תוספות ד"ה מדבעי

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains Rebbi Akiva's position.)

בלא חיה נמי מצי למדרש הכי אקרא אני בכל דבר טמא

(a) Implied Question: Without the word "Chayah," Rebbi (7a) would still be able to make his derivation by saying, "The Pasuk could say, "Anything that is impure." (Why, then, is the Gemara saying we need the Pasuk to say "Beheimah" and "Chayah" because of Rebbi? It could have relied on the Pasuk, "Anything etc." and the teaching would still be valid!)

אלא לאו דוקא נקט חיה וחיה נמי לא נכתבה אלא בשביל דבר שנתחדש בה כדתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל ומשום דרבי נקט חיה במילתיה נקט נמי הכא בהמה וחיה כדרבי

(b) Answer: The Gemara did not mean that the word "Chayah" was specifically necessary. The word "Chayah" was only written because of the novel law derived regarding the topic, as stated by the house of Rebbi Yishmael (in our Gemara). However, being that Rebbi stated "Chayah" when making his derivation, the Gemara here also stated "Beheimah" and "Chayah" as did Rebbi.

ותימה דבפרק בהמה המקשה (חולין דף עא.) משמע דאי לאו קרא דבהמה טמאה בכלל חיה טמאה לא הוה דריש רבי ג"ש משום דאיצטריך בהמה טמאה לגופה והשתא בלא חיה נמי הוה דרשי' ג"ש דבהמה דמכל דבר טמא נפקא

(c) Question: This is difficult. In Chulin (71a), the Gemara implies that if it were not for the Pasuk of "Beheimah Temei'ah" being included in "Chayah Temei'ah," Rebbi would not have derived his Gezeirah Shaveh. This is because "Beheimah Temei'ah" would have been required to teach the law itself (if we would not know it is included in "Chayah Temei'ah"). According to what we said above this is incorrect, as we stated that without the word Chayah we would also have derived the Gezeirah Shaveh of Beheimah from, "Anything that is impure."

ויש לומר דאי לאו בהמה בכלל חיה לא הוה דרשי' ג"ש דבהמה טמאה אע"ג דכתיב בכל דבר טמא אלא ה"א דאתו פרטי לאשמועינן דבעינן דידע אי בשרץ איטמא אי בנבילה איטמא אפילו לרבי עקיבא אבל השתא דבהמה בכלל חיה הוי כאילו כתב בהמה ב' פעמים ש"מ לכדרבי הוא דאתא

(d) Answer: It is possible to answer that if "Beheimah" would not be included in the word "Chayah," we would not derive the Gezeirah Shaveh of "Beheimah Temei'ah" even though the Pasuk says "Anything that is impure." Rather, I would think that the specific things that are mentioned are in order to teach that one must know if he became impure from a Sheretz or from a Neveilah, even according to Rebbi Akiva. However, now that "Beheimah" is included in the word "Chayah," it is as if it says Beheimah twice. This indicates that it is for Rebbi's teaching.

ולר' אליעזר אתא נמי לאשמועינן דבעינן דידע אי בשרץ אי בנבילה איטמא משרץ ונבילה

1. According to Rebbi Eliezer this is also needed in order to teach us that a person needs to know whether he became impure through a Sheretz or Neveilah from the words "Sheretz" and "Neveilah."

ולר"ע כיון דע"כ משום דבהמה בכלל חיה כדפרישית מהשתא ש"מ בכולהו לא נכתב אלא בשביל דבר שנתחדש בה ולא בעינן דידע במאי איטמא

2. According to Rebbi Akiva, being that a Beheimah is included in a Chayah as explained, we see regarding all similar things that they are only written again because of a novel law that is taught the second time they are written. This does not mean a person must know what made him impure.


תוספות ד"ה פרט

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains the different types of Misasek.)

בפרק ספק אכל (כריתות דף יט:) מסיק מתעסק דמאי אי דחלבים ועריות חייב שכן נהנה אלא מתעסק דשבת כדשמואל

(a) Observation: In Kerisus (19b), the Gemara concludes that this cannot be referring to Misasek in prohibitions of forbidden fats and relations, as a person has pleasure from these sins (and therefore is liable even though he is Misasek)! It must be referring to Misasek on Shabbos, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.

ובקונטרס לא דק דהזכיר נמי מתעסק דעריות

(b) Implied Question: Rashi was not exact, as he mentions Misasek in prohibitions of forbidden relations as well.

