QUESTION: The Gemara asks what the source in the Torah is for the law that if a Kohen has in mind, during any of the various stages of offering a Korban Chatas, intent that the animal should be a different type of Korban, the Chatas is Pasul and may not be offered at all. The Gemara says that the source that such intent -- during the Shechitah of the animal -- invalidates the Chatas is the verse, "v'Shachat Osah l'Chatas" -- "he shall slaughter it for a Chatas" (Vayikra 4:33), which teaches that it is a valid Chatas only when slaughtered with the intent that it be a Chatas. Similarly, the next verse, "The Kohen will take from the blood of the Chatas" (4:34), teaches that the Kabalas ha'Dam must be done with intent that the Korban is a Chatas, and it is Pasul if the Kohen has intent that it be any other Korban. The same law applies to the Zerikas ha'Dam, as derived from the verse, "v'Chiper Alav ha'Kohen me'Chataso" -- "the Kohen will provide atonement for him for his sin" (Vayikra 5:6). All of the Derashos seem to be based on the fact that the verse emphasizes that the Korban must be offered for the sake of a Chatas and not with any other Korban in mind.

The two verses from which the Gemara derives that the wrong intent during Shechitah or during Kabalah invalidates the Korban Chatas are written with regard to an ordinary Korban Chatas. However, the verse that the Gemara quotes that discusses the Zerikas ha'Dam of a Chatas is written with regard to a Korban Oleh v'Yored, which is not the ordinary type of Korban Chatas. Why does the Gemara cite a verse about Zerikah which is written with regard to an unusual form of Korban Chatas, when the same verse is written with regard to the normal Korban Chatas: "v'Chiper Alav ha'Kohen Al Chataso Asher Chata" -- "The Kohen will provide atonement for him for his sin which he transgressed" (4:35)? (TOSFOS DH Zerikah)


(a) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES answers that the verse written with regard to the normal Korban Chatas (4:35) does not refer to the Zerikas ha'Dam of the Korban Chatas, but rather to the Kohen who provides atonement for the sinner "for his sin (Chataso) which he transgressed (Asher Chata)." TOSFOS adds that, similarly, when the Torah says that the "Kohen will provide atonement for him from his sin (me'Chataso)" with regard to the Korban of the Nasi (Vayikra 4:26), it does not refer to the Korban Chatas itself, but rather to the actual sin that was transgressed, as indicated by the words "v'Nislach Lo" -- "and it will be forgiven for him." Only in the verse of the Korban Oleh v'Yored is it written, "The Kohen will provide atonement for him for his sin (me'Chataso)," without any other modifier to imply that this "Chatas" refers to the sin and not to the Korban. Therefore, it is from this verse that the Gemara learns that the Zerikas ha'Dam must not be done with intent for any other Korban other than a Chatas.

(b) TOSFOS, in his first answer, explains that the context of the verse written with regard to the normal Chatas (4:35) shows that it is not discussing the Zerikas ha'Dam of the Chatas. The Torah there states that the Kohen is to put the blood on the Mizbe'ach, and then it states that the fats must be burned on the Mizbe'ach. Only afterwards does the verse say that the Kohen will provide atonement for him. Even though atonement is usually accomplished at the moment of Zerikas ha'Dam, it is not clear that this verse is referring to Zerikah, because it is separated from the earlier verse which discusses the Zerikah of a normal Chatas. Therefore, the Gemara instead derives the Derashah from the verse regarding the Oleh v'Yored, which clearly refers to Zerikah.

Tosfos has difficulty with this explanation. The Gemara later (8b) asks that now that there is a source that the Zerikah must be done l'Shem Chatas for an ordinary Chatas, what is the source that the same applies for an Oleh v'Yored? What is the Gemara's question? The very verse from which the Gemara derives that the Zerikah must be done l'Shem Chatas is written with regard to the Oleh v'Yored!

Tosfos answers that the intention of the Gemara later is as follows. The Gemara earlier (7b) teaches that in the case of a Korban Shelamim, there is no reason to differentiate between Shechitah and the other Avodos with regard to the requirement to perform them with proper intent. Similarly, for an ordinary Chatas, all that is necessary is a verse teaching that the Shechitah must be done l'Shem Chatas and not for the sake of any other Korban. Once such a verse is found, it follows that all of the other Avodos also have this requirement. In contrast, in the case of a Korban Oleh v'Yored, the only verse that implies that it must be l'Shem Chatas is the verse regarding Zerikah. The law of Zerikah cannot teach anything about the other Avodos, since the Zerikah is the main part of the atonement, and what applies to it might not apply to the other Avodos. Therefore, other sources still are needed to teach that the other Avodos of an Oleh v'Yored cannot be performed with another Korban in mind.

