1) A WOMAN WHO MAKES A "NEDER" AND PROHIBITS HERSELF TO ALL MEN
QUESTIONS: The Gemara discusses the Halachah of a married woman who made a vow to prohibit herself (b'Tashmish) to all men. The Gemara inquires about her status with regard to her husband's brother after her husband dies. At the time she made her Neder, did she anticipate falling to Yibum, in which case she had her Yavam in mind when she made her Neder, or did she not anticipate falling to Yibum and did not have him in mind, and he is not included in her Neder?
RASHI explains the Gemara's question as follows. When a woman makes a Neder to prohibit herself to someone, she obviously intends to prohibit herself only to someone to whom she otherwise would be permitted. Does she consider the possibility that she will fall to Yibum and become permitted to the Yavam and thus she has intention to prohibit herself to him as well? Perhaps she does not consider the possibility that she will become permitted to the Yavam and thus she does not have in mind to prohibit herself to him.
The Gemara says that according to Rav, "the Yavam is not like the husband." According to Shmuel, "the Yavam is like the husband." Rashi explains that the woman obviously has in mind to prohibit herself to her husband, as is clear from the fact that the husband must annul her Neder in order to be permitted to her (as mentioned in the Mishnah quoted by the Gemara earlier). Rav maintains that the Yavam is not like the husband and her Neder does not prohibit her to him. Shmuel argues and says that her Neder does prohibit her to the Yavam.
The Gemara attempts to prove Rav's view from the Mishnah (111b). The Mishnah states that when a woman makes a Neder -- while her husband is alive -- to prohibit her husband's brother from deriving pleasure from her, Beis Din forces him to do Chalitzah with her when her husband dies. It is assumed that she did not consider the possibility that she would fall to him for Yibum, and thus she did not have in mind to prohibit herself to him under such circumstances. Since she did not intentionally prohibit herself from performing Yibum with the Yavam, Beis Din forces the Yavam to do Chalitzah with her.
TOSFOS and other Rishonim ask a number of questions on Rashi's explanation.
1. If it is true that when the woman makes her Neder she does not have in mind that her Neder should apply to a man to whom she is prohibited already, why does the Gemara ask its question only about the Yavam? The Gemara's question applies to every other man in the world to whom she is not married. At the moment she makes her Neder, she is prohibited to all other men because of the Isur of "Eshes Ish"! Similarly, why does the Gemara not ask whether her Neder prohibits her to the husband of her sister after her sister dies? Why does the Gemara ask specifically about the Yavam, when its question is not a question specific to the Yavam?
2. Why does Rav and Shmuel compare the Yavam to "the husband"? The woman's Neder includes all Jews and not just the husband, and thus Rav should say that the Yavam is "not like all other Jews," and Shmuel should say that the Yavam "is like all other Jews."
3. It is clear from the Gemara that when a woman makes a Neder while her husband is alive to prohibit her husband's brother from deriving pleasure from her (the case of the Mishnah), she is prohibited to do Yibum with him even though she did not consider the possibility that she might fall to Yibum. Even though she did not consider the possibility that she might fall to Yibum, she did have in mind to prohibit herself to him (b'Tashmish) when she made a Neder to prohibit him from deriving pleasure from her.
ANSWERS:
(a) The Rishonim propose various answers for these questions:
1. The RASHBA addresses the first question, why the Gemara asks only whether she has the Yavam in mind and does not ask whether she has all other prohibited men in mind. He explains that she certainly has in mind other men who are prohibited to her already because of the Isur of "Eshes Ish," because she knows that she can become permitted to them through Gerushin, divorce. Hence, the Gemara does not ask whether or not she includes them in her Neder. As for why the Gemara does not ask whether she has in mind her sister's husband after the death of her sister, the Rashba suggests that perhaps the Gemara's question also applies to that case but it chose to ask its question with regard to just one of the two cases (that of Yavam).
