NEDARIM 86 - Two weeks of study material have been dedicated by Mrs. Estanne Abraham Fawer to honor the Yahrzeit of her father, Rav Mordechai ben Eliezer Zvi (Rabbi Morton Weiner) Z'L, who passed away on 18 Teves 5760. May the merit of supporting and advancing Dafyomi study -- which was so important to him -- during the weeks of his Yahrzeit serve as an Iluy for his Neshamah.

1)

(a)We just queried Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua's explanation (that our Mishnah speaks when the woman declared her hands forbidden after her husband divorced her), on the grounds that, seeing as she was unable to do so immediately, why is it not still considered a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam? Rav Ila now attempts to compare the case to someone who declares the field that he is about to sell to his friend Hekdesh for when he has bought it back. Why does he consider our case comparable to his, seeing as in our case, the woman cannot forbid her work immediately?

(b)On what grounds does Rebbi Yirmeyahu refute Rav Ila's explanation?

(c)So he compares our case to the very case that Rav Ila declined to compare it to (where the 'owner' declares a field that he has already sold, Hekdesh). Rav Papa however, rejects this on the same grounds as Rav Ila did. He in turn, compares it to someone who declares Hekdesh the field that he gave as collateral against a loan for after he has redeemed it. Why does the field only become Hekdesh after the borrower has redeemed it? Why does Hekdesh not override the Shibud?

(d)If hat is so, how can we ask in Erchin how it is possible for the renter to live in his rented house once the owner has declared it Hekdesh. Why do we not say there too, that Hekdesh Damim cannot override the Shibud of the renter?

1)

(a)We just queried Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua's explanation (that our Mishnah speaks when the woman declared her hands forbidden after her husband divorced her), on the grounds that, seeing as she was unable to do so immediately, why is it not still considered a 'Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam'? Rav Ila now attempts to compare the case to someone who declares the field that he is about to sell to his friend Hekdesh for when he has bought it back. He consider our case comparable to his, despite the fact that, in our case, the woman cannot forbid her work immediately - because it is better than the next stage, where he declares a field that he has already sold Hekdesh (since there, nothing is in his hands, whereas in our case, at least the woman is in her own possession), and which will obviously not take effect.

(b)Rebbi Yirmeyahu refutes Rav Ila's explanation - on the grounds that, when all's said and done, in that case, the seller could declare the field Hekdesh immediately, whereas in our case, the woman could not.

(c)So he compares our case to the very case that Rav Ila declined to compare it to (where the 'owner' declares a field that he has already sold Hekdesh). Rav Papa however rejects this on the same grounds as Rav Ila did. He in turn, compares it to someone who declares Hekdesh the field that he gave as collateral against a loan, for after he has redeemed it. The field only becomes Hekdesh after the borrower has redeemed it - because it is only by Kedushas ha'Guf that Hekdesh overrides a Shibud, not by Kedushas Damim (which a Hekdesh field is).

(d)Nevertheless, we ask in Erchin how it is possible for the renter to live in his rented house once the owner has declared it Hekdesh (even though the Kedushah of a house is only Kedushas Damim) - because there it speaks when he rented him a house Stam (not specifically that house), in which case the Shibud is not particularly on that house, but on a house. Consequently, the Hekdesh takes effect, and the owner must supply him with another house).

2)

(a)How does Rav Shisha Brei d'Rav Idi reject the proof from the previous case that the woman too, should be able to declare her hands Hekdesh after her divorce?

(b)Why is that? Why is it not nevertheless possible for the woman to make her Neder effective immediately, by saying 'Eini Nizones v'Eini Osah', like Rav Huna?

(c)So to which similar case of Mashkon does Rav Shisha now compare our case, to prove that she can declare her hands Hekdesh for after she becomes divorced?

(d)And on what grounds does Rav Ashi, in turn, reject his explanation?

2)

(a)Rav Shisha Brei d'Rav Idi rejects the proof from the previous case that the woman too, should be able to declare her hands Hekdesh after her divorce - on the grounds that, whereas there, the owner has the authority to redeem the house immediately, in our case, it does not lie in the woman power to get divorced.

(b)Neither can the woman make her Neder effective immediately by saying 'Eini Nizones v'Eini Osah', like Rav Huna - because Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri (who says 'Yafer, Shema Yigreshenah ... ', and whose opinion we are discussing) is not speaking when the woman declared a Neder on the amount that Chazal obligated her to produce (which is subject to 'Eini Nizones v'Eini Osah'), but when she forbade on him all Hana'ah (which is not).

(c)So Rav Shisha tries to prove that she can declare her hands Hekdesh for after she becomes divorced - by comparing it to a case where someone declared Hekdesh a field that he gave the creditor as collateral for ten years, and where the Hekdesh is effective.

(d)But Rav Ashi rejects his explanation - on the grounds that there, at least there is a fixed date for the field to be returned, whereas in our case, the woman may never get divorced.

86b----------------------------------------86b

3)

(a)To solve the problem, Rav Ashi finally declares that Konamos are different. What does he mean by that?

