Without verbalized intent, how would we know the korban was invalid? Or just need to rely on the kohen to admit the mistake afterwards? Were the people bringing korbanos close enough to the offering to be able to hear what the kohen was saying?
Joshua Danziger
Rav bloom and the kollel, a follow on. While most rishonim hold that wrong intent needs to be verbalized, the general view is that the rambam holds that mental intent alone is sufficient to disqualify. Is that correct? The reason I ask is that in Pesulei hamukdashim 14:10 the rambam discusses the use of the word "achilah" in a way that seems he might actually agree about intent needing to be verbalized.
Let me know what you think!
Josh
1) The source of the Rambam in Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashim 14:10 is the Gemara in Zevachim 31a, "d'Afkah b'Lashon Achilah" -- "he said it as Achilah." This Gemara is cited by the Smag (Mitzvos Lo Ta'aseh #337) as a proof that Machshavah in Kodshim means speech. So we will have to know how the Rambam (as explained by the Mishneh l'Melech, Hilchos Pesulei Hamukdashim 13:1, who says that according to the Rambam, all Machshavah of Kodshim is without speech) and the Sefer ha'Chinuch (Mitzvah 144, who also holds that Machshavah of Kodshim is without speech) learn Zevachim 31a
2) The only possibility that I can think of at the moment is to say that the Rambam learns that the Gemara in Zevachim 31a, "that he brought it forth with a Lashon of eating," does not actually mean that one must say something, but rather that often people do say what they are thinking, even though it would also be Pigul if they just thought it. According to this, when the Rambam (14:10) writes "v'Im Hotzi'o b'Lashion Achilah," was merely following the words of the Gemara, and we cannot prove from this wording that the Rambam holds that one must say something.
3) The Frankel edition of the Rambam, on Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 13:1 (the location of the Mishneh l'Melech I cited above) cites the Chasdei David on the Tosefta in Menachos (end of chapter 5) who disagrees with the Mishneh l'Melech and says that the Rambam agrees with the other Rishonim that one must verbally express his thought. However, the Sefer ha'Chinuch (beginning of Mitzvah 144) writes that the Pesul of Machshavah is that "he made up his mind" that he would eat the Korban at the wrong time. This implies more clearly that one does not require speech, and the Me'iri in Pesachim (63a) writes, "It does not need to be said by one's mouth, either for Machsheves Pigul...," so even if the Rambam is not so clear on this matter, the Me'iri and Sefer ha'Chinuch say more clearly that wrong intent need not be verbalized.
4) I found, bs'd, that the Teshuvos Minchas Baruch (Siman 1:6, DH uMH'T) cites the Smag (#337) that I mentioned above who quotes Zevachim 31a as a proof that for Kodshim one must verbalize, but then he writes that even according to the Rambam -- who says that Pigul is effective merely by thinking -- if he verbalizes his intentions for Pigul it no longer matters what he is thinking (because Devarim sheb'Lev Einam Devarim, so if what he says contradicts what he claims he is thinking, we have to follow what he said out loud). The Minchas Baruch also writes that it is possible to say that the Gemara there does not mean he actually said the Lashon of Achilah or Haktarah, but rather he was Meharher in his heart these phrases (in fact, some have written that the entire issue under discussion at the moment depends on the question in Berachos 20b of whether thinking is equivalent to speaking).
Again, we can say that the Rambam (14:10) merely cited the words of the Gemara, but they now contain these two possibilities: either that he verbalized the opposite of what he was thinking, or even the Gemara there means he was only thinking.
5) The opinion of Rashi:
I should mention that it may be that Rashi agrees with the Rambam. See Kidushin 41b, where the Gemara asks, "Mah l'Hanach she'Ken Yeshnan b'Machshavah." The Sugya there is saying that Kodshim apply through thought. Rashi (DH she'Ken) cites the Gemara in Shavuos 26b which asks, "If a person merely decided in his heart that an animal will be a Korban, how do we know that this is effective?" The Gemara answers by citing the verse, "All generous of heart bring offerings" (Divrei ha'Yamim II 29:31). From this we learn that one may make an animal Kodesh merely by thinking in one's heart. There is also a statement in brackets in the Rashi which reads, "Also the invalidation of Kodshim and Pigul come through thinking," but there is a note in the margin that says that the Maharshal in Chochmas Shlomo erases this latter statement.
6) However, I would like to suggest that it may be possible to justify the text that we have in Rashi before the Maharshal's amendment. My source is from Rashi in Chumash on the verse, "You may not slaughter... any bad Davar" (Devarim 17:1). Rashi writes there in the name of Sifri that this is a warning against doing Pigul on Kodshim by bad speech. The Mizrachi on Rashi writes that when Rashi says that one needs "bad speech" this is not to be taken literally because even a bad thought can make Pigul. This is derived from the verse, "Lo Yechashev Lo Pigul" (Vayikra 7:18), which teaches that Pigul happens through "Yechashev," merely by thinking.
7) The question has been asked on the Mizrachi (the leading Mefaresh on Rashi on Chumash): if Rashi says speech, then why did the Mizrachi say thought? The question becomes stronger when we see that Rashi in Zevachim 41b (DH Kegon) writes that all Machshavah of Kodshim means that he says it out loud. So how can the Mizrachi say that one need not say it out loud?
The answer may be that the Mizrachi (who was older than the Maharshal) had the text that we have in Rashi in Kidushin 41b before the brackets were inserted, so Pigul comes through mere thought without speech.
Dovid Bloom