12th CYCLE DEDICATION:
 
BEITZAH 31 (6 Kislev) - Dedicated in honor of the Yahrzeit of Eliezer ben Reb Shraga Feivel Marmorstein, by his nephew, Mr. David Kornfeld, who Mr. Marmorstein raised like his own child after the Holocaust.

1) WOOD IN A "KARPAF" ON YOM TOV
QUESTION: The Mishnah states that on Yom Tov one may gather wood from a Karpaf (a large, enclosed area) and bring it into his home, even though the wood in the Karpaf is scattered about. Since the Karpaf is enclosed, one presumably intended before Yom Tov to use the wood in the Karpaf on Yom Tov.
Rebbi Yehudah says that the wood is permitted only when the Karpaf is near the city (in which case the owner of the wood presumably intended to use it). Rebbi Yosi says that the wood is permitted only when the Karpaf has a lock, in which case the wood may be used even if the Karpaf is far from the city.
The Gemara asks what exactly is the dispute between Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yosi, and it offers two approaches. The first possibility is that Rebbi Yehudah requires both that the Karpaf have a lock and be near the city, while Rebbi Yosi says that it suffices either to have a lock (and be far away) or to be near the city (without a lock). The second possibility is that Rebbi Yehudah says that the only factor which matters is the proximity of the Karpaf to the city; the wood is permitted only when the Karpaf is near the city (even if it has a lock). Rebbi Yosi says that the only factor which matters is whether the Karpaf has a lock.
The Gemara concludes that Rebbi Yosi's words in the Mishnah imply that he maintains "Tarti l'Kula" -- there are two leniencies.
The Gemara seems to follow its first suggestion, that Rebbi Yehudah requires that the Karpaf be both nearby and have a lock in order for the wood to permitted, while Rebbi Yosi maintains that the wood is permitted either when the Karpaf is nearby (without a lock) or when the Karpaf has a lock (and is far away). These are the "two leniencies" of Rebbi Yosi. This is the way TOSFOS explains the Gemara.
RASHI, however, writes that the Gemara's conclusion is a third explanation for the dispute. The Gemara explains that Rebbi Yehudah maintains that the only determining factor is the distance of the Karpaf from the city -- which is Rebbi Yehudah's opinion according to the Gemara's second suggestion, while Rebbi Yosi maintains that the Karpaf needs only to be nearby or to have a lock -- which is the view of Rebbi Yosi according to the Gemara's first suggestion. (See Chart.)
Why does Rashi write that the Gemara's conclusion combines the first and second explanations for the dispute? The Gemara itself says merely that Rebbi Yosi maintains that there are two leniencies, which implies the first version of the dispute. Why does Rashi assume that the Gemara maintains, in its conclusion, that even Rebbi Yehudah agrees with one leniency (that the Karpaf does not need a lock when it is nearby)? Moreover, since the Gemara suggests only two ways to understand the dispute in the Mishnah, why does Rashi posit a third possibility?
ANSWER: The statement of Rebbi Yosi as it is worded in our text of the Mishnah permits one to bring in wood from "any area (Karpaf) into which one enters with a key, and even (v'Afilu) if it is [far away but] within the Techum Shabbos."
Rashi, in the end of the Mishnah, quotes this line of the Mishnah with a slight difference: "even if (Afilu) it is [far away but] within the Techum Shabbos." Rashi's Girsa of the Mishnah omits the letter "Vav" ("and") before the word "Afilu." This is also the Girsa recorded by the DIKDUKEI SOFRIM (#80), the RIF (manuscript), and the Cambridge manuscript of the Mishnah (as the Dikdukei Sofrim mentions).
However, when Rashi explains the Gemara which quotes this part of the Mishnah in its attempt to clarify the argument between the Tana'im, Rashi (end of DH Rebbi Yosi l'Kula, and end of DH O Dilma) records the phrase the way it appears in our text of the Mishnah -- "v'Afilu." Apparently, Rashi's text of the Mishnah did not have the extra "Vav," but his text of the Gemara deliberately added the "Vav." Why did the Gemara add the extra "Vav"?
Rashi understands that the Gemara added a "Vav" to denote that it is presenting a two-part proof. The Gemara proves from the words of the Mishnah both the exact opinion of Rebbi Yehudah and the exact opinion of Rebbi Yosi.
First, the Gemara cites the first half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, "any area (Karpaf) into which one enters with a key," in order to prove one thing. It then cites the second half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, "even (Afilu) if it is [far away but] within the Techum Shabbos," in order to prove a second point. To denote that there are two distinct points, each of which can be proven from a different line of the Mishnah, the Gemara adds the letter "Vav" before it cites the second half of Rebbi Yosi's statement in the Mishnah.
(The CHIDUSHEI HA'ME'IRI quotes a Girsa of the Gemara which explicitly shows that the Gemara's intent is to cite separate proofs from each half of Rebbi Yosi's statement. That Girsa adds the words, "v'Od, Mai Afilu...," which clearly show that the words from "Afilu" and on are a second proof.)
What does the Gemara intend to prove from each half of Rebbi Yosi's statement?
Rashi says that the first half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, "any area (Karpaf) into which one enters with a key," implies that normally a Karpaf is not locked and does not need a key. This implication proves that Rebbi Yehudah -- who permits taking wood from an ordinary, unqualified Karpaf -- permits taking wood from a Karpaf even without a lock, as long as it is nearby.
The second half of Rebbi Yosi's statement, "even (Afilu) if it is [far away but] within the Techum Shabbos," teaches that Rebbi Yosi maintains that when the Karpaf is nearby the law is more lenient and the Karpaf does not need a lock.
Support for this approach may be drawn from two inferences in the words of Rashi. When the Gemara concludes that "Rebbi Yosi Tarti l'Kula" (Rebbi Yosi maintains that there are two leniencies), Rashi (beginning of DH Tarti) writes that we derive from Rebbi Yosi's words both the exact opinion of Rebbi Yehudah and the exact opinion of Rebbi Yosi (in that order). Why does Rashi mention Rebbi Yehudah first? He should mention Rebbi Yosi first, since the Gemara addresses his opinion explicitly ("Rebbi Yosi Tarti l'Kula..."), while the inference from Rebbi Yosi's words which teaches Rebbi Yehudah's opinion is Rashi's own addition! It must be that Rashi understands that the Gemara itself is making a two-part inference from the Mishnah, and that it is the first half of Rebbi Yosi's statement which reveals what Rebbi Yehudah maintains, and it is the second half which reveals what Rebbi Yosi himself maintains. Rashi mentions Rebbi Yehudah before Rebbi Yosi because he is explaining the proofs of the Gemara in the order in which the Gemara presents them.
In addition, the Girsa which appears in an early manuscript of Rashi (as quoted by DIKDUKEI SOFRIM #200) makes it even more evident that there are two parts to the proof. That text contains an additional comment (DH Ta Shema) which does not appear in our text of Rashi. In that comment, Rashi writes explicitly that from the fact that "[Rebbi Yosi says 'any area...'] and also in the end of his words he adds 'even if it is [far away]...,' from here we learn that he maintains that there are two leniencies." Rashi clearly understands that the Gemara is teaching a two-part proof: first, that Rebbi Yosi maintains that there are two leniencies, and, second, that Rebbi Yehudah maintains that the Karpaf needs to be nearby. (M. KORNFELD)

