Shalom Rabbi Kornfeld,
I hope you and your family are all in good health. As always, thanks so much for the Daf Yomi Advancement Forum.
Question about the "lulov holder" discussed on Sukkah 37a } http://dafyomi.co.il/sukah/insites/su-dt-037.htm
>>1) A LULAV-HOLDER
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses whether one must hold the Lulav in his bare hand, or whether he may use a Lulav-holder with which to grasp the Lulav. Rabah maintains that one may not use a Lulav-holder, because it is considered a Chatzitzah (intervention) between his hand and the Lulav. The Torah requires that one grasp the Lulav with a "Lekichah Tamah" (a "complete grasp"), and thus one cannot fulfill the Mitzvah when there is a Chatzitzah. Rava argues and says that a Lulav-holder is not a Chatzitzah, because it is used for the purpose of beautifying the Mitzvah.
The Gemara continues and discusses whether one may hold a Lulav with a handkerchief. RASHI explains that the question is whether one is permitted to wrap the handkerchief around one's hand and hold the Lulav with it. Rabah says that one may not hold the Lulav in such a way, because it is not a "Lekichah Tamah." Rava argues and says that one may hold the Lulav with a handkerchief, because "Lekichah Al Yedei Davar Acher Shemah Lekichah" -- when one holds an object by the way of something else, he is considered as though he is holding the object itself.
In the Gemara's first discussion (about a Lulav-holder), it is clear that even Rava would agree that an intervening item that does not serve to beautify the Mitzvah is considered a Chatzitzah. Why, then, does he not consider a handkerchief a Chatzitzah (but only a "Lekichah Al Yedei Davar Acher")? Since it does not serve to beautify the Mitzvah, Rava should agree that it is considered a Chatzitzah.
Moreover, the Gemara in Pesachim (57a) relates that a sinful Kohen by the name of Yissachar Ish Kefar Barka'i was punished because he performed the Avodah in the Beis ha'Mikdash while he wore gloves. Rashi there explains that the gloves were a Chatzitzah and thus disqualified the Avodah. What is the difference between one who holds the Lulav while he wears a handkerchief around his hand (which is not considered a Chatzitzah according to Rava) and one who performs the Avodah while he wears a glove? (TOSFOS DH d'Ba'ina)
ANSWERS:
(a) In his first answer, TOSFOS (DH d'Ba'ina) suggests that a handkerchief differs from a Lulav-holder in the following way. Since the handkerchief is wrapped around one's hand (and not around the Lulav), it serves the hand and not the Lulav. It is considered subordinate to (and part of) the hand and thus it is not a Chatzitzah.
Why, then, was Yissachar Ish Kefar Barka'i punished because he wore a glove during the Avodah? His glove served his hand and should not have been considered a Chatzitzah. Tosfos answers that he was not punished for performing the Avodah with a Chatzitzah, but rather for disgracing the Avodah by showing that he did not want to touch it directly with his hands.
The RITVA quotes the RAMBAN who answers the question from the case of Yissachar Ish Kefar Barka'i differently. He asserts that the Gemara here is not discussing the question of Chatzitzah at all. There is no concern for a Chatzitzah when one holds a Lulav. Even Rabah, who does not permit one to hold a Lulav with a handkerchief, does not call it a Chatzitzah; he says only that it is not a "Lekichah Tamah."
(In the previous case, although Rabah says that a Lulav-holder is a Chatzitzah, he means that it is not a proper Lekichah, as Rashi there explains. He does not mean that a Chatzitzah itself invalidates one's fulfillment of the Mitzvah of Lulav. However, when the Gemara later (37b) mentions Chatzitzah, it certainly refers to the normal problem of Chatzitzah, because the rules of "Min b'Mino Eino Chotzetz" would not be appropriate to the discussion there if the problem with a Chatzitzah was only that it is not a "Lekichah Tamah." The difference between the Gemara here and the Gemara later is that the Gemara here refers to an intervening object between one's hand and the Lulav . The Gemara there refers to an intervening object between one's hand and the other Minim .)
When one holds the Lulav, a Chatzitzah itself is not a Pesul. Rather, the Torah requires a "Lekichah Tamah." The Gemara here inquires whether something that is wrapped around one's hand when he holds the Lulav is considered a proper Lekichah. In the case in Pesachim, the sinful Kohen was punished because the Avodah may not be done with a Chatzitzah. Even though his glove was serving his hand, it was a Chatzitzah between his hand and the Avodah. In contrast, when one holds a Lulav, there is no requirement that there be no Chatzitzah, but that there be a "Lekichah Tamah." The only case of a Lekichah that is not "Tamah" is where there is an object between one's hand and the Lulav that neither serves the hand (and thus is not Batel to it) nor beautifies the Lulav.
(b) Tosfos (ibid.) eventually rejects this explanation. He answers instead that an object is considered a Chatzitzah between one's hand and the Lulav only when the object is necessary. A Lulav-holder is necessary because it holds the Lulav together with the other Minim, and without it the Arba'as ha'Minim would not be bound together. In contrast, an object which is extraneous, such as a glove, is not considered a Chatzitzah. (Perhaps the logic behind this answer is the principle, "Kol ha'Ra'uy l'Bilah, Ein Bilah Me'akeves Bo"; since the Lulav does not need that object (it is possible to remove it and still fulfill the Mitzvah properly), it is not considered a Chatzitzah.)
