1)

(a)How is it possible to rule both like Rav (who establishes a Kol [a rumor] only when there are witnesses, and like Rebbi (who establishes it even when there are none)?

(b)Abaye's wise foster-mother told him that 'Dumi d'Masa Yoma u'Palga'. Dumi d'Masa might mean the Kol pertaining to the suspected sinners of the town. What else might it mean?

(c)The Kol must have been constant during that time and must not have stopped. When does it not matter even if it did stop for a brief while in the middle?

(d)Which other condition does a Kol require before it can be taken seriously?

1)

(a)It possible to rule both like Rav (who establishes a Kol [a rumor] only when there are witnesses, and like Rebbi (who establishes it even when there are none) - by establishing Rav by a Kol that was canceled by a second Kol stating that the first one was false (though this is not the opinion of Rav himself - see Mahadura Basra).

(b)Abaye's wise foster-mother told him that 'Dumi d'Masa Yoma u'Palga'. Dumi d'Masa either means the Kol pertaining to the suspected sinners of the town - or rumors that are no more than conjectures.

(c)The Kol must have been constant during that time and must not have stopped in the middle - unless it was stopped out of fear, in which case we will take it seriously even if it did.

(d)The man concerned must also have no enemies - otherwise one can assume that it is his enemies who spread the Kol in the first place.

2)

(a)Why does the Mishnah say in Nedarim that someone may never take his wife back if he divorces her because of ...

1. ... vows that she took whilst they were married ?

2. ... a bad name that she has acquired for herself?

(b)On what grounds did Rabah bar Rav Huna object to Rabah bar Rav Nachman, who learns from our Mishnah ('Af-al-Pi she'Kanas, Yotzi') that in the event that he did take her back, he is obligated to divorce her?

(c)How did Rabah bar Rav Nachman justify his comparison?

(d)On what grounds do we conclude that, despite the similarity between the two sets of cases, in the Mishnah in Nedarim, the husband may well be permitted to remain with his wife if he actually took her back illegally, even though in our Mishnah he is not)?

2)

(a)The Mishnah says in Nedarim that someone may never take his wife back if he divorces her because of ...

1. ... vows that she took whilst they were married - since we are afraid that, if he could, she may nullify those vows after she re-marries and has children from her second husband, and that her ex-husband will then claim that, had he known that her vows could be nullified, he would never have divorced her. In so doing, he nullifies the Get he gave her retroactively, rendering the sons from her second husband Mamzerim. So we advise him to check before divorcing her whether her vows cannot be nullified, because once he has divorced he, he will be unable to take her back.

2. ... a bad name that she has acquired for herself - because we are afraid that, after she marries again, a second Kol will negate the first one, and her ex-husband will then present the same argument as in the previous case.

(b)Rabah bar Rav Huna objected to Rabah bar Rav Nachman, who learns from our Mishnah ('Af-al-Pi she'Kanas, Yotzi') that in the event that he did take her back, he is obligated to divorce her - on the grounds that, in our Mishnah, it was the Beis-Din who forced the husband to divorce the woman in the first place (as Rav learned above) which is the reason why if the suspected adulterer did marry her, he must divorce her immediately; whereas in the Mishnah in Nedarim, it was the husband who divorced his wife of his own volition, so why should he not take her back?

(c)Rabah bar Rav Nachman justified his comparison - by establishing the Mishnah too, by when the husband divorced his wife of his own volition (not like Rav explained).

(d)We conclude that, despite the similarity between the two sets of cases, in the Mishnah in Nedarim, the husband may well be permitted to remain with his wife if he actually took her back illegally, even though in our Mishnah he is not) - because in the case in our Mishnah, by marrying the woman with whom he had an affair, he substantiates the Kol, whereas in the other two cases, it looks more as if he took her back because he discovered that the Kol in either case was unfounded.

3)

(a)We learned in Gitin that if someone brings a Get from overseas to Eretz Yisrael, he is obligated to state 'be'Fanai Nichtav uv'Fanai Nechtam'. Why is that?

(b)Why is he then forbidden to marry the woman whose Get he brought, after her divorce?

(c)The Tana also prohibits a witness who testifies that a woman's husband died, or that he (either alone or together with others) killed him, from marrying the man's wife. What does Rebbi Yehudah say?

3)

(a)We learned in Gitin that if someone brings a Get from overseas to Eretz Yisrael, he is obligated to state 'b'Fanai Nichtav uv'Fanai Nechtam' - because the Sofrim in Chutz la'Aretz are not expert in writing Gitin accurately.

(b)He is also forbidden to marry the woman whose Get he brought, after her divorce - because, seeing as she is becoming divorced through him, it looks very much as if he was helping the divorce to become effective, in order to marry her.