ומיהו תימה דאמאי איצטריך בה פרט למתעסק דשבת תיפוק ליה מטעמא דשמואל דאמר התם דפטור מטעם דבעינן מלאכת מחשבת

(c) Question #1: However, this is difficult. Why do we require the Pasuk, "Bah" to exclude Misasek on Shabbos? We should derive this from Shmuel's reasoning! Shmuel says in Kerisus (19b) that a Misasek is exempt because we require a Meleches Machsheves for one to transgress Shabbos.

ואמילתא דשמואל גופיה קשה דאי טעמא דנהנה עיקר לחייב בחלבים ועריות למה לי למיפטריה בשבת משום מלאכת מחשבת ואי טעמא דמלאכת מחשבת עיקר למה לי למחייביה בחלבים ועריות משום דנהנה

(d) Question #2: Shmuel's statement is also difficult. If the reason that one has pleasure is the main reason why a Misasek is liable for forbidden fats and relations, why should we say that on Shabbos a Misasek is exempt because of Meleches Machsheves? If the reason of Meleches Machsheves is the main reason, why should we say a Misasek in forbidden fats and relations is liable because he has pleasure?

ונראה דאיכא תרי גווני מתעסק כגון נתכוין לחתוך מחובר זה וחתך מחובר אחר דמיפטר מטעם שלא נעשית מחשבתו ולא שייך למיפטריה משום מתעסק

(e) Answer: It seems that there are two types of Misasek. One is intending to cut this plant that is attached to the ground, and instead cutting a different plant. Such an action is exempt because his intent was not done. He cannot be deemed exempt because of Misasek.

ועוד מתעסק אחר כגון נתכוין לחתוך את התלוש ולהגביה את התלוש למר כדאית ליה ולמר כדאית ליה ונמצא מחובר דנעשית מחשבתו ומיפטר משום בה פרט למתעסק

1. There is another Misasek, where one intends to cut or pick up something that is not attached to the ground. (Rava and Abaye argue regarding the details of this case in Kerisus 19b.) Each opinion states the case differently. He then ends up cutting it off the ground (he did not realize it was attached). His intention (to take this item) has been done, and therefore he is exempt because of Misasek.

ובתרוייהו איירי שמואל ומשום הכי קאמר בכריתות אלא מתעסק דשבת כדשמואל דאיירי נמי שמואל במתעסק דמיפטר משום בה לר' אליעזר אלא שלא חשש לפרש אלא טעם דמלאכת מחשבת דלא איירי בה רבי אליעזר

2. Shmuel is discussing both cases. This is why the Gemara says in Kerisus that "Bah" is referring to the Misasek of Shabbos, as stated by Shmuel. This is because Shmuel also discusses the type of Misasek where one indeed is exempt from a Korban because of Bah, according to the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer. However, Shmuel only explained the other type of Misasek that Rebbi Eliezer is not discussing.

ובחלב נמי איכא תרי גווני מתעסק כגון נתכוין לאכול חלב זה ואכל חלב אחר דחייב בלא טעמא דנהנה דלא שייך למיפטריה מטעם מלאכת מחשבת

3. Regarding forbidden fats, there are also two types of Misasek. One example is where a person intended to eat a certain piece of fat, and he ended up eating a different piece. Such a person is liable without the reasoning of having to be liable if one had pleasure. This is because it is not possible to say he should be exempt because of Meleches Machsheves.

ועוד מתעסק אחר כגון סבור שהוא שומן או רוק ובלעו דכיוצא בו מיפטר לענין שבת מדכתיב בה והכא לית לן למעוטי משום דנהנה וטעמא דנהנה ומשום מלאכת מחשבת לא קאי אכולהו

4. There is another type of Misasek, which is thinking that a piece of fat is permitted fat, or he thought that the forbidden fat was spit in his mouth, and he proceeded to swallow it. Similar cases regarding Shabbos make one exempt, as the Pasuk says "Bah." However, here we cannot say he is exempt because he has pleasure. The reasons of having pleasure and Meleches Machsheves do not apply to every case (see the Tosfos Ha'Rosh who explains this last sentence at length).

ומה שפירש הקונטרס כאן מתעסק היינו נתכוין לחתוך את התלוש וחתך את המחובר ואיזהו חייב נתכוין לחתוך את זה וחתך זה וכסבור שהוא תלוש ונמצא מחובר

(f) Opinion #1: Rashi explains here that Misasek is intending to cut something that is already cut, and instead cutting a different item that is attached. A person is liable if he intended to cut an item that he thought was not attached and it happened to be attached.

