Implied question: In Eruvin (27b), animals are considered Gidulei Karka! We expound "v'Nasatah ha'Kesef ba'Bakar uv'Tzon" - just like the Prat is something that reproduces and is Gidulei Karka...

Answer: There, [animals] are called Gidulei Karka because they are fed from the ground;

Here, we properly exclude milking and making cheese. They are not included in threshing, which is [done to] something that grows and sprouts from the ground.

Question: The verse needed to write Kamah twice, once to include all Ba'alei Kamah (standing crop), and once to include that man may eat what is detached!

Answer: It means as follows. One might have thought that we should not expound one of the Drashos above, rather, expound to include milking, for it is more reasonable to expound like this.

Alternative text: Some text say 'since it is written "Kamah" to include all Ba'alei Kamah, we should include also [animals]!'

Support: This is better, for "all Ba'alei Kamah" properly includes animals, which have stature.

Question: Still, we should include from Kamah something that does not grow from the ground, like milking!

Implied question: If so, what do we learn from Dayish? (Is it not to exclude what does not grow from the ground?!)

Answer #1: We need it to include what is detached! Had it not written Dayish, rather, 'Lo Sachsom Shor bi'Melachah', we would have established it to discuss only something attached, similar to a worker.

Support: We similarly ask why we need Dayish to exclude milking, for we learn from "Ki Savo" only what is attached;

Inference: We should establish an ox similar to a person.

Answer #2: We need Dayish for several Drashos below.

Assertion: If not for "v'El Kelyecha Lo Siten", we would expound from Dayish only "just like threshing, there was not final processing for Ma'aser";

We would not expound the time of final processing, that it does not need the ground.

However, now that it is written "v'El Kelyecha", to expound at the time of final processing, we expound also Dayish like this.

Question (Ri): Granted, it needed to teach baking, even though it taught kneading, for we find that one is obligated to separate Chalah even without (Tosfos ha'Rosh - a Chiyuv from the time of) kneading, through baking;

We say in Pesachim (37a) that bread fried in honey, wafers made from a thin dough... if one baked them in a pan, they are exempt [from Chalah. If they were baked] in an oven, they are obligated;

However, why did it teach arranging the dough? Does arranging the dough apply without kneading?!

Explanation: Also Chalah in Chutz la'Aretz is only mid'Rabanan, like is proven in Bechoros (27a)

Explanation: Since if they were obligated in Ma'aser, this would be considered final processing for Ma'aser after Miru'ach, and the law would depend on that final processing...

Also if they are not obligated in Ma'aser, [final processing] is no less, and the law should depend on that final processing... Why does the law depend on Chalah?!

Explanation: Now that it taught in one of them Ma'aser and Chalah, it is properly proven that "for Ma'aser" excludes only when Chalah does not apply, e.g. one who separates dates [that stuck together];

However, when Chalah applies, only final processing for Chalah matters.

Distinction: If one Beraisa taught only [final processing] for Ma'aser, this implies that it always depends on final processing for Ma'aser.

Implied question: Ma'aser [of dates] is only mid'Rabanan!

Answer: This is considered final processing, since if Ma'aser applied to them mid'Oraisa, the law would depend on final processing for Ma'aser.

Explanation #1 (Rashi): The fire sweetens [the Peros]. We ask whether one may roast and sweeten, and through this he will eat more;

Is this like eating grapes and something else, or not?

Question #1 (R. Tam): Why does it say below "breaking on a rock - how does this sweeten the Peros?!"

How could the Makshan think that this does not sweeten them? If so, why does he break them?

Question #2: Here we conclude that he may not salt due to [the obligation for] Ma'aser. If not, one may salt;

If so, all the more so one may roast, for salting is more like grapes and something else, like is proven below. The Sugya connotes that nothing was resolved!

Explanation #2 (R. Tam): If they are proper to eat, surely one must roast. It merely makes the fruits tastier!

Rather, we ask about [Peros] that are proper to eat only in pressed circumstances. One roasts them so they will be good to eat;

He asks whether this is like grapes and something else, since through roasting, he eats much;

Or, perhaps this roasting is no different than roasting sweet Peros, which is permitted!