(c)The Tana also prohibits a witness who testifies that a woman's husband died, or that he (either alone or together with others) killed him, from marrying the man's wife. According to Rebbi Yehudah - he is believed to say that he killed him together with others (as will be explained in the Sugya), but not to say that he killed him on his own.

4)

(a)Our Mishnah forbids the witness who brings the Get from Chutz la'Aretz to marry the woman, from which we can infer that if he brings it from one town in Eretz Yisrael to another, he may. Why is that?

(b)What is the real reason that Chazal permitted a woman to get married on the basis of the testimony of only one witness who testified that her husband died?

(c)Then why is the man who brings a Get in Eretz Yisrael permitted to marry the woman after the divorce, whereas the witness who testifies that her husband died, is not (seeing as in neither case, do we really rely on the single witnesses' testimony)?

(d)What other Halachic difference between the two cases based on the same distinction?

4)

(a)Our Mishnah forbids the witness who brings the Get from Chutz la'Aretz to marry the woman, from which we can infer that if he brings it from one town in Eretz Yisrael to another, he may - because (due to the fact that the Sofrim in Eretz Yisrael are experts in writing Gitin, the Sheli'ach who brought the Get did not need to testify that the Get was written and sealed in his presence.

(b)The real reason that Chazal permitted a woman to get married on the basis of the testimony of only one witness (who testified that her husband died) - is because the woman is then expected to make extensive inquiries of her own before getting married again.

(c)The reason that the man who brings a Get in Eretz Yisrael is nevertheless permitted to marry the woman after the divorce, whereas the witness who testifies that her husband died, is not (despite the fact that, in neither case, do we really rely on the single witnesses' testimony) is - because in the former case, there is a document which bears out his testimony (so that his testimony does not even appear to be instrumental in the woman's divorce), whereas in the latter case, she becomes free to marry entirely on the basis of the witnesses' testimony, and it looks as if it is through him that she is getting married.

(d)Another Halachic difference between the two cases based on the distinction is - the fact that even women who are not believed to testify that the woman's husband died, are believed to bring a woman's Get from one town to another.

5)

(a)According to Rav Yosef, if a man testifies together with a second witness that someone raped him, he is believed to have the man stoned, but not if he claims that he was a willing partner. Why is that?

(b)We query the suggestion that our Mishnah, which believes the witness who testified that he killed the woman's husband, is different because we are lenient by Eidus Ishah, on the basis of Rav Menasheh's statement. What did Rav Menasheh say?

(c)According to Rav Yosef, Rav Menasheh will then hold like Rebbi Yehudah, who does not believe the witness who testifies that he killed the woman's husband. We reconcile him with the Rabanan however, by establishing their opinion in our Mishnah like Rava, who disagrees with Rav Yosef. What does Rava say?

(d)Then when do we apply the principle 'Hoda'as Ba'al Din k'Me'ah Eidim Dami'?

5)

(a)According to Rav Yosef, if a man testifies together with a second witness that someone raped him, he is believed to have the man stoned, but not if he claims that he was a willing partner - because according to his own testimony, he is a Rasha, and a Rasha is not believed to testify (as the Torah writes in Mishpatim).

(b)We refute the suggestion that our Mishnah, which believes the witness who testified that he killed the woman's husband, is different because we are lenient by Eidus Ishah, on the basis of Rav Menasheh - who said that a Gazlan d'Rabanan (such as a gambler and all of the cases listed in the Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah) is Kasher to testify to permit a woman to get married, whereas a Gazlan d'Oraisa is Pasul (demonstrating that Eidus Ishah is no different than other area of Halachah).

(c)According to Rav Yosef, Rav Menasheh will then hold like Rebbi Yehudah, who does not believe the witness who testifies that he killed the woman's husband. We reconcile Rav Menasheh with the Rabanan however, by establishing their opinion in our Mishnah like Rava (who disagrees with Rav Yosef, and ) - who says that, seeing as a person is a close relative to himself, he is not believed in testimony that concerns himself. Consequently, when he testifies that someone had relations with him with his consent, he is believed regarding his main testimony, but not what he testifies with regard to himself.

(d)We confine the principle 'Hoda'as Ba'al-Din k'Mei'ah Eidim Dami' - to money matters, but not to fines, punishments (e.g. Malkus) or invalidating oneself).

25b----------------------------------------25b

6)

(a)How do we reconcile Rav Yosef, who maintains that a person who claims that someone had relations with him with his consent, disqualifies himself, with the Rabanan in our Mishnah?

(b)How does Rav Yosef then explain Rav Menasheh?

6)

(a)We reconcile Rav Yosef, who maintains that a person who claims that someone had relations with him with his consent, disqualifies himself, with the Rabanan in our Mishnah - by attributing their lenient ruling there to Chazal's lenient approach by Eidus Ishah, because of Iguna.

(b)In his opinion - Rav Menasheh, who does not make any concessions by Eidus Ishah, holds like Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah.

