bar Chanah, who says that Rebbi Meir rules like Rebbi Yosi and does not follow the first words in a statement containing several parts. Rebbi Meir merely argues with regard to how to determine the intention of the owner of the Korbanos.
TOSFOS (DH Amar Lei Abaye) asks that Abaye's statement is difficult to reconcile with Abaye's opinion in the previous Gemara (30a).
The Gemara earlier discusses an argument between Abaye and Rava. Abaye says that although Rebbi Meir argues in the case of "Temuras Olah, Temuras Shelamim" that the animal has the Kedushah of an Olah, his reasoning is that the owner said the word "Temuras" twice. If he would say only that this animal should be "Temuras Olah u'Shelamim," or that it should be "half Olah and half Shelamim," Rebbi Meir would agree that the animal becomes a blend of both an Olah and a Shelamim (see Tosfos to 30a, DH Lachtzos). Rava argues that in this case, too, Rebbi Meir maintains that the animal has only the Kedushah of an Olah. Rava proceeds to ask a question on Abaye's opinion. A case in which a person slaughtering a Korban has two consecutive thoughts to eat a k'Zayis of the meat Chutz l'Zemano and to eat a k'Zayis of the meat Chutz l'Mekomo seems identical to a case in which the owner of two Korbanos says that this animal should be "half Olah and half Shelamim." However, in the first case, Rebbi Yehudah argues with the Rabanan in the Mishnah and says that we follow the first thought. This implies that Rebbi Meir would also argue with Rebbi Yosi in the case of Temurah.
Tosfos is perplexed by the question on Abaye. Abaye explicitly maintains that Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Meir do not agree about the logic. How, then, can Rava ask that if Rebbi Yehudah argues in the Mishnah, then Rebbi Meir should argue with Rebbi Yosi?
Moreover, why does Abaye not simply answer Rava's question by quoting Rabah bar bar Chanah, as he does in the Gemara here, and state that the two arguments have nothing to do with each other? (See TZON KODASHIM for the reason why Tosfos does not ask this question.)
(a) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES (Hashmatos, #4) quotes the RIVA who answers that Rava asks his question based on the following understanding of Abaye's statement. Although Abaye himself maintains that Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Meir disagree, he asserts that whether or not one maintains that they disagree, both Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yosi will admit that in a case in which the owner says that the animal should be Temurah of "half Olah and half Shelamim," the animal has the Kedushah of both. Rava's question on Abaye is that those who maintain that Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Meir agree would not be able to accept Abaye's statement. This explanation is also given by the KEREN ORAH.
(b) The SEFAS EMES and CHAZON ISH have difficulty with the question. They understand that Abaye's statement that Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yosi are not arguing does not mean that either of them argues with Rebbi Yehudah. When Abaye responds to Rav Dimi, who says that Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah both say that a status is determined by the first part of one's statement, Abaye wants to show him a different perspective on the argument between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yosi. Abaye tells him the view of Rabah bar bar Chanah, whose view has nothing to do with following the first part of one's statement. Abaye explains that in the case of "Temuras Olah and Temuras Shelamim," there is an argument about how to determine the intention of the person who makes a statement with two opposing parts. Rebbi Yehudah himself may agree with both of these opinions. Abaye earlier (30a) explains that the argument in the Mishnah applies to a case in which one Siman was slaughtered with intent of Chutz l'Zemano, and the second Siman was slaughtered with intent of Chutz l'Mekomo. In that case, Rebbi Yosi himself may agree that the first thought is the main one, since those two thoughts do not contradict each other. If this is what Abaye means, then there is no question as to why Rava challenges the view of Abaye that Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah should agree with each other. (Y. MONTROSE)