1)

(a)What She'eilah did Rav Hoshaya ask with regard to a man who gave a woman two Perutos, declaring that he is betrothing her, with one of them now, and with the other, after he divorces her?

(b)How did Rav Avin and Rebbi Yitzchak b'Rivi attempt to resolve this She'eilah from bar Pada?

(c)We already learned above (Rebbi Yochanan's ruling) that if a third person redeems the plants from Hekdesh, even bar Pada, who holds 'Chozros v'Kodshos, will agree that they do not become Hekdesh. Will this apply even if the purchaser subsequently bought them back from him?

1)

(a)Rav Hoshaya asked - in a case where a man gave a woman two Perutos, declaring that he is betrothing her, with one of them now, and with the other, after he divorces her, whether the second Kidushin is effective or not.

(b)Rav Avin and Rebbi Yitzchak b'Rivi attempted to resolve this She'eilah from bar Pada (who holds 'Chozros v'Kodshos', even though the Noder did not issue a fresh declaration after redeeming them) - that here too, the second Kidushin will take effect after the divorce even without a fresh Kidushin.

(c)We already learned above (Rebbi Yochanan's ruling) that if a third person redeems the plants from Hekdesh, then even bar Pada will agree that they do not become Hekdesh - and this will apply even if the purchaser subsequently bought them back from him.

2)

(a)How did Rebbi Yirmeyahu therefore refute Rav Avin and Rebbi Yitzchak b'Rivi's proof, when he aroused himself from his nap?

(b)What gives a woman the Din of a third person in this regard? Why is she not like Hekdesh?

(c)Does this mean that Rebbi Yirmeyahu considers her completely like a third person, in which case he will resolve Rav Oshaya's She'eilah in the opposite direction (and the second Kidushin will not take effect)?

2)

(a)Upon arousing himself from his nap, Rebbi Yirmeyahu therefore refuted Rav Avin and Rebbi Yitzchak b'Rivi's proof - by comparing the case of Kidushei Ishah to a third person, in which, we just learned, even bar Pada does not hold 'Chozros v'Kodshos'.

(b)What gives a woman the Din of a third person in this regard is - the fact that, the moment she leaves her husband jurisdiction, she is not like the original owner of the plants, who had and who has the power to declare them Hekdesh (because the Torah writes "Ki Yikach Ish Ishah", but rather, she resembles Hefker, seeing as Kidushin can only be performed by the husband, and as far as he is concerned, she is like a third person.

(c)This does not mean that Rebbi Yirmeyahu considers her completely like a third person, in which case he will resolve Rav Oshaya's She'eilah in the opposite direction (and the second Kidushin will not take effect) - because neither does she totally resemble a third person, seeing as she is the one to bring herself into her husband domain, by giving her consent, in which case she is somewhat similar to Hekdesh (and the second Kidushin ought to be valid).

3)

(a)According to Rebbi Yirmeyahu then, the She'eilah remains unresolved. In the opinion of the Rashba however, Rebbi Ila (in Kesuvos and later in this Masechta), does resolve it. What does Rebbi Ila say about declaring a field Hekdesh?

(b)Then why did Rebbi Yirmeyahu not quote Rebbi Ila?

(c)The Rambam too, agrees with the Rashba. How will this ruling apply even to the case of bar Pada, when a third person redeems the plants, where the Hekdesh is not automatically effective?

(d)On what grounds do we reject the Rashba's proof from Kesuvos?

3)

(a)According to Rebbi Yirmeyahu then, the She'eilah remains unresolved. In the opinion of the Rashba however, Rebbi Ila (in Kesuvos and later in this Masechta), does resolve it. Rebbi Ila says - that if someone declares a field that he is about to sell Hekdesh for when after he re-purchases it from the buyer, the field does indeed become Hekdesh ...

(b)... and the reason that Rebbi Yirmeyahu did not quote Rebbi Ila is - because he did not know about his ruling.

(c)The Rambam too, agrees with the Rashba. This ruling will apply even to the case of bar Pada, when a third person redeems the plants (where the Hekdesh is not automatically effective) - to validate a specific Neder that he made prior to the redemption, declaring them Hekdesh now after he purchases them from the purchaser.

