1) THE RIGHTS OF A DAUGHTER OF A KOHEN TO EAT "TERUMAH"
QUESTION: The Gemara quotes a Beraisa that says that when a Bas Kohen who is married to a Yisrael eats Terumah (which she is prohibited from eating), she is not obligated to pay the Chomesh penalty.
RASHI (DH she'Nises) explains that she does not pay Chomesh because she is not a Zarah, a non-Kohen. Rashi gives two reasons for why she is not classified as a Zarah. The first reason is that if her Yisrael husband dies and she marries a Kohen, she may eat Terumah. The second reason is that if her Yisrael husband dies without children, she may eat Terumah, because she returns to her former status as part of a Kohen's family.
It is not clear how the entitlement of a Bas Kohen married to a Kohen to eat Terumah demonstrates that she is not a Zarah. The Mishnah in a number of places (see Gitin 5:5) teaches that a Bas Yisrael married to a Kohen is also permitted to eat Terumah, even though she certainly is a Zarah! Rashi should have mentioned only his second reason, that a Bas Kohen may eat Terumah if her husband dies, even without getting married to a Kohen. (MELO HA'RO'IM)
ANSWER: The Mishnah in Yevamos (86b) states that when a Bas Yisrael married to a Kohen has a son from the Kohen, after her husband dies she still may eat Terumah. If she later marries a Yisrael, she may not eat Terumah, and if he dies after she has a son from him, she also may not eat Terumah even though she has a son who is a Kohen.
The Mishnah continues and says that when a Bas Kohen married to a Yisrael has a son from the Yisrael, after her husband dies she may not eat Terumah, since she has a son who is a Yisrael. If she later marries a Kohen and has a son from him, then even if her husband dies she may eat Terumah.
Why may the woman not eat Terumah in the first case, in which she has a son from a Yisrael and a son from a Kohen, while in the second case she may eat Terumah when she has a son from a Yisrael and a son from a Kohen?
The ARUCH LA'NER in Yevamos (87a) offers two possible explanations.
He explains that when there are two sons, a Kohen and a Yisrael, their respective powers to enable or hinder the mother's right to eat Terumah cancel each other, so to speak, and she is left with her "default" status. Thus, if the woman herself is a Bas Yisrael (the first case in the Mishnah there), she has no basis for eating Terumah. If the woman is a Bas Kohen (the second case), then she may eat Terumah by virtue of the fact that she is a Bas Kohen.
Alternatively, the Aruch la'Ner suggests that it depends on the order in which she was married to the Kohen and the Yisrael. In the first Mishnah, the woman first married a Kohen; when she later marries a Yisrael she loses her ability to eat Terumah. Since she has a son from the Yisrael, she never regains the ability to eat Terumah. However, in the second case of the Mishnah, she first married a Yisrael, and later she married a Kohen and acquired the ability to eat Terumah. Since she has a son from the Kohen, even if the Kohen himself dies she retains the ability to eat Terumah.
There are two cases that demonstrate the differences between these two explanations:
1. A Bas Kohen first married a Kohen and then a Yisrael, and she had sons from both. According to the first explanation, she may eat Terumah, because whenever she has children from both a Kohen and a Yisrael she reverts to the status of being a member of her father's (the Kohen's) family. According to the second explanation, she may not eat Terumah now since she could not eat Terumah during her most recent marriage (to the Yisrael).
2. A Bas Yisrael first married a Yisrael and then a Kohen, and she had sons from both. According to the first explanation, she still may not eat Terumah, because the two sons cancel each other out, so to speak, and she reverts to her default status. According to the second reason, she is able to eat Terumah, because she was able to eat Terumah during her most recent marriage (to the Kohen).
Can any support be found for either one of these explanations of the Aruch la'Ner?
