PESACHIM 48 (1 Elul) - Dedicated l'Iluy Nishmas Esther Chaya Rayzel (Friedman) bas Gershon Eliezer (Yahrzeit: 30 Av, Yom Kevurah: 1 Elul) by her daughter and son-in-law, Jeri and Eli Turkel of Raanana, Israel. Esther Friedman was a woman of valor who was devoted to her family and gave of herself unstintingly, inspiring all those around her.
PESACHIM 48 (6 Adar) - dedicated by the Feldman family in memory of their father, the Tzadik Harav Yisrael Azriel ben Harav Chaim (Feldman) of Milwaukee.

QUESTION: The Gemara says that it is possible for a person to transgress five prohibitions (and receive five sets of Malkus) by burning the wood of Hekdesh (1), in order to cook a Gid ha'Nasheh on Yom Tov (2), with milk (3), and eating it (4 and 5).
However, if the wood is Hekdesh, then he should be liable for transgressing a sixth prohibition as well -- he benefits from Hekdesh (Me'ilah). Why does the Gemara not ask this question?
ANSWER: TOSFOS in Makos (22a, DH Ela Hacha) and TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ here answer that it is possible to derive benefit from the wood of Hekdesh without transgressing the Isur of Me'ilah, such as by using less than a Shaveh Perutah's worth of Hekdesh. The prohibition against burning Hekdesh, however, applies to even less than a Shaveh Perutah.
QUESTION: Rami bar Chama suggests that the dispute between Rabah and Rav Chisda whether we apply the principle of "Ho'il" is the same as the dispute between Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Yehoshua in the Mishnah (end of 46a). Rebbi Eliezer permits one to bake dough into Matzos before he separates Chalah, while Rebbi Yehoshua does not. Rabah, who applies "Ho'il" ("since guests might come..."), follows the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer, who applies "Ho'il" to permit one to bake Matzos on Yom Tov ("since he could separate Chalah from each loaf separately..."). Rav Chisda, who does not apply "Ho'il," follows the opinion of Rebbi Yehoshua, who maintains that the logic of "Ho'il" does not permit one to bake Matzos on Yom Tov.
The Gemara refutes Rami bar Chama's suggestion. Perhaps Rebbi Eliezer does not agree with Rabah's ruling, but he maintains that "Ho'il" does not apply to permit one to bake on Yom Tov for the weekday, because the host has not yet invited any guests to his home.
Similarly, Rebbi Yehoshua does not necessarily agree with Rav Chisda's ruling, but rather he agrees with Rabah that "Ho'il" does apply to permit one to bake on Yom Tov for the weekday. In Rabah's case, the dish that he cooked is fit for guests and it is common for guests to come, while in Rebbi Yehoshua's case, it is unusual to separate a small piece of Chalah from each loaf (and thus one of the loaves is definitely forbidden to be eaten).
RASHI (DH Aval Hacha) quotes an explanation that the principle of "Ho'il" can be applied to forbid one from owning Chalah which is Chametz on Pesach. Although the Chalah does not legally belong to him once he separates it from the dough, since ("Ho'il") he can revoke its status of Chalah (through "She'eilah") and thus become the true owner of the Chametz, it is considered his even now.
Rashi disagrees and says that according to this explanation, one should be liable for Bal Yera'eh even when he has Chametz of Hekdesh in his possession, since ("Ho'il") if he wants, he can redeem it and make the Chametz his. The Gemara (5b), though, clearly states that one does not transgress Bal Yera'eh when he has Chametz of Hekdesh in his possession.
Why does Rashi ask that the logic of "Ho'il" should apply to Hekdesh because one can redeem it? He should ask that "Ho'il" should apply to Hekdesh simply because She'eilah applies to Hekdesh (just as it applies to Chalah); one can revoke the status of Hekdesh from an item and make it his. (TOSFOS YOM TOV)
(a) The TOSFOS YOM TOV answers that in Nazir (9a), Rebbi Eliezer, who is the Tana of the Mishnah here, states that "Ein She'eilah l'Hekdesh" -- the status of Hekdesh of an item cannot be revoked. Therefore, Rashi has no choice but to explain that "Ho'il" should apply to Hekdesh because it can be redeemed.
(b) The RASHASH answers that She'eilah works for Hekdesh only before the Gizbar (the treasurer of the funds of the Beis ha'Mikdash) receives the item. After the Gizbar receives the item, one may redeem the item, but he cannot revoke the status of Hekdesh from it through She'eilah (see Tosfos to 46b, DH Ho'il #2). Accordingly, Rashi mentions that one may redeem Hekdesh, because redemption is the way in which one may revoke the status of Hekdesh in any situation, both before and after it has been given to the Gizbar.
(c) TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ points out that the mechanism of "Ho'il" will put the item of Hekdesh into one's possession due to his ability to do She'eilah only for the person who consecrated the item as Hekdesh. If one person consecrated the Chametz and made it Hekdesh, and now the Chametz is in someone else's possession, the Chametz will not be considered his due to "Ho'il" and the original owner's ability to do She'eilah. It will be considered his only due to the "Ho'il" that Rashi here mentions -- he has the ability to redeem the item from Hekdesh. Rashi's question is that Hekdesh should be forbidden to have in one's home during Pesach, even for the person who did not consecrate it.
Based on this explanation, Rabeinu Peretz suggests an answer to Rashi's question on the explanation that Rashi quotes. Perhaps "Ho'il" applies (and puts the Chametz of Hekdesh into one's possession on Pesach) only when one is able to do She'eilah and revoke the status of Hekdesh. "Ho'il" does not apply when one is able to redeem the Chametz of Hekdesh. The reason for this, Rabeinu Peretz suggests, is because Pidyon (redemption of Hekdesh) requires that money be given to the Beis ha'Mikdash in exchange for the Hekdesh. This additional requirement puts the Hekdesh even farther away from his possession, and the logic of "Ho'il" will not be able to make it his. (Tosfos (46b) suggests other ways to justify the explanation quoted by Rashi.)
The TOSFOS HA'ROSH also differentiates between Pidyon and She'eilah, but based on another reason. When one redeems Hekdesh which is Chametz, only at the moment that he redeems it does it become his property, and, if it is Pesach, at that moment he must be concerned about the Isur of owning Chametz. However, before he redeems it he does nothing wrong by having Chametz of Hekdesh in his possession. In such a situation, "Ho'il" cannot make the Chametz his; what one might do later does not affect the status of the Hekdesh now.
In contrast, when one revokes the status of Chalah through She'eilah, the Chalah-status is removed retroactively. When one does She'eilah, the dough is considered to have been his property retroactively, from the time that it was separated as Chalah. When he baked the Chalah into Chametz, he actually baked his own Chametz. Only in such a case does "Ho'il" cause the Chametz to become his even before he does She'eilah on it.