(d)We reject the Rashba's proof from Kesuvos however - because there, seeing as the owner could have declared the field Hekdesh now had he so wished, the Hekdesh now for later is also effective; whereas in our case and in the case of Kidushin, where he is 'Makdish v'Chozer u'Makdish' or 'Mekadesh v'Chozer u'Mekadesh' and where the second Hekdesh or Kidushin could not be effective now (before the first one), it may well be that it will not be effective later either.

4)

(a)Our Mishnah permits someone who forbids Hana'ah from sailors to benefit from people who reside on dry land. What will be the Din if someone forbids Hana'ah from people who reside on dry land? May he benefit from sailors?

(b)Rav Papa and Rav Acha Brei d'Rav Ika argue over the Seifa of our Mishnah 'Lo k'Eilu she'Holchin m'Acco l'Yafo, Ela b'Mi she'Darko Lefaresh'. According to one of them, this refers to (the inference from) the first case 'ha'Noder mi'Yordei ha'Yam, Mutar b'Yoshvei Yabashah'. What would the Seifa then come to teach us?

(c)According to the other, it refers to the second case 'ha'Noder mi'Yoshvei Yabashah, Asur b'Yordei ha'Yam'. What would the Seifa be coming to teach us now?

(d)What will this second opinion hold in the Reisha with regard to Yordei ha'Yam who only sail from Acco to Yafo (where the first opinion ruled leniently)?

4)

(a)Our Mishnah permits someone who made a Neder forbidding Hana'ah from sailors to benefit from people who reside on dry land. On the other hand - it forbids someone who made a Neder forbidding Hana'ah from people who reside on dry land to benefit from sailors (seeing as they reside on dry land, too.

(b)Rav Papa and Rav Acha Brei d'Rav Ika argue over the Seifa of our Mishnah 'Lo k'Eilu she'Holchin m'Acco l'Yafo, Ela b'Mi she'Darko Lefaresh'. According to one of them, this refers to (the inference from) the first case 'ha'Noder mi'Yordei ha'Yam, Mutar b'Yoshvei Yabashah', 'Ha mi'Yordei ha'Yam Asur' - but only from long distance sailors who travel overseas, not from ferry-boat men who only sail from Acco to Yafo.

(c)According to the other, it refers to the second case 'ha'Noder mi'Yoshvei Yabashah, Asur b'Yordei ha'Yam' - and not just from ferry-boat men, but even from long-distance sailors.

(d)This second opinion, which says nothing about the Reisha with regard to Yordei ha'Yam who only sail from Acco to Yafo - presumably does not differentiate, and they too, are considered sailors and included in the Neder (even though, the first opinion ruled leniently).

5)

(a)'Those who travel from Acco to Yafo' might pertain only to those who do so regularly, says the Rashba. How else might we interpret it?

(b)The Yerushalmi cites a Machlokes Tana'im in the last Perek of this Masechta, regarding a woman who undertakes to become a Nazir from the time that she marries. Rebbi Yishmael holds there that her husband may annul her Neder, and Rebbi Akiva holds that he may not. What is the basis of their Machlokes?

(c)Like whom is the Halachah?

(d)What does the Yerushalmi prove from here regarding someone who forbade Hana'ah from sailors after thirty days ... ?

(e)Are people who go on cruises considered sailors in this regard?

5)

(a)'Those who travel from Acco to Yafo' might pertain only to those who do so regularly, says the Rashba - or it might pertain to those who happened to have been traveling on that route at that particular moment.

(b)The Yerushalmi cites a Machlokes Tana'im in the last Perek of this Masechta, where if a woman undertakes to become a Nazir from the time that she marries, Rebbi Yishmael holds that her husband may annul her Neder - because he goes after the time when the Neder takes effect; whereas according to Rebbi Akiva, he may not - because in his opinion, we go after the time when the Neder is made (Rebbi Akiva).

(c)The Halachah - is like Rebbi Akiva.

(d)The Yerushalmi proves from here - that whether if someone forbids Hana'ah from sailors after thirty days, this incorporates people who become sailors during the thirty-day period are included in the Neder or not, is a Machlokes Tana'im.

(e)Whether people who go on cruises are considered sailors in this regard or not - is in fact an unresolved She'eilah in the Yerushalmi (and we rule l'Chumra).

30b----------------------------------------30b

6)

(a)Someone who declares an Isur Hana'ah from 'Ro'ei ha'Chamah', says our Mishnah, is not permitted to benefit from blind people, because he was really referring to all living creatures whom the sun sees. Then what does his Neder preclude?