(b)How does this explain why Shmuel rules like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri (who says 'Yafer, Shema Yigreshenah'), despite the fact that he holds 'Ein Adam Makdish Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam'?

(c)From where does Rav Ashi learn this? Which aspect of Konamos renders them similar to Kedushas Mizbe'ach, rather than to Kedushas Damim?

(d)Rava holds that Hekdesh, Chametz and Shichrur remove the Shibud. What does he mean by ...

1. ... Hekdesh?

2. ... Chametz?

3. ... Shichrur?

3)

(a)To solve the problem, Rav Ashi finally declares that Konamos are different, by which he means - Konamos are considered (not Kedushas Damim, but) Kedushas ha'Guf.

(b)Consequently, even though Shmuel holds 'Ein Adam Makdish Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' - since Konamos are considered 'Kedushas ha'Guf, when the woman declared the work of her hands Hekdesh, the Isur took her hands out of the Shibud.

(c)Rav Ashi learns this - from the fact that Konamos, like Kedushas Mizbe'ach, cannot be redeemed, whereas Kedushas Damim can.

(d)Rava holds that Hekdesh, Chametz and Shichrur remove the Shibud. By ...

1. ... Hekdesh, he means - that if someone gave his animal as collateral, and then declared it a Korban, the Hekdesh is effective.

2. ... Chametz, he means - that if a Jew designates a cellar-full of whisky as collateral against a loan from a Nochri, and Erev Pesach arrives, he is obligated to destroy it together with the rest of his Chametz.

3. ... Shichrur, he means - that if a Jew designates his Eved Kena'ani collateral, and then sets him free, the Eved goes free, and the creditor must claim his loan from another source (as is the case by Hekdesh and Chametz).

4)

(a)According to Rav Ashi's explanation, why does the Tana of our Mishnah say 'Shema Yigreshenah'? Why does the Neder not take effect immediately?

(b)In that case, how do we resolve our original problem of 'Adam Makdish Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' (where Shmuel appears to contradict himself)?

4)

(a)Strictly speaking, according to Rav Ashi's explanation, the Neder takes effect immediately, as we just explained. The reason that the Tana added 'Shema Yigreshenah' is - because the Rabanan strengthened the husband's rights (to override Hekdesh and Konamos). Consequently, it is only after the divorce that the Konam can actually take effect.

(b)We resolve our original problem of 'Adam Makdish Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam' (where Shmuel appears to contradict himself) - by adding that, since min ha'Torah, Hekdesh overrides the husband's Shibud, when Chazal strengthened the Shibud, they did so only until such time as he divorces his wife. The moment he does, the Hekdesh takes effect retroactively.

5)

(a)What does our Mishnah say about a man who annuls a Neder thinking it was his wife who declared it, and it turns out to be his daughter, or vice-versa?

(b)What if he annuls her Neder of Nezirus thinking she declared an ordinary Neder, or vice-versa, or if he annulled her Neder thinking that she forbade figs, when really it was grapes, or vice-versa?

(c)Will the same apply if he upholds her Neder under the same circumstances?

(d)What is the reason for this ruling?

5)

(a)If a man annuls a Neder thinking it was his wife who declared it, and it turns out to be his daughter or vice-versa - his Hafarah is invalid, and he must annul it again before nightfall.

(b)The same will apply if he annuls her Neder of Nezirus thinking she declared an ordinary Neder, or vice-versa, or if he annulled her Neder thinking that she forbade figs, when really it was grapes, or vice-versa, or ...

(c)... if he upholds her Neder under the same circumstances (in which case he will still be able to annul the Neder up until nightfall).

(d)The reason for this Halachah is - because a Hafarah or a Hakamah made in error is not valid.

6)

(a)How do we learn this principle from the Pasuk "Yani Osah"?

(b)But this Pasuk is written by Hafarah. What is the source of the same principle by Hakamah?

(c)In view of the Hekesh "Ishah Yekimenu, v'Ishah Yeferenu", what can we learn from the Beraisa in 'Na'arah ha'Me'orasah', which cites a Chumra of Hakamah over Hafarah, in that whereas Kiyum in one's heart is not valid, Hafarah in one's heart is?

(d)What other Halachah can we learn from the word "Ki Hecherish Lah"?

6)

(a)We learn this principle from the word "Yani Osah" - implying that he knows exactly who declared the Neder (and by the same token, its contents).

(b)This Pasuk is written by Hafarah. The source of the same principle by Hakamah - lies in the word "Ki Hecherish Lah", which has the same connotations as "Osah".

(c)In view of the Hekesh "Ishah Yekimenu, v'Ishah Yeferenu", we can learn from the Beraisa in 'Na'arah ha'Me'orasah' which cites a Chumra of Hakamah over Hafarah, in that whereas Kiyum in one's heart is not valid, Hafarah in one's heart is - that the Hekesh is not absolute, that it is confined to issues mentioned in the Pasuk itself.

(d)We can also learn from the word "Ki Hecherish Lah" - that a husband is not able to uphold the Nedarim of two wives simultaneously.