The RITVA adds that the Gemara's question indeed may be specific to the Yavam. In the case of her sister's husband, she certainly considers the possibility that her sister will die and she will become permitted to her sister's husband (because she will become permitted to him when her sister dies regardless of whether her sister has children). In contrast, she might not consider the possibility that her husband will die without children and she will become a Yevamah. Therefore, the Gemara asks only whether she is permitted to the Yavam and not whether she is permitted to her sister's husband.
2. The first question itself may provide the answer to the second question, why Rav and Shmuel say that the "Yavam is (or is not) like the husband." The person most obviously included in her Neder is her husband, since he is the only one who is presently permitted to her (without the Neder). It is not so obvious that she includes other men in her Neder, since she is already prohibited to them even without the Neder. Rav and Shmuel compare (or contrast) the Yavam specifically to the husband because it is clear that her Neder refers to him.
A closer analysis of the words of Rashi (DH Eino k'Ba'al) reveals that Rashi may have another answer to this question. The reason why Rav and Shmuel compare the Yavam to the husband is as follows. If the woman's Neder does prohibit her to the Yavam, the Neder will cause the husband to suffer -- there will be no one to carry on his name if he dies without children. Consequently, her Neder might qualify as "Devarim she'Beino l'Veinah," a Neder which affects the relationship between the husband and wife, a type of Neder which the husband is entitled to annul. Thus, the question of the Gemara is not merely whether or not she is prohibited to the Yavam, but whether her husband needs to annul the Neder (which prohibits her to the Yavam) or whether she is permitted to the Yavam without the annulment of the Neder.
This explains why Rav and Shmuel compare the Yavam to the husband. According to Shmuel, the woman's Neder which prohibits her to the Yavam is considered a Neder against the husband which he is entitled to annul. According to Rav, her Neder does not prohibit her to the Yavam and thus the husband has no need to annul it. The husband, however, certainly is not permitted to annul the part of the Neder which affects all other men in the world, because that part of the Neder does not constitute "Devarim she'Beino l'Veinah."
This approach answers a different question which the Rishonim ask on the explanation of Rashi. Why does the Gemara find it necessary to quote the Mishnah in Nedarim (which discusses the enactment of the Rabanan that authorizes the husband to annul his wife's Neder prohibiting herself to all Jews) as a preface to the question of whether or not the woman's Neder includes the Yavam? That Mishnah seems unrelated to the question of the Gemara. The Mishnah there says merely that since there is a concern that she is trying to rid herself of her husband, the Rabanan enacted that he may annul her Neder.
According to the explanation implied by Rashi, the reason for why the Gemara cites that Mishnah is clear. The Gemara cites that Mishnah to show that the Rabanan allow the husband to remain married and to annul the part of his wife's Neder that affects him, when she prohibits herself to all Jews. The Gemara questions whether he needs to annul the part of her Neder which prohibits her to the Yavam as well in the event that she falls to Yibum afterwards. (M. Kornfeld)
3. The RA'AVAD (cited by the Rashba) answers the third question. He explains that in the case of the Mishnah (111b), the woman does not prohibit herself specifically from Bi'ah, but she prohibits herself from all pleasures from her Yavam (as the Mishnah says, "ha'Noderes Hana'ah"). Even if she does not intend to prohibit Bi'ah with the Yavam (since she does not anticipate that her husband will die childless), she certainly does prohibit herself from receiving any other form of benefit from him. Beis Din forces him to do Chalitzah because if he does Yibum with her she will not be able to live with him -- one cannot live with a spouse from whom one is prohibited from deriving any pleasure.
The RITVA offers a different answer. The Ritva explains that in the case of the Mishnah, even though the woman does not anticipate falling to Yibum, since she singled out the Yavam by mentioning him specifically when she prohibited all Hana'ah from him, she showed her intent that the Neder prohibit Bi'ah just as it prohibits all of the other forms of Hana'ah from him.