אין נראה לפרש אלא נראה כדפרישית

(g) Opinion #2: This does not seem correct. The correct explanation is as I have explained (above).


תוספות ד"ה הרי העלם טומאה

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains that it is not the amount of "forgetting" that make one have to bring a Korban.)

תימה דהכא ולקמן בפרק שלישי (דף כו.) גבי העלם שבועה והעלם חפץ פשיט רב נחמן לחיובא ובפרק כלל גדול (שבת דף ע: ושם) גבי העלם שבת והעלם מלאכה פשיט לפטור

(a) Question: This is difficult. Our Gemara and the Gemara later (26a) both say regarding a case where a person forgot the oath that he made and didn't realize that the object was the object he forbade that he is liable to bring a Korban. In Shabbos (70b), the Gemara says that if a person both forgot that it was Shabbos and that this Melachah is forbidden, he only brings one Korban. (Rav Nachman's answer here and later is that being that one of these two "forgettings" makes him liable, he should bring one Korban. This implies that one is liable based on the amount of forbidden forgetting that he does. If someone forgets in two ways that make him liable, he should have to bring two Korbanos!)

וי"ל דלא דמי דהכא סברא הוא דליחייב כיון דאיכא נמי העלם טומאה

(b) Answer: It is possible to answer that the cases are incomparable. Here there is a logical reason that he is liable, as he also forgot that he was impure. [This is the only reason he is liable.]

אבל התם אין סברא לחייבו על כל אחת ואחת דכיון דבשגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות לא מיחייב אלא חדא השתא נמי דשגג במלאכה הרי יש כאן נמי שגגת שבת

1. However, regarding Shabbos, there is no reason to make a person liable to bring two Korbanos, one for forgetting Shabbos and one for forgetting this Melachah. Being that forgetting it was Shabbos but knowing that this Melachah is prohibited only makes one liable for one Korban, now that he forgot about this Melachah there is (no reason to make him bring another Korban) still the aspect of forgetting about Shabbos (that already makes him liable to bring a Korban).


תוספות ד"ה הרי העלם מקדש

(SUMMARY: Rabeinu Tam and Tosfos argue whether or not a regular Korban Chatas would be brought for Helem Mikdash and Helem Kodesh.)

אומר רבינו תם דלא מיפטר אלא מקרבן עולה ויורד אבל חטאת קבועה חייב דהא גמרינן מע"ז דכל שחייבים על זדונו כרת חייבים על שגגתו חטאת

(a) Opinion #1: Rabeinu Tam says that he is only exempt from a Korban Olah v'Yored. However, he is liable to bring a regular Chatas, as we derive from Avodah Zarah that whatever sin a person is liable to receive Kares for if he does it on purpose, he must bring a Chatas for if he does it accidentally.

והא דאמר בפ"ק (לעיל דף ב.) דעל שאין בה ידיעה בתחלה ששעיר החיצון מכפר אלמא לא מוקמינן ליה בחטאת קבועה דאי הוה ביה חטאת קבועה לא הוה חיצון מכפר אמידי דבר קרבן הוא

(b) Implied Question: The Mishnah earlier (2a) says that on Tumah where there is no prior knowledge, the Si'eer ha'Chitzon atones. This implies that he does not bring a regular Chatas. If he did have to bring a regular Chatas, the Chitzon would not atone, as it does not atone for a sin where the person must bring a Chatas. (How, then, can Rabeinu Tam say he must bring a Chatas in this case?)

התם ודאי מיפטר לגמרי שלא יהא חמור אין בה ויש בה מיש בה ויש בה

(c) Answer: There he is clearly exempt from a Chatas, as not having knowledge originally and then having knowledge afterward is clearly not as stringent as a (typical Korban Olah v'Yored) case where he both knew originally and afterwards.

ומיהו קשיא דלישנא דקאמר הכא דפטור משמע דפטור לגמרי

(d) Question #1: However, this is difficult. The term "Patur" used in our Mishnah (14b) implies that he totally exempt (and does not have to bring a Chatas either).