(b)How do we know that he did not mean what he said?

6)

(a)Someone who declares an Isur Hana'ah from 'Ro'ei ha'Chamah', says our Mishnah, is not permitted to benefit from blind people because he was really referring to all living creatures whom the sun sees. And his Neder comes to preclude - fish and animal fetuses, which are permitted to him.

(b)He cannot have meant what he said - because then he ought to have said 'm'Ro'in' (rather than 'm'Ro'ei ha'Chamah').

7)

(a)Our Mishnah forbids someone who declares an Isur Hana'ah from black-haired people to receive any benefit from both bald people and from white-haired people. Then from whom may he receive benefit? Why is that?

(b)How do we know that ...

1. ... he did not mean to preclude bald people?

2. ... white-haired people?

7)

(a)Our Mishnah forbids someone who declares an Isur Hana'ah from black-haired people to receive any benefit from both bald people and from white-haired people. He may however - receive benefit from women (whose hair is always covered - and regarding whom the title 'covered-haired' is more apt) and small children (whose hair is always uncovered - and regarding whom the title 'uncovered-hair' is more apt).

(b)We know that ...

1. ... he did not mean to preclude bald people - because then he would have said 'Ba'alei Se'ar').

2. ... white-haired people - because since 'Shechorei Rosh' does not preclude bald people, it does not preclude white-haired people either.

8)

(a)Someone who declares an Isur Hana'ah from 'Yilodim', is permitted to receive benefit from Noladim. Why, according to the Chachamim, may someone who made a Neder forbidding Hana'ah from 'Noladim' not receive benefit from Yilodim?

(b)What is the problem with the statement 'Rebbi Meir Matir Af b'Yilodim'?

(c)How do we amend Rebbi Meir's statement to answer the Kashya?

8)

(a)Someone who declares an Isur Hana'ah from 'Yilodim', is permitted to receive benefit from Noladim (because 'Yilodim' implies those who have already been born, but not those who have yet to be born). Someone who made a Neder forbidding Hana'ah from 'Noladim' on the other hand, may not receive benefit from Yilodim, according to the Chachamim - because 'Noladim' incorporates both those who are born already and those who have yet to be born.

(b)The problem with the statement 'Rebbi Meir Matir Af b'Yilodim' is - that if the Noder is permitted to receive benefit also from the Yilodim, then who is included in the Neder?

(c)To answer the Kashya, we amend Rebbi Meir's statement to read - 'Rebbi Meir Omer, Af ha'Noder min ha'Noladim, Mutar b'Yilodim'.

9)

(a)What can we prove from the Pasuk ...

1. ... in Vayechi "Shnei Banecha ha'Noladim L'cha b'Eretz Kena'an"?

2. ... in Melachim "Hinei Ben Nolad l'Veis David Yoshiyahu Shemo"?

(b)How do we reconcile this with Rebbi Meir, who considers 'Noladim' to mean specifically people who have yet to be born?

(c)In which point do the Chachamim disagree with Rebbi Meir?

9)

(a)We can prove from the Pasuk ...

1. ... "Shnei Banecha ha'Noladim Lecha b'Eretz Kena'an" - that 'Noladim' means those who have already been born.

2. ... "Hinei Ben Nolad l'Veis David Yoshiyahu Shemo" - that it also means those who have yet to be born.

(b)We reconcile this with Rebbi Meir, who considers 'Noladim' to mean specifically people who have yet to be born - by restricting his opinion to Lashon Bnei Adam; whilst regarding Lashon Torah, it refers to either.

(c)According to the Chachamim (who also agree with the principle 'bi'Nedarim Holchin Achar Leshon Bnei Adam') - people tend to apply the term 'Noladim' to those who have been born as well as to those who have yet to be born (just like the Torah does).

10)

(a)The Chachamim in the Seifa of our Mishnah say 'Lo Niskaven Ela b'Mi she'Darko Lehivaled'. What are they coming to preclude?

(b)With which of the previous Tana'im do they conform?

10)

(a)The Chachamim in the Seifa of our Mishnah say 'Lo Niskaven Ela b'Mi she'Darko Lehivaled' - to preclude fish and Sheratzim, which do not give birth, but lay eggs.

(b)This is not a third opinion. In fact, the Chachamim conform - with the Tana Kama, who does not preclude someone who is already born from the word 'Noladim'.