(b) TOSFOS and other Rishonim explain the Sugya differently. They explain that the Gemara's question of whether her Neder includes the Yavam refers to the ruling of the Mishnah.
1. The Mishnah states that if the woman considered the possibility that she might fall to Yibum when she prohibited herself to her husband's brother (and she intended to avoid Yibum), Beis Din does not force the Yavam to do Chalitzah. If, on the other hand, she did not consider the possibility that she might fall to Yibum (and she did not intend to avoid Yibum), Beis Din forces the Yavam to do Chalitzah. The Gemara asks what her intention is when she prohibits herself to the Yavam during her husband's lifetime.
This approach provides a clear answer to the first question. The Gemara's question is unrelated to the assumption that a woman does not intend to prohibit herself to a man who is already prohibited to her. In fact, that assumption is incorrect -- all men become prohibited to her as a result of her Neder, whether or not they are presently permitted to her. The Yavam is included in the Neder as well, and thus the Mishnah rules that he must perform Chalitzah and not Yibum. (This answers the third question.) The Gemara is in doubt only whether or not she intended to avoid a situation of Yibum with her Neder.
2. Rav says that "the Yavam is not like the husband." He means that when the woman declares that she is prohibited from all Jews, it is assumed that she is attempting to get away from her husband (as the Mishnah in Nedarim teaches), but she is not attempting to get away from the Yavam because she does not consider the possibility of falling to Yibum. In that sense, "the Yavam is not like the husband." Shmuel says that she does consider the possibility of falling to Yibum and thus she does intend to get away from him through her Neder, just as she intends to get away from her husband through her Neder.
3. There is no question that the Neder does take effect with regard to the Yavam even though he is presently prohibited to her (as mentioned above in the answer to the first question). The question of the Gemara is only whether she intended to avoid a situation of Yibum.
Why does Rashi not explain the Gemara in this straightforward fashion? Rashi apparently is bothered by the wording of the Gemara's question. If the Gemara's question has no practical application other than the Halachah of the Mishnah, the Gemara should not ask about a woman who made a Neder with the words, "I am hereby prohibited to all Jews." The Gemara should ask instead what the Halachah is in a simple case in which a woman makes a Neder, during her husband's lifetime, which prohibits herself specifically to her husband's brother. (Although the Mishnah says that it is assumed that she does not intend to avoid a situation of Yibum with the Neder she makes while her husband is alive, perhaps that reasoning applies only when her husband has children who die later (after she makes her Neder), and whose death necessitates that she fall to Yibum when her husband dies. (M. Kornfeld)

112b----------------------------------------112b

2) THE KIDUSHIN OF A KETANAH
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses whether the Rabanan instituted Nisu'in for a Cheresh, Shoteh, Katan, and Ketanah. The Gemara says that for a Shoteh (and Shotah) and a Katan the Rabanan did not institute Nisu'in, but for a Cheresh (and Chareshes) and Ketanah they did institute Nisu'in.
Why does the Gemara discuss only Nisu'in? Why does it not ask whether the Rabanan instituted Kidushin for a Cheresh, Shoteh, Katan, and Ketanah? Similarly, the Mishnah discusses only the Nisu'in of a Cheresh. Why does it not also discuss his Kidushin?
Moreover, the Mishnah earlier (107b) states that the Ketanah who may do Mi'un is one whose mother and brother effected her "Nisu'in." Why does it not mention the Ketanah's Kidushin at all?
ANSWERS:
(a) The TESHUVOS HA'RIF (1:267-268), in a Teshuvah attributed to RABEINU YEHUDAH ALBARGELONI (author of Sefer ha'Itim), writes that a Ketanah cannot have Kidushin (since she cannot effect a Kinyan) but only Nisu'in. For this reason the Mishnah mentions only the "Nisu'in" of a Ketanah. The same reasoning presumably applies to a Cheresh and Chareshes.