ועוד דלקמן פרק שלישי (דף כד:) גבי יש אוכל אכילה אחת דחיק לאשכוחי חטאת קבועה בטמא שאכל את הקדש ומוקי לה בנשיא וכר' אלעזר ולוקמה בהעלם קדש

(e) Question #2: Additionally, the Gemara later (24b) regarding the case of a person who eats one time (and is liable because of this to bring four Korbanos Chatas) insists that one must bring a Chatas if he is impure and he ate Kodesh. The Gemara there concludes that this is talking about a Nasi and is according to Rebbi Elazar (who says that a Nasi brings a Chatas, not an Olah v'Yored, for such a sin). Why don't we say that the case is simply where he forgot that this was Kodesh (as Rabeinu Tam would say that in this case as well one must bring a regular Chatas)?

על כן נראה דפטור לגמרי משום דהוי דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא לידון בדבר החדש כדאמרינן לקמן בפרק שלישי (דף כה:) גבי שבועת העדות

(f) Opinion #2: It therefore appears that he is totally exempt from bringing any Korban. This is because it is included in a general rule, and went out to be judged by a new thing, as stated later (25b) regarding Shevuas ha'Eidus.


תוספות ד"ה אמר רב אשי

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains how this ascertains what he forgot.)

תימה מנא ידעינן אי משום דא"ל טמא אתה ופירש דלמא אי הוו א"ל נמי מקדש הוא היה פירש ואי דא"ל מעיקרא מקדש הוא ולא פירש דלמא אי הוו א"ל נמי טמא אתה לא הוה פריש אלא השתא דא"ל תרוייהו פריש

(a) Question: This is difficult. How do we know that he left because they told him he was impure? Perhaps if they would have told him this is the Mikdash he would also leave! If we know this because they originally told him this was the Mikdash and he did not leave, perhaps if they would have originally told him he was impure he also would not have left! Maybe he only left after he found out both that he was in the Mikdash and that he was impure!

ונראה דרב אשי לא בא לפשוט הבעיא אלא בא לפרש שפעמים יש לברר איזה שכוח ממנו יותר כגון דנישייליה אי מחמת טומאה הוה מידכר אמקדש ומחמת מקדש לא הוה מידכר אטומאה א"כ הוי העלם טומאה בידו ואם להפך הוי [העלם] מקדש בידו ואם שניהם שכוחין בשוה בהא ודאי מבעיא לן

(b) Answer: It appears that Rav Ashi is not coming to answer the question on Rav Nachman. Rather, he is coming to explain that sometimes we have to find out what he forgot about the most. For example, we can ask him questions. If remembering he was impure would have made him remember about the Mikdash, but remembering he was in the Mikdash would not have reminded him that he was impure, he has forgotten his impurity. If the opposite is true, he has forgotten about the Mikdash. If they are equally forgotten, this is indeed a question.

ולגבי שבת בפרק כלל גדול (דף ע:) י"ס שכתוב בהן במילתיה דרב אשי אי משבת קפריש העלם שבת בידו ואי כי מודעי ליה אשבת אכתי צריך לאודועיה אמלאכות העלם מלאכה בידו

(c) Text #1: In Shabbos (70b), there are some Sefarim that have the text of Rav Ashi's statement as follows. "If he has separated himself from Shabbos, he has forgotten Shabbos. If when he is told about Shabbos he still must be reminded about the Melachos, he has forgotten about the Melachos."

ואין גיר' זו נכונה דאכתי צריך לפרש וכי מודעי ליה אמלאכה לא צריך לאודועיה אשבת לפי מה שפירשנו

(d) Question: This text is incorrect. The Gemara still has to explain that if he is told about the Melachos and he does not have to be told about Shabbos etc. as we have explained.

אלא גר' אי משבת קפריש אי משום מלאכה קפריש

(e) Text #2: Rather, the correct text is, "If he forgot Shabbos or if he forgot the Melachos."

ועוד נראה לפרש בענין אחר אי משום טומאה קפריש אפי' אם הודיעוהו טומאה באחרונה דאע"ג דאילו הודיעוהו בתחלה לא הוה פריש חשיב פריש מחמת טומאה כיון דקרבן ע"י בתרייתא קאתי ואי א"ל מקדש הוא ופריש ידיעה בתרייתא דמקדש הוא ופטור

(f) Answer #2: It is also possible to explain this in a different way. "If he forgot about the impurity" could mean that even if they told him about the impurity after telling him about the Mikdash, it could still be the main thing he forgot. This is despite the fact that if they would have told him this originally he might not have separated. The reason for this is that the second piece of information causes the Korban. If he was told it is the Mikdash and he separated, this second piece of information regarding the Mikdash made him separate, and he is therefore exempt.