The RAMBAM (Hilchos Terumos 6:19) rules, "If a Bas Yisrael marries a Yisrael first and has a son from him, and then she marries a Kohen... and the Kohen died and left her with a son from him, she may eat Terumah because of the son." The Rambam clearly rules in accordance with the second reasoning, that the woman's status depends on the order of the marriages.
However, it seems that RASHI here (DH v'Einah Meshalemes) rules in accordance with the first explanation -- that the son from a Kohen (or even a live husband who is a Kohen) and the son from a Yisrael "cancel each other out." Rashi writes that "if the husband (Yisrael) of a Bas Kohen dies and then she marries a Kohen, she may eat Terumah." Why must the daughter of a Kohen remarry a Kohen in order to eat Terumah? Even if she is not married, she should be permitted to eat Terumah! Rashi might mean that if she remarries a Kohen, she may eat Terumah even if the Yisrael left her with a son. Since Rashi says that only a Bas Kohen may eat Terumah when she has a son from a Kohen, even though she also has a son from a Yisrael, this proves that eating Terumah depends on the woman's "default" status, and not necessarily on whom she was married to most recently. (See also Insights to Yevamos 87:1.)
2) YOM KIPPUR AND THE "SA'IR HA'MISHTALE'ACH"
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses how a person can be Chayav Kares for desecrating Yom Kippur if the day of Yom Kippur itself atones for one's sins.
If Yom Kippur is Mechaper, why is there a need for a Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach to atone for the sins of the Jewish people?
(a) TOSFOS (Shevuos 13a, DH d'Avad) answers that Yom Kippur removes the actual Chiyuv Kares, but it does not provide a full atonement. The Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach achieves a full atonement for the people.
Tosfos mentions that according to some opinions, Yom Kippur provides full atonement. However, the Sa'ir ha'Mishtale'ach atones immediately at the time that it is offered, while Yom Kippur atones only once the entire day has passed. (When the Gemara mentions the case of a person who "choked while
eating" on Yom Kippur and did not attain atonement, it also could have said that he ate to satiation, but he died of natural causes at some point before sunset.) (See Insights to Shevuos 2:1
3) THE EIGHTY-FIRST DAY
QUESTION: The Mishnah discusses a dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel regarding a case in which a pregnant woman miscarried on the night following the eighty-first day after she had given birth to a girl. Beis Shamai maintains that the Korban she brings for the first birth covers the second birth as well, and Beis Hillel maintains that she must bring a separate Korban for the second birth. (In contrast, had she miscarried within eighty days of the first birth, all would agree that one Korban suffices for both births, since her days of Tohar from the first birth have not yet ended.)
Why does the Mishnah mention "81" days, and assume that the first birth was a girl? The Mishnah could have mentioned "41" days and assumed that the first birth was a boy, for which only forty days of Tohar are observed!
ANSWER: The RAMBAM (in Perush ha'Mishnayos) answers that an embryo less than 41 days old does not obligate the Yoledes to bring a Korban (as the Gemara says later on 10a), since an embryo is not considered a person until 41 days after conception. If the woman gave birth to a boy, then even if she conceived again immediately after the birth, she will not give birth to a 41-day-old embryo until after the days of Tohar of the boy are over -- because the Tohar period is only 40 days long. (Moreover, since she is forbidden to have relations with her husband until at least seven days have passed after the birth of the boy, it certainly is impossible to give birth to a 41-day-old embryo within the 40-day Dam Tohar period.) Therefore, the only possible way that she could give birth to a completely formed embryo within the days of Tohar of the first birth is if the first birth was a girl. (Rashi on 9b, DH ha'Ishah she'Yaldah, gives this explanation as well.)
There seems to be a flaw in this reasoning. Perhaps the second birth was conceived at the same time as the first, but born a few days later -- that is, it is a twin of the child of the first birth. Perhaps the Mishnah specifically deals with a non-twin birth in order to teach that even though the second baby was conceived independently, Beis Hillel does not require that a second Korban be brought. (M. KORNFELD)