Tosfos also rejects this explanation on logical grounds. Tosfos argues (and proves from Yoma 58a) that if the object is not necessary for the Lulav, then, on the contrary, it certainly should be considered a Chatzitzah.
(c) Tosfos concludes that in the case of one who holds a Lulav with a handkerchief, the handkerchief is not wrapped around his hand or around the Lulav. Rather, the handkerchief is arranged in such a way that it serves as a holder for the Lulav: the handkerchief holds the Lulav, while the person's hand holds the handkerchief. (For example, he loops the handkerchief around the Lulav and gathers the two sides of the handkerchief and twists them together. He thereby forms a handle which he holds in his hand.) In this case, the handkerchief actually assists the hand to hold the Lulav, and it does not merely protect the hand. Consequently, with regard to the act of Lekichah (holding the Lulav), the handkerchief is considered an extension of the hand and is not a Chatzitzah.<<
When you speak of the inyan of Min B'mino Aino Chotzaitz by the lulov holder, I assume you mean the lulov itself: meaning, that the holder itself is made from lulov leaves so it's "min b'mino" to the lulov itself, so it's not a chatziza to your hand holding it.
But what about the Hadassim and Aravot ? When your hand is holding the lulov holder, that holder is NOT the same min as either the Hadassim nor the Aravot. So it's not min b'mino. So why isn't that holder a chatzitza to the Hadassim and Aravot? Your hand isn't touching the Hadassim and Aravot!
If you would email me an answer, I'd appreciate it.
Thanks,
Amiel Naiman
Chicago, IL USA
Hi Amiel,
Thank you for your wonderful question. The importance of your question is not only regarding the understanding of this specific sugya, but it really has relevance to understanding the term of 'Min Be'mino aino chotzetz' altogether. For example, we find this rule too in the halachos of tvilah (immersion) of a vessel or a person in a mikvah, or in different halachot in the work in beit hamikdash.
Before I answer your question, let us turn the page to daf 37b. The gemara brings a third case of dispute between Raba and Rava, in a case that a person tied the hadassim and aravot together, and then, stuck the Lulav into the package, while disconnecting leaves from the hadassim or the aravot and now they might be a chatzitzah, as they are just leaves, and not part of the mitzvah. The gemara says that according to Rava, since 'min bemino' is not a chatzitzah, that is not a problem. We see again, that all the three species, are considered one 'min' as far as the rules of chatzitzah concern, and again, your question arises, why is that.
(BTW, the Kapos Tmarim on this sugya says, that the reason the gemara discusses two cases, one as I brought before, that one should or should not stuff his lulav into the package of his hadassim and aravot, and then another case of someone who tied together all three species and now cut his lulav on the bottom, leaving lulav leaves beween his hands and the three species, to teach us that Rava holds that these cases are not a chatzitzah, even if it is the leaves of the 'min' that isn't the one of the holder. I would also add, that lots of people are used to using a holder called a 'koishiklach', and in that case, not only is the holder from a different type, but also, they put the hadassim and aravot alone in a holder made of lulav leaves, which is even harder to understand!).
Let us examine one case in masechet Yuma (58b). The gemara discusses a case of a cohen who is about to accept the blood coming from a sacrifice that was just slaughtered. This acceptance, is considered an 'Avoda', one of the services of the sacrifice, that the cohen has to do according to the strict rules assigned to this service. The blood has to be accepted in a holy vessel called a 'mizrak'. What if the cohen put the mizrak into another mizrak, and accepted the blood into the inner vessel?
The Achronim clarify, what is the idea behind the rule that two objects from the same material are not considered a chatziza. Rav Elchonon Wasserman (kovetz hearos, hosafos d, d"h sham) seems to say that the reasoning is that both mizrakim, or in our case, the lulav and the lulav holder made from the same material, the 'extra' holder or mizrak, is Batel to the lulav or main mizrak, and they turn as if they are united, so it os as if the hand is actually touching the lulav, or is it like we find in other achronim (Tiferes Yisroel on mishnayos Mikvaos 8), who understand that the extra object is just considered as if it isn't there, but still, it is not considered as if the hand is touching the lulav, but we just do not consider the lulav holder as anything significant, and we just regard it as if it was not here.
Now to your question. You are asking, why a holder made of lulav leaves, is considered the same specie as the hadassim and aravot.
Now, if we consider the holder as one piece with the lulav, the reason it is not a chatziza, is not a special privilege of the lulav, but rather it is just considered as part of one of the species, and there is no difference which one, and whichever material the holder is made of, as long as it is as one of the three, is can unify with its twin material from the same specie.
On the other hand, if the reasoning of the rule is just because we consider the extra object as it is as if it is not there, the question is much stronger! why should we consider the holder as if it is not there, just because it is the same material as one of the three species while just as well, it is not the same material as the other two. Why should we consider it as if it is not here?
We can answer this according to the gemara in the end of the sugya, that the bracha (blessing) on the mitzvah of the four minim, mentions specifically the Lulav (Al Netilas Lulav) rather than the etrog or any of the other species, since it is the tallest of them all.
We can say now, that if the holder is made of lulav leaves, even if the reasoning for the halacha that it is not 'chotzetz' because it is considered as if the holder is not here, that is because the main and most important specie in this 'mitzvah package', is the lulav. Although according to this, if the holder was made somehow out of hadassim or aravot, it would still be a chatzitzah.
Aharon Steiner