וכענין זה יש לפרש ההיא דלקמן (דף כו.) גבי העלם שבועה והעלם חפץ וההיא דשבת

1. One can explain the Gemara in Shabbos (70b) and the Gemara later (26a) regarding forgetting about the oath and the object of the oath in the same fashion.


תוספות ד"ה הלך

(SUMMARY: Tosfos notes that the paths must be in a public domain.)

אי ברה"י איירי בחד נמי חייב דספק טומאה ברה"י ספיקו טמא אבל הכא איירי ברה"ר דמוקמינא ליה בחזקת טהרה

(a) Explanation: If these paths are in a private domain, even if he traveled on one of them he would be liable, as a doubt regarding impurity in the private domain is ruled as being impure (according to Torah law, as is apparent in Sotah 28b). However, the case here is where the paths are in the public domain, and are therefore (each one on its own is) considered to have a status of being pure.



תוספות ד"ה עשו

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains how this Gemara is different from an earlier Gemara where we did not say doubtful knowledge is considered knowledge.)

לא דמי לנגע בכעדשה דריש פירקא (דף יד:) ולא ידע אי כזית מטמא אי בכעדשה מטמא

(a) Implied Question: This is not similar to the case quoted earlier (14b) where a person touched a piece of Sheretz, and he did not know whether the amount of a Sheretz that makes one impure is an amount the size of an olive or an amount the size of a lentil. (Why don't we say there that doubtful knowledge is considered knowledge?)

דהתם הוא מסופק אי שייכא כלל טומאה במה שנגע אבל הכא פשיטא ליה דאיכא טומאה הלכך הוי ליה ידיעה טפי

(b) Answer: In that case he does not know if there is any impurity in his touching this amount of Sheretz. However, here it is obvious there is impurity (being that he went on both paths). This is considered a higher degree of knowledge.


תוספות ד"ה כאן

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains why there is no contradiction in Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah's opinion according to Reish Lakish.)

תימה לר"ל תיקשה דר"ש בן יהודה אדרבי שמעון בן יהודה דהכא לא פליג ארבי אלא לענין אשם תלוי אבל בהא דמחלקות לחטאות מודה ולעיל פטר גבי מקדש דלא חשיב ליה ידיעה

(a) Question: This is difficult. According to Reish Lakish, the Gemara should ask that Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah contradicts himself! In our Gemara, Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah only argues on Rebbi regarding the bringing of an Asham Taluy. However, regarding this type of knowledge separating obligations to bring a Chatas, he agrees with Rebbi that multiple Chataos are required. Earlier, Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah agreed regarding going into the Beis Hamikdash when impure that this is not considered knowing!

ואם יש לחלק ולומר דגבי מקדש בעינן ידיעה מעלייתא טפי משום דבעינן ידיעה בתחלה ודאית דומיא דידיעה בתרייתא

1. If it is possible to differentiate that regarding the Mikdash more concrete knowledge is needed because he must have clear original knowledge in order to be liable (as opposed to forbidden fat where no original knowledge is required), similar to his clear knowledge after the fact.

א"כ היכי פריך מר"ל אר"ל

2. If this was an answer, how could the Gemara ask a similar question on Reish Lakish? (This should be a way to avoid the question on Reish Lakish as well!)

ובדוחק י"ל דהכי פריך אמאי מוקי לה כרבי ישמעאל לוקמה כרבי ולימא דסבירא ליה דאין חילוק בין ידיעה המחלקת לחטאת ובין ידיעה דמקדש ופליג אדרבי שמעון בן יהודה

(b) Answer: When pressed we can answer that the question on Reish Lakish is as follows. Why establish that this is according to Rebbi Yishmael? Why don't we establish that it is according to Rebbi, and that Rebbi holds that there is no difference between the type of knowledge required for bringing two Chataos, and the knowledge required for liability due to impurity in the Mikdash? We could then establish that this argues on Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah.


תוספות ד"ה נוקמה

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains why the Gemara does not take into account Rebbi's opinion that knowledge of the situation is not even required.)