(b) The Ramban (107a) and other Rishonim cite the RIF who rejects this suggestion because it is clear from many places in the Mishnah and Gemara that a Ketanah does have Kidushin. For example, in the Mishnah earlier (107a), Beis Hillel states that a Ketanah who is either a Nesu'ah or an Arusah (with only Kidushin) may do Mi'un, while Beis Shamai states that only an Arusah may do Mi'un. Similarly, the Beraisa (108a) gives an example of Mi'un wherein a girl says, "I do not want the Kidushin with which my mother was Mekadesh me," and the Gemara (ibid.) discusses whether it is considered Mi'un when an Arusah accepts Kidushin from another person. (See also 109b, where the Gemara discusses the Kidushin of one who was Mekadesh a Ketanah.) In Gitin (65a), the Gemara says that a girl who is old enough to take care of an object she receives is able to become "Miskadeshes" with Kidushin d'Rabanan. Similarly, Rashi here (DH d'Takinu) writes that the Rabanan instituted Nisu'in "and Kidushin" for a Cheresh.
Accordingly, it seems that whenever the Mishnah or Gemara mentions Nisu'in with regard to a Ketanah, it is not used in the specific sense, but rather as a general term which includes Kidushin as well.
(c) The RAMBAN (107a, and cited by the Rashba and Ritva) accepts the reasoning of Rabeinu Yehudah Albargeloni and suggests a compromise between the above-mentioned opinions in order to explain why the Mishnah uses the term "Nisu'in" when it discusses the betrothal (Kidushin) and marriage (Nisu'in) of a Ketanah.
The Ramban suggests that a Ketanah does have Kidushin, but only when the Ketanah herself personally accepts the Kesef or Shtar of Kidushin. If her mother or brother accepts the Kesef or Shtar on her behalf, the Kidushin does not take effect. This is because the Rabanan did not institute Shelichus for a Ketanah, and thus Kidushin does not take effect for her when someone else accepts the Kidushin on her behalf. Furthermore, when someone else accepts the Kidushin for the Ketanah, the Ketanah does not relate to that action as one which affects her personally, and thus she does not consent to the Kidushin. (The Kidushin of a Ketanah takes effect only with her full consent, 107b.) Nisu'in, in contrast, involves physically bringing the Ketanah into the home of the husband, and thus the Nisu'in is valid even when it is her mother or brother who gives her over to the husband for Nisu'in. Since the Ketanah is involved in the act of Nisu'in, she presumably consents to it. The Mishnayos which mention the Nisu'in of a Ketanah done through her mother or brother specifically mention Nisu'in because the mother and brother are not involved in her Kidushin but only in marrying her off with Nisu'in. The Mishnayos that mention Kidushei Ketanah refer to cases in which she accepted the Kidushin herself.
In the case of the Gemara here, perhaps the Ramban maintains that the Rabanan did not institute Kidushin for a Chareshes at all (even when she accepts the Kesef or Shtar herself), and thus the Gemara discusses only whether the Rabanan instituted Nisu'in for a Chareshes. A Chareshes is considered to have less Da'as than a Ketanah since she will never have Da'as, unlike a Ketanah who eventually will have Da'as. The Rabanan required that Kidushin be done with her only so that it be followed by Nisu'in. The Kidushin itself is ineffective until the Nisu'in is done. Therefore, it is logical to suggest that a Chareshes has only Nisu'in, in contrast to a Ketanah who has Kidushin as well.
According to this approach, what does the Beraisa (108a) mean when it says that Mi'un occurs when the Ketanah says, "I do not want the Kidushin with which my mother was Mekadesh me"? If the Ketanah's mother accepted Kidushin for her, the Kidushin should not take effect and there should be no need for Mi'un! The Ramban explains that the Beraisa means that the Ketanah says, "I do not want the Kidushin that they (my mother or brother) persuaded me to accept for myself."