31b----------------------------------------31b

2) A STOREHOUSE WHICH BECAME BREACHED ON YOM TOV
QUESTION: The Mishnah states that if a storehouse of fruit became breached on Yom Tov, one may take fruit by reaching in through the opening, but one may not break open any part of the storehouse l'Chatchilah. Rebbi Meir says that one is permitted to break open the storehouse l'Chatchilah in order to get to the fruit.
Why is one permitted to take the fruit on Yom Tov when the storehouse was locked at the onset of Yom Tov but became breached? If the fruit was locked within the storehouse in such a way that it was not accessible during Bein ha'Shemashos, the fruit should be Muktzah.
ANSWERS:
(a) RASHI (DH Notel) explains that when an object may not be used at the start of Yom Tov only because of an Isur d'Rabanan, the object is not considered Muktzah Machmas Isur. In this case, in order to get to the fruits one merely needs to do an act which is an Isur d'Rabanan of Stirah, since the storehouse is built with uncemented rows of bricks (as the Gemara says). Therefore, the fruit is not Muktzah Machmas Isur.
TOSFOS asks that there are a number of sources which teach that an Isur d'Rabanan does create an Isur of Muktzah, such as in the case of a bed on which money was left during Bein ha'Shemashos (Shabbos 44b), and a basket on which there were chicks during Bein ha'Shemashos (Shabbos 43a). In those cases, the bed and basket become a "Basis l'Davar he'Asur" and may not be moved the entire Shabbos.
Perhaps Rashi understands that cases of a "Basis l'Davar he'Asur" are different because the non-Muktzah object which supports the Muktzah object becomes a prohibited object itself by virtue of its role as a "Basis." In contrast, when the non-Muktzah object is merely inaccessible due to an Isur which stands in its way (for example, it is locked inside of a room, such as in the case of the Mishnah here), the object (the fruit) is not prohibited as Muktzah.
The RAMBAN asks a different question. A candle that was aflame during Bein ha'Shemashos of Shabbos is Muktzah, even though the act of extinguishing it is only an Isur d'Rabanan (because it is a "Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah"). According to Rashi, who says that an Isur d'Rabanan does not render an object prohibited as Muktzah, why is the flame Muktzah?
The answer to this question may be that Rashi maintains that a "Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah" is considered a "Melachah," and therefore it is treated with the stringency of a Melachah d'Oraisa even though it is prohibited only mid'Rabanan.
(b) TOSFOS (DH v'Nifchas) cites RABEINU MOSHE who offers a different answer. He asserts that whether the object may not be used because of an Isur d'Oraisa or because of an Isur d'Rabanan is not relevant. Rather, the object's permissibility depends on whether the Isur has been removed entirely from the world, or whether it is still in existence but no longer acts to prohibit the object. In the case of a storehouse built with uncemented rows of bricks, once some of the bricks are breached absolutely no Isur of Stirah is involved in entering through the breach and taking some fruit. Similarly, fruits of Tevel are not Muktzah on Shabbos and may be eaten when Ma'aser is separated from them (even though one is not permitted to separate Ma'aser on Shabbos), since the Isur Tevel of those fruits is no longer extant. In the case of a "Basis," however, the object of Muktzah which made the permitted object a "Basis" in the first place is still in existence (it has just been removed from the object that was supporting it), and therefore the object remains a "Basis" and is prohibited.
Tosfos challenges the answer of Rabeinu Moshe. According to the logic of Rabeinu Moshe, one should be prohibited from taking the fruits from the storehouse because the rest of the bricks are still present and, therefore, the Isur of Stirah is still present. Only when all of the bricks have been removed is one permitted to take the fruits.
(c) TOSFOS explains that the Mishnah is in accordance with the opinion of Rebbi Shimon who maintains that there is no general category of Muktzah.