He resolves the question for the Heter for workers to dip their bread in brine. Now, he holds that workers can eat [the Peros] only with difficulty, and he compares this to a food that is proper only with difficulty.

Question: The words "so they will eat many grapes" connotes that they can eat without this!

Explanation #2 (cont.): We then resolve from [a Beraisa that teaches that] workers may eat [grapes] at the ends of the rows [of the vineyard], as long as they do not roast;

[The Isur to] roast does not refer to [grapes at] the ends of the rows, for one may roast them, for they are proper to eat;

Rather, "as long as they do not roast" refers to things that are not proper to eat.

Support #1: Now it is fine that it says "how does [breaking on a rock] sweeten the Peros?!", for breaking does not fix those that are not proper to eat. It only sweetens those that are already proper to eat, and obviously [for those] it is permitted!

If so, [surely] the Beraisa forbids due to Bitul Melachah.

Support #2: Rava said that one may not salt, due to Ma'aser. If not for this, it would be permitted;

This refers to those that are proper to eat, but those that are not proper to eat, we ask whether roasting is permitted;

It is clear to us that salting is like grapes and something else, like [the Gemara] said initially.

Assertion (Ri): According to R. Tam, grapes and something else are forbidden only when they are not proper [to eat].

Support: This is fine that we say that salting is like grapes and something else, i.e. only for those that are not proper to eat. For those that are proper to eat, it is permitted, like Rava's words connote.

Defense (of Explanation #1): [R. Tam asked that] if [breaking on a rock] does not sweeten the Peros, why does he break them? We can say that he breaks them into small pieces, so he can put in his mouth a little at a time.

Implied question: [He asked also] why would Rava permit to salt, if not due to Ma'aser?

Answer: He discusses when the employer authorized him to eat [this way, or a fixed number].

Support: Also the Beraisa, which permits salting one at a time, this is because he stipulated [with his employer].

Explanation #1 (Rashi): He stipulated with the employer on condition that he may eat. Now, this is like a sale.

Assertion (R. Tam): According to this, this refers to the Reisha, when he hired him to dig under the tree;

If [it referred to the Seifa, when] he hired him to harvest, why would he stipulate without need? He eats due to Torah law!

Also, why would the stipulation help that he may not eat two at a time, since he stipulates without need?

Question: What was the question "since he stipulated, he can eat whatever he wants?" Why is it so obvious that he may eat with salt because he stipulated? He did not stipulate to eat with salt!

He needs the stipulation, for according to letter of the law, he does not eat at all, since he hired him to dig!

Explanation #2 (R. Chananel): He stipulated that he may eat only 10 or 20 Peros.

Support: Now it is a proper question "he may eat them with whatever he wants!"

Explanation: A sale is Kove'a [for Ma'aser] in something that had final processing for Ma'aser;

When he detaches two together, this is considered a granary, like we learn below, for the buyer will not make another granary.

Explanation: Above it taught that one may not salt. That is in Eretz Yisrael.

Question: Why don't we establish [the Beraisa] that forbids salting to be due to grapes and something else, like we said initially?

We could say that the Heter to salt [in the second Beraisa] refers to the Seifa [when he stipulated], and it is both in Eretz Yisrael and Chutz la'Aretz;

The Chidush is that salting is not Kove'a. Now, [Rava's] question (if salting is Kove'a in Eretz Yisrael, it is Kove'a also in Chutz la'Aretz) against Abaye is not difficult!

Answer: Had we not heard in any place that salting is Kove'a, it is no Chidush for the Beraisa to teach that one may salt;

Therefore, we establish [the Beraisa] that forbids salting to be in Eretz Yisrael, because salting is Kove'a;

Now, [the Beraisa] that permits to salt teaches that even though in Eretz Yisrael, salting is Kove'a, in Chutz la'Aretz it is not Kove'a.

Implied question: Also a sale of two at a time is Kove'a, like it says above! (Why did we ask only about salting?)

Answer: Because we were discussing salting, it mentioned salting.

Explanation: This is an Asmachta. (The verse is a parable for how the soldiers of Gog and Magog will be threshed.)

Explanation: This is not in order to make bread, for when Chalah applies, it does not depend on final processing for Ma'aser!

Rather, it discusses grain to make parched grain or Shasis (a food made from parched grain).