7)

(a)Rebbi Yehudah's distinction between 'Haragti' and 'Haragnuhu' is senseless. What does he mean when he says that 'Haragnuhu' is believed (see also Tosfos DH 'b'Omer')?

(b)In the Beraisa that supports this explanation, what did Rebbi Yehudah retort to the Rabanan, when they quoted him the story of the robber who, as he was being taken out to be killed, testified that he had killed the wife of Shimon ben Kohen, concluding that the Rabanan of that time believed him?

(c)If, as Rebbi Yehudah maintained, he had only participated in the robbing, but not in the murder, then why did he receive the death-penalty?

7)

(a)Rebbi Yehudah's distinction between 'Haragti' and 'Haragnuhu' is senseless. When he says that 'Haragnuhu' is believed - he means, not that they killed the man together with others (which is no different than saying that he killed him on his own), but that he was with the murderers when they killed him.

(b)In the Beraisa that supports this explanation, when the Rabanan quoted him the story of the robber who, as he was being taken out to be killed, testified that he had killed the wife of Shimon ben Kohen, concluding that the Rabanan of that time believed him - Rebbi Yehudah retorted by emending the robber's words to a statement that he was with the robbers when they murdered the victim.

(c)In spite of the fact that according to Rebbi Yehudah, the robber had only participated in the robbing, but not in the murder, he received the death-penalty - because it was a court of Nochri judges who had judged him, who had failed to clarify his guilt before sentencing him.

8)

(a)A Chacham who was unable to find justification for nullifying a woman's vow, as a result of which her husband divorced her, is forbidden to marry her. Why then, is a Dayan in whose presence a girl performed Mi'un or Chalitzah, subsequently permitted to marry her?

(b)We infer from our Mishnah, that had the same Chacham succeeded in nullifying the woman's vow, he would have been permitted to marry her in the event of her husband subsequently dying or divorcing her. This cannot be referring to one of three Dayanim, who are permitted to do so in any case, but to a single Dayan. Since when can one Dayan nullify vows?

8)

(a)A Chacham who was unable to find justification for nullifying a woman's vow, as a result of which her husband divorced her, is forbidden to marry her. A Dayan, on the other hand, in whose presence a girl performed Mi'un or Chalitzah, is subsequently permitted to marry her - because that requires a Beis-Din of three, which is above suspicion.

(b)We infer from our Mishnah, that had the same Chacham succeeded in nullifying the woman's vow, he would have been permitted to marry her in the event of her husband subsequently dying or divorcing her. This cannot be referring to one of three Dayanim, who are permitted to do so in any case, but to a single Dayan, who is permitted to nullify vows on his own - provided he is an expert in that field.

9)

(a)The Tana of our Mishnah permits a Dayan in whose presence a girl performed Mi'un or Chalitzah to marry her, because a Beis Din f three is beyond suspicion. How about a pair of two witnesses?

(b)Then why did the Tana specifically write a Beis Din of three?

9)

(a)The Tana of our Mishnah permits a Dayan in whose presence a girl made Mi'un or Chalitzah to marry her, because a Beis-Din of three is beyond suspicion. As a matter of fact - a pair of two witnesses is not suspected of lying either.

(b)And the reason that our Mishnah mentions a Beis-Din of three, is to teach us (incidentally) - that Mi'un and Chalitzah require a Beis-Din of three (to preclude the opinion that permits even one of two).

10)

(a)If a Chacham or a witness who brings a Get from overseas subsequently marries the woman concerned, Rav Kahana rules that he must divorce her immediately. What does Rav Ashi say?

(b)On what grounds does Rav Zuti d'Bei Rav Papi cite a Beraisa?

(c)In reply to the Rabanan's query as to whether this is a tradition or a Sevara, Rav Ashi cited the Mishnah on the previous Daf (concerning someone about whom a rumor has spread that he had relations with a Shifchah or a Nochris who was subsequently set free or who converted). What does the Mishnah say? What does that prove?

(d)Then why must someone who marries a divorced woman under similar circumstances divorce her immediately?

10)

(a)If a Chacham or a witness who brings a Get from overseas subsequently marries the woman concerned, Rav Kahana rules that he must divorce her immediately. According to Rav Ashi - he is permitted to remain with her.

(b)Rav Zuti d'Bei Rav Papi cites a Beraisa - to corroborate Rav Ashi's ruling.

(c)In reply to the Rabanan's query as to whether this is a tradition or a Sevara, Rav Ashi cited the Mishnah on the previous Daf, which rules that someone about whom a rumor has spread that he had relations with a Shifchah or a Nochris - is forbidden to marry her, but that, if he did, he may remain married to her (a proof for his own ruling).

(d)Someone who married a divorced woman under similar circumstances however, must divorce her immediately - because, since her husband only divorced her on account of this man, it is particularly ugly for him to then go and marry her (or to remain with her if he did).