תימה דבלא ההיא דידיעת ספק מחלקת תקשה ליה נוקמה כרבי דאמר ידיעת בית רבו שמה ידיעה

(a) Question #1: This is difficult. Without the concept that doubtful knowledge can split two sins into an obligation to bring two separate Chataos, the Gemara should still be able to ask its question. Why don't we say this is Rebbi because he is the one who holds that knowing that something is forbidden due to having learned the law is considered sufficient knowledge (to create an obligation to bring a Korban)?

ועוד דמטעם ספק ידיעה לא מצי לאוקמה כרבי דהא איהו לא בעי ידיעה כלל

(b) Question #2: Additionally, one should not be able to establish the Beraisa as being according to Rebbi because he holds that this doubtful knowledge is sufficient, as Rebbi does not even hold one needs actual knowledge! (Knowing the law is enough.)

וי"ל שזה לא היה חידוש אי הוה מוקי לה כרבי דלא בעי אלא ידיעת בית רבו אלא הכי פריך דאפילו כמאן דבעי ידיעה גמורה מצי לאוקומה וכרבי דאמר ידיעות ספק מחלקות

(c) Answer: It is possible to answer that it would not be novel to suggest that the Mishnah is according to Rebbi, as he only requires knowing the law. However, the Gemara is asking the following question. Even according to the opinion that we do require knowing the situation, we can still establish the Beraisa is according to Rebbi based on his opinion that doubtful knowledge is enough to divide the two obligations.


תוספות ד"ה שבועות

(SUMMARY: Tosfos notes that the Mishnah is not quoted exactly as it appears in Nedarim.)

משנה היא בפרק ב' דנדרים (דף טז.)

(a) Observation: This is a Mishnah in Nedarim (16a).

אף ע"ג דהתם קתני השבועה [הא שבועה] שאוכל לך והכא קתני שבועה

(b) Implied Question: This is despite the fact that (it does not seem to be that Mishnah because) the Mishnah there says, "Ha Shevuah that I will give you to eat" and our Gemara quotes "Shevuah." (If it is the Mishnah in Nedarim, why isn't it quoted accurately?)

דרך הגמרא לקצר המשנה שהביא

(c) Answer: It is normal for the Gemara to shorten Mishnayos that it quotes.

ואין חילוק בין שבועה להשבועה [הא שבועה] דאהאי מתני' דהתם נמי פריך ממתני' דהכא בגמ' ומשני כי הכא

1. There is no difference between the words "Shevuah" and "Ha Shevuah" in this context, as is apparent from the fact that the Gemara there also asks a question from our Mishnah, and gives the same answer.

ול"ג בסמוך ברייתא במסרבין בו לאכול

(d) Text #1: We do not have the text in our Gemara, "the Beraisa is when they are pestering him to eat."

דאין לומר שהביא ברייתא משום דלא קתני השבועה [הא שבועה] דלא ה"ל למיפרך מברייתא כיון דמצי למיפרך ממתני'

(e) Question: It is not reasonable to say that the Gemara quoted a Beraisa just because it does not say "Ha Shevuah." There is no reason the Gemara should have asked this question from a Beraisa over a Mishnah.

אלא גר' התם במסרבין

(f) Text #2: Rather, the text is, "There the case is that they were pestering that he eat."


תוספות ד"ה לא שבועה

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains how this Mishnah can indeed be according to Rebbi Meir.)

דמשמע הא מה שאוכל לך יהא באיסור שבועה

(a) Explanation: This implies that whatever I do eat from you should be upon me as forbidden by an oath.

ואע"ג דבפ"ב דנדרים (שם) מוקי רישא דהך משנה כר"מ ור"מ לית ליה מכלל לאו אתה שומע הן גבי נדרים כדאמרינן ספ"ק דנדרים (דף יג:)

(b) Implied Question: This is despite the fact that in Nedarim (16a) the first part of this Mishnah is established as being according to the opinion of Rebbi Meir. Rebbi Meir does not hold that when a person says a negative statement that the positive is also valid regarding Nedarim, as stated in Nedarim (13b). (Accordingly, how can he hold that an oath stated in the negative makes the positive into a valid oath?)

יש חילוק בין שבועה לנדרים כמו שאפרש בס"פ שבועת העדות (דף לו: ד"ה ה"ג) בע"ה

(c) Answer: There is a difference between Shevuos and Nedarim (which answers this question because Rebbi Meir only holds this way regarding Nedarim not Shevuos), as I will explain later (36b, DH HACHI GARSINAN) with the help of Hash-m.