Tosfos' intention is not clear. Rebbi Shimon agrees that in order for an object which was inaccessible because of an Isur during Bein ha'Shemashos to become permitted, one must be "Yoshev u'Metzapeh" (anticipate that it will become permitted). In this case, however, there seems to be no reason for the owner of the storehouse to anticipate being able to eat the fruit on Yom Tov.
The RASHBA asks this question. He proposes that the Mishnah refers to a case of a storehouse which is already beginning to break down and is likely to collapse on Yom Tov, and thus one certainly had intention to use the fruit inside of it.
(d) The RASHBA himself writes that if the storehouse in the Mishnah's case has a shaky wall ("Kosel Re'u'ah"), then the Mishnah may follow the opinions of both Rebbi Shimon and Rebbi Yehudah. The Mishnah refers to a case in which one stipulates before the onset of Yom Tov that he intends to use the fruit when the wall of the storehouse breaks down. Such a Tenai works even according to Rebbi Yehudah. (See Insights to Beitzah 30:1.)
(e) The RAMBAN (in Milchamos, page 19b of the pages of the Rif) explains that the Mishnah refers to a case in which the storehouse became breached before Shabbos. This explains why the fruits are not Muktzah Machmas Isur.
If this is the case, however, then it is obvious that one may take the fruit on Shabbos. What is the Chidush of the Mishnah?
The Ramban explains that one might have thought that the Rabanan prohibit taking fruit from the place of the breach lest one increase the size of the breach. Therefore, the Mishnah teaches that one may take the fruit and there is no concern that he will make the opening larger. Alternatively, one might have thought that the Rabanan prohibited taking fruit from the place of the breach because the room has the status of an Otzar, a storehouse; since it was originally sealed shut, the fruit is like an object that was placed in a storehouse, which Rebbi Yehudah maintains is Muktzah. Therefore, the Mishnah teaches that the fruit is not considered Muktzah.
The Ramban asserts that this is the opinion of the RIF (and, by inference, of the RAMBAM).
(f) The Ramban suggests a second way to understand the Rif (and Rambam). Perhaps the fruits are not considered Muktzah Machmas Isur because there is nothing inherently wrong with them. It is an external factor which prevents one from eating them -- the wall that stands between the fruits and the person. The fruits themselves are fit to be eaten on Shabbos. For this reason, the fruits cannot be compared to an oil-lamp that was burning at the start of Shabbos, in which case the oil was unable to be used because of the Isur against extinguishing the fire (Mechabeh) by removing the oil from the lamp. That Isur is inherent in the oil itself. (The Ramban adds that a "Basis l'Davar he'Asur" is an exception to this rule. Although the object which serves as the "Basis" is rendered inaccessible due to an external factor (the object of Muktzah that is placed upon it), the Basis nevertheless becomes Muktzah Machmas Isur since it becomes an object of Isur itself; see (a) above.)
(The Ramban himself, in Milchamos to Pesachim 56a, seems to reject this argument when he writes that detached dates that are high up in a tree become Muktzah Machmas Isur because one cannot climb the tree to get them at the start of Shabbos.)
HALACHAH: The SHULCHAN ARUCH (OC 518:9) permits one to take fruit from behind a fallen wall with no limitations. It seems that he permits the fruit whether an Isur d'Rabanan is involved in dismantling the wall or an Isur d'Oraisa is involved, whether part or the wall or the entire wall collapsed, whether it collapsed on Erev Yom Tov or on Yom Tov, and whether the wall was weak or strong. The Poskim point out that the only way to explain this ruling is as the Ramban suggests (f), that the fruits did not become Muktzah since the Isur is not due to a factor inherent in them.
The BI'UR HALACHAH, however, writes that since most of the Rishonim do not accept this ruling (and the Ramban himself offers another way to interpret the Gemara), one should not move or eat such fruits except under extenuating circumstances ("She'as ha'Dechak").

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