Comment: After having taught the Dinim in three sections (Bava Kama, Metzi'a and Basra), the Tana goes on to teach us how many Dayanim are required to judge them.

Implied Question: Why does the Tana not include 'Kofer' (regarding a Shor Mu'ad that killed a person) and 'Sheloshim Shekalim of an Eved (Cana'ani)'?

Answer: Some explain that this is because sentencing the ox to death requires twenty-three Dayanim, and it is when the ox is stoned that the owner pays Kofer and the thirty Shekalim of an Eved Cana'ani (see Maharam [though this does not conform with the opinion of R. Eliezer in Perek Arba'ah va'Chamishah, who maintains that the ox can be sentenced to death even by the testimony of one witness or of the owner]).

Refutation: This is not correct however, seeing as there are Amora'im there who maintain that even R. Akiva (who argues there with R. Eliezer) Darshens "Im Kofer" to include sentencing the ox to death even there where it killed unintentionally (see Maharam).

Alternative Answer #1: Rabeinu Tam therefore explains that 'Kofer' and 'the thirty Shekel of an Eved are already included in

Alternative Answer #2: Alternatively, the Tana omits these two cases, as it does that of an Eved going out with the twenty-four main limbs (which is also a K'nas that requires three Dayanim).

Comment: According to the previous answer, this last case is not considered an omission, since it is obvious that it is included in 'Chavalos'.

Alternative Explanation: Or else because the Tana is only concerned with actual money that changes hands (into which category the Eved going free does fit).

Implied Question: The Gemara ought surely to have mentioned 'Mamono' first - as it generally tends to do whenever it uses the expression 'what is the difference between ... ', where it mentions the given case first?

Precedent: Like we find in 'ha'Mafkid', in the case of 'Mal'ach ha'Ma'ves Mah Li Hacha, Mah Li Hasam'; in Chulin, in the case of 'Mah Li Katla Kulah, Mah Li Katla Palga'; and in 'Eizehu Neshech', where R. Yanei says that just as we say, we will also say 'Mah Li Demeihen, Mah Li Hein'.

Answer: Nevertheless, the Gemara here mentions 'Chaval be'Gufo' first, due to the fact that it is more common.

Clarification: The Gemara is asking a contradiction in R. Avahu, since Shmuel and the other Amora'im hold 'Dineihem Din'.

Question: How can the Gemara say 'Divrei ha'Kol', when the Beraisa cited by Rami bar Chama (cited in 'ha'Gozel Kama') specifically says that the four Shomrin require partial denial (like a debtor), because it does not hold of Eiruv Parshiyos, and whoever does not old of Eiruv Parshiyos, does not require three Dayanim, as is evident in our Sugya.

Answer: R. Avahu does not consider that Beraisa authentic, since it was not learned in the Beis-ha'Medrash of R. Chiya and R. Oshaya.

Question #1: R. Yochanan there (in 'ha'Gozel Kama') agrees with Rami bar Chama; yet the Yerushalmi at the beginning of our Masechta states that R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish both hold that if two people judge, their Din is invalid?

Question #2: Likewise, the Gemara in 'ha'Choletz cites R. Yochanan, who holds that a Ger requires three judges, because the Torah uses the word "Mishpat" in connection with him?

Answer: In fact, even those who hold 'Ein Eiruv Parshiyos Kasuv Ka'an, require three judges - because the Torah writes "Mishpat Echad Yih'yeh Lachem"; And when the Gemara here says 'What does he hold ... ' (insinuating that he does not), what he means to say is - that if he holds 'Ein Eiruv Parshiyos Kasuv Ka'an', and the reason that he does not require Mumchin (expert judges) is because he does not Darshen "Mishpat Eched ... ", to compare Hoda'os and Halva'os to Gezeilos and Chavalos (which definitely require experts), then from where does he know that one requires three judges?

Implied Question: When the Gemara answers that really he holds 'Eiruv Parshiyos Kasuv Ka'an', and that is why we require Mumchin, why did it not answer that even if he held 'Ein Eiruv Parshiyos Kasuv Ka'an', we would still require Mumchin, because of "Mishpat Echad ... "?

Answer: The Gemara could have indeed answered that. Only it wanted to avoid retracting from the questioner's premise that if one holds 'Ein Eiruv Parshiyos Kasuv Ka'an', then we do not learn three judges and Mumchin from "Mishpat Echad ... '.

Question: Just as we learn 'D'rishah and Chakirah' from "Mishpat Echad ... ", why can we not also learn three judges and Mumchin from there, even according to those who do not hold Eiruv Parshiyos.

Answer: "Mishpat Echad" comes to compare Dinei Mamonos to Dinei Nefashos, and not to compare different aspects of Dinei Mamonos to one another.

Proof: Like we find later in the fifth Perek, where we learn a Gezeirah-Shavah "Heitev" "Heitev", to learn D'rishah va'Chakirah from one aspect of Dinei Nefashos to another, and decline to learn it from "Mishpat Echad ... '.

Disproof: There is no proof from there however, because if it was indeed so, it would pose a Kashya on Rami bar Chama according to R. Avahu and on R. Yochanan, who hold "Mishpat Echad ... " even with regard to comparing Dinei Mamonos to one another.

Alternative Explanation: It must therefore be that we need "Heitev" "Heitev" for the reason mentioned there (that the Torah should otherwise have written them together [see Maharam]).

Question: The question remains however, why do we not learn Mumchin with regard to Dinei Mamonos from Dinei Nefashos, like we do regarding 'D'rishah va'Chakirah'?

Answer: Since the Torah inserts Mumchin by Gezeilos, it is clear that the Torah does not want us to learn (other) Dinei Mamonos from Nefashos (see Maharam).

Question: According to those who learn 'Eiruv Parshiyos', why does the Torah need to write 'Mumchin' by Dinei Mamonos (see Maharam).

Answer: Perhaps we cannot learn Dinei Mamonos from Dinei Nefashos with regard to 'Mumchin', seeing as three judges will suffice (and not twenty-three).

Question: What is however, difficult is all the distinctions between Dinei Mamonos and Dinei Nefashos that we will learn later in Perek Echad Dinei Mamonos. Why do we not compare them from "Mishpat Echad ... ".

Reference: Tosfos has already explained this in Bava Kama, in Perek ha'Gozel Kama.

Question: Our Gemara seems to preclude Hedyotos from "Elohim", whereas in 'ha'Megaresh', the Gemara learns it from '"Lifneihem", 've'Lo Lifnei Akum', "Lifneihem", 've'Lo Lifnei Hedyotos'.

Answer: In fact, the D'rashah of "Lifneihem" refers to "Elohim" quoted here (in which the two D'rashos are one and the same).

Question: Rashi in Gitin however, explains that "Lifneihem" refers to the seventy elders mentioned at the end of the Parshah - the Sanhedrin, who accompanied Moshe up the Mountain.

Answer: It therefore seems that the D'rashah in Gitin is written with reference to coercing the litigants to adhere to their ruling, since it is in that connection that the Gemara cites the D'rashah. The Gemara relates how Abaye found Rav Yosef sitting and enforcing Gitin, and said to him 'But are we not Hedyotos (who are not empowered to enforce the law)? "Elohim" on the other hand, is not written in connection with enforcing the law, but with judging in the first instance.

Proof: What prompts the Gemara to learn the Din of coercion from "Lifneihem", is the preceding words "Asher Tasim", about which we shall later say 'These are the vessels of the Dayanim' (i.e. the strap and the stick [see Rashi there]).