>>The SHITAH MEKUBETZES questions the Gemara's proof that Reish Lakish maintains that "He'ir ha'Mizrach" permits Chadash. Perhaps the new grain remains Asur until the Minchas ha'Omer is offered, and the reason why a Korban Minchah brought before the Minchas ha'Omer on the sixteenth of Nisan is valid is that Reish Lakish maintains that "Ein Mechusar Zeman l'Vo va'Yom." The Gemara earlier (5a) uses this logic to explain why a Korban Omer offered she'Lo Lishmah is valid, even though the Isur of Chadash is not removed. This logic dictates that since, on this day, Chadash will become Mutar, it is considered Mutar already from the beginning of the day. Accordingly, perhaps Reish Lakish maintains that the reason why the Minchah brought before the Omer is valid is that the Omer eventually will be brought on this day and permit Chadash.<<
It seems to me that the Shita Mekubetzes is not asking such a question at all. Rather, he is coming to explain why the Gemara says that "Lav b'Feirush Itmar Ela Michlala Itmar", which always indicates that the understanding was flawed. In other words, this is not a question on the Gemara, but rather an explanation.
It is true that sometimes the phrase "Lav b'Feirush Itmar Ela Michelalah Itmar" indicates that the understanding was flawed. An example is in Bava Metzia 36a, where Rav said that a Shomer who handed it over to another Shomer is exempt. The Gemara says that they thought that Rav said this because he exempted the Shomer in a certain incident but in fact in that case there was a different reason, apart from "a Shomer who handed over to a Shomer," why Rav exempted.
However, the Gemara in Menachos 5b cites Resh Lakish and states, "One sees that Resh Lakish holds that 'He'ir ha'Mizrach' permits Chadash." The Gemara does not reject this proof in a similar way that it does in Bava Metzia 36a. This suggests that when the Shitah Mekubetzes writes that a proof is not being brought that He'ir ha'Mizrach permits, this implies that he is questioning what the Gemara stated that we see that Resh Lakish holds that He'ir ha'Mizrach permits.
Kol Tuv,
Dovid Bloom
R' Dovid,
I respectfully disagree. Rashi in Berachos at the end of the first Perek clearly implies that this is a rule. Rishonim in every Sugya in Shas back this up. And in this case, the Shita is clearly NOT asking a question - he is explaining why they Hava Amina was wrong.
B'Hatzlacha,
M. Cohen
Reb Moshie,
1) Many thanks for your very perceptive comments. However, I do not think that we can say for certain that the Gemara was flawed when it said that Resh Lakish holds that He'ir ha'Mizrach Matir. Rather, we can say that we do not have a proof for this, since it could be that the reason the Minchah is Kasher is because of Ein Mechusar Zman l'Bo ba'Yom.
Our Gemara does not say explicitly that He'ir ha'Mizrach is wrong in the same way that other Gemaras state that the "Michlala" is wrong.
Both options are possible and we do not have a proof one way or the other, but we are not sure that the Hava Amina was wrong.
This is what the Shitah Mekubetzes means, "it does not bring a proof here that the reason is He'ir ha'Mizrach since perhaps the reason is because of Ein Mechusar Zman...." Both are possible explanations.
2) I later found in Hagahos v'Chidushim, at the end of Maseches Menachos here, that they cite Sefer Halichos Olam, the major work about Kelalei ha'Gemara Gemara (the rules of the Gemara). They cite this from Halichos Olam, Sha'ar 2, Perek 2, section 22 (there is a printer's error there and it should read 22 instead of 82). The Halichos Olam writes that sometimes when the Gemara states, "What so and so said was not 'b'Feirush Itmar Ela Michlalah Itmar," the Gemara proceeds to ask, "v'Iy Michlalah, Mai?" -- "And if it was derived through an inference, what difference does it make?" (This is indeed the case in the Gemara in Berachos 12a that you cited, which asks, "v'Iy Michlalah, Mai?")
The Halichos Olam writes that since the Gemara attempted to establish that it was b'Feirush Itmar, this suggests that there is a Grei'usa, some disadvantage, in the fact that it is only derived Michlalah. He cites Yevamos 60b as an example of this.
However, when the Gemara says, "What so and so said was not said b'Feirush but Michalalah," the Gemara does not ask, "v'Iy Michlalah, Mai?" because there is no weakness in the fact that it was stated Michlalah but this is rather the truthful way that this teaching was imparted.
The Halichos Olam seems to be saying that wherever the Gemara does not ask "v'Iy Michlalah, Mai?" this shows that there is no weakness in the fact that it was stated only as an implication.
Since the Gemara here in Menachos 5b does not ask "v'Iy Michlalah, Mai?" this suggests that there is no weakness in the fact that it was said Michlalah, because Resh Lakish can really hold that He'ir ha'Mizrach Matir.
Yeyasher Kochacha,
Dovid Bloom