(c) The KEREN ORAH has difficulty with the approach of Tosfos. He suggests instead that the text of the Gemara should be corrected, and the correct text indeed quotes the verse of an ordinary Chatas as the source for the law of Zerikah. Accordingly, the Gemara later (8b) certainly is justified in asking for the source that the Zerikah of an Oleh v'Yored must be done with the proper intent. (Y. MONTROSE)



QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the source for the law that a Korban Pesach slaughtered at any time other than Erev Pesach is a valid Korban Shelamim, as long as it was not slaughtered with intent that it serve as a Korban Pesach. The Gemara at one stage suggests that this law is derived from the verse, "If his Korban, for a Zevach Shelamim to Hash-m, is from the flock..." (Vayikra 3:6). Using the method of "Klal u'Frat u'Chlal," the words "l'Zevach" and "la'Hashem" are general terms, and the word "Shelamim" is a specific term. Accordingly, the verse teaches that just as a Korban Pesach which was slaughtered to be a Shelamim is a valid Korban, it is a valid Korban if it is slaughtered with intent to be any other type of Korban, with one exception. The only time it should not be valid is when it was slaughtered, on any day other than Erev Pesach, with intent that it be a Korban Pesach.

The Gemara asks that if a law is being derived from the "Prat," then the law should be that only if the Pesach is slaughtered in the name of a Korban which can be offered voluntarily is it a valid Korban, but not if it is slaughtered in the name of a Chatas or Asham (which cannot be offered voluntarily). The Gemara answers that the word "l'Zevach" is a "Ribuy" (inclusive). How does this answer the Gemara's question?


(a) RASHI (DH Ela) explains that the Gemara, in its answer, is giving an entirely different approach which has nothing to do with "Klal u'Frat u'Chlal." The Gemara retracts its application of "Klal u'Frat" here, because it determines that the word "l'Zevach" is not a "Klal" (a general term) but rather a "Ribuy" (an inclusive word). A "Klal" in this context would be the word "Behemah," for example, which would include all animals. The word "Zevach," however, is not only a general term -- it is also an unnecessary one, since it is connected to the next word of "Shelamim." Hence, the Gemara decides to derive the law through the methodology of "Ribuy" instead of the methodology of "Klal u'Frat."

(There are three different opinions regarding the correct Girsa of Rashi's words in his explanation for what "l'Zevach Shelamim" means. Our text in Rashi is that of the TZON KODASHIM. See other texts of Rashi in the SHITAH MEKUBETZES, and in the CHOK NASAN in the name of the PANIM ME'IROS.)

The verse could have said merely "l'Shelamim." Since the word "l'Zevach" is extra and therefore inclusive, it cannot be used to derive a "Klal u'Frat u'Chlal." The Gemara explains that the principle of "Klal u'Frat u'Chlal" is not applied here, but instead the extra word "l'Zevach" teaches that regardless of what Korban it is slaughtered for, the animal remains a valid Korban.

The Shitah Mekubetzes (in Hashmatos) writes that Rashi does not mean that a word used in a "Klal u'Frat u'Chlal" cannot be inclusive. Rather, Rashi means that in this verse, there are two consecutive words that are both inclusive. The verse states, "v'Im Min ha'Tzon Korbano, l'Zevach Shelamim la'Hashem" -- both the word "Korbano" and the word "l'Zevach" are general terms. Two consecutive general terms in a verse teaches that all things are considered valid. In this context, this means that a Korban Pesach offered with the intent of any Korban is valid, including a Chatas and an Asham as well.

The Shitah Mekubetzes has difficulty with his explanation of Rashi. If all things are included by the words "Korbano l'Zevach," then how can the Gemara immediately ask that this Korban Pesach should acquire the status and laws of the Korban for which it was intended? This certainly cannot be the case, because the word "Shelamim" in the verse teaches that the Korban Pesach should have the status and laws of a Shelamim!

(b) The Shitah Mekubetzes concludes that the correct explanation is that of TOSFOS (DH Ela). Tosfos explains that the word "l'Zevach" is not a Klal (a general term), but rather a "Ribuy" (an inclusive term). There is a similar principle, known as "Ribah u'Mi'et v'Ribah," when there are two inclusive terms and one exclusive term. This principle teaches that the verse includes everything possible, besides one thing, regardless of whether or not all of the things being included are similar to the exclusive word or not (this is in contrast to the principle of "Klal u'Frat u'Chlal"). Now that the Gemara learns that the verse is teaching a "Ribuy" from the word "l'Zevach," the question that Chatas and Asham are not similar is no longer a problem, since they do not need to be similar. The only thing that the verse excludes is a Korban Pesach slaughtered on any day other than Erev Pesach with the intention that it be a Korban Pesach, which indeed is unfit. (Y. MONTROSE)