BAVA KAMA 45 (17 Shevat) - Dedicated by Mrs. Idelle Rudman in memory of Harav Reuven Moshe Rudman ben Harav Yosef Tuvia Rudman on his third Yahrzeit.

[45a - 35 lines; 45b - 44 lines]

1)[line 7]אומרין באיסורי הנאה הרי שלך לפניךOMRIN B'ISUREI HANA'AH "HAREI SHELCHA LEFANECHA"

(a)Isurei Hana'ah are items from which it is prohibited by the Torah to derive benefit. Such items are considered to be of no monetary value. Some examples are Orlah (see Background to Kidushin 56:6), Kil'ei ha'Kerem (see Background to Kidushin 56:7), Chametz b'Pesach (see next entry), and Shor ha'Niskal (see Background to Bava Kama 44:20).

(b)A Shomer (one of the four watchmen mentioned in the Torah - see Background to Bava Kama 44:21) and a Gazlan (a robber) have obligations to return items to their owners. If they cannot return the item for any reason, they must reimburse the owner with the value of the item. If the item becomes Asur b'Hana'ah while it is in the hands of the Shomer or the Gazlan, the Tana'im mentioned in our Gemara maintain that they may return the item "as is," and do not have to reimburse the owner, even though the item is worthless at present.


Chametz that was in the possession of a Jew during Pesach is prohibited to eat and is Asur b'Hana'ah (to derive benefit from it) due to a Gezeirah d'Rabanan.

3)[line 13]אין גומרין דינו של שור אלא בפניוEIN GOMRIN DINO SHEL SHOR ELA B'FANAV

(a)The Gemara teaches (Bava Kama 44b) that an animal is only put to death if it killed a person in a manner that would have warranted that death sentence had the act been committed by a person. For this reason, if the animal killed unintentionally or if it killed a person that was a Tereifah (see Background to Bava Kama 41:6) the animal is not put to death, since a person who kills in such a manner is not given the death sentence.

(b)Similarly, the court case in which the animal is sentenced to death, according to some Tana'im, resembles the court case of a person. As such, just as a person must be present in court when testimony is brought against him, so, too, must the bull appear in court in order for it to become a Shor ha'Niskal.

(c)The dissenting opinion (Rebbi Yakov) maintains that it is not necessary for the animal to appear in court just like a person must appear in court, since the person must appear in court for a logical reason: to present his case to the court. This obviously does not apply to a bull. When the logical arguments determining the way a person is judged do not apply to a bull, the bull is not sentenced the same way as a person. (See also TOSFOS to Sanhedrin 78a DH Shor)

4a)[line 14]אי אהדרתיה ניהליIY AHADARTEI NIHALI- had you returned it to me

b)[line 15]הוה מערקנא ליה לאגמאHAVAH ME'ARAKNA LEI L'AGMA- I would have chased it into the marshes [and claimed that it is lost]

5)[line 15]השתא אתפשתיה לתוראי בידא דלא יכילנא לאשתעויי דינא בהדיהHASHTA ASPASTEI L'SORA'I B'YADA D'LO YACHILNA L'ISHTA'UYEI DINA BAHADEI- now you have let my bull be seized by someone (i.e. Beis Din) from whom I cannot retrieve it (lit. with whom I cannot argue)

6)[line 22]בני טענה נינהוBNEI TA'ANAH NINHU- people, who are able to make claims in court

7)[line 30]דנטריהD'NATREI- guarded it [with a Shemirah Me'ulah, an extraordinary guarding]

8a)[line 32]שמירה פחותהSHEMIRAH PECHUSAH- the lower standard of guarding, e.g. a closed door that will stay closed in an average wind

b)[line 33]שמירה מעולהSHEMIRAH ME'ULAH- the higher standard of guarding, e.g. a closed door that will stay closed in an extraordinary wind

9)[line 34]כלתה לו שמירתוKALSAH LO SHEMIRASO- (lit. his [obligation of] watching is ended) he has fulfilled his obligation with regard to guarding the animal


10)[line 1]שוכר כשומר חנם / כנושא שכרSOCHER K'SHOMER CHINAM / K'NOSEI SACHAR

The Socher, or renter, is one of the four watchmen mentioned in the Torah (see Background to Bava Kama 44:21). He pays money to rent an item from his friend. There is a Machlokes Tana'im in Bava Metzia (93a) whether the Socher has the status of the Nosei Sachar, or the status of a Shomer Chinam. The Halachah follows the opinion that he has the status of a Nosei Sachar, and as such he is liable for damages in cases of Peshi'ah (negligence), theft or loss, but is not liable in a case of Ones (an unavoidable accident) (RASHI to Bava Kama 4b).

11)[line 3]וכולן במועדין פטורין לענין כופרV'CHULAN B'MU'ADIN PETURIN, L'INYAN KOFER- [and, according to Rebbi Yehudah,] all [of the Shomrim who guard bulls] that are Mu'adim [at the level of a Shemirah Pechusah] will be exempt from paying Kofer, [since they have fulfilled their obligation of guarding]

12)[line 5]אין לו שמירה אלא סכיןEIN LO SHEMIRAH ELA SAKIN- (lit. the only method of guarding it is with the knife) even if the Shomer guarded it at the level of a Shemirah Me'ulah, he is liable for its damages; the only way to guard a Shor ha'Mu'ad properly is to slaughter it and thus remove the damaging agent from the world

13)[line 12]ואי דלא קביל עליה שמירת נזקיוV'IY D'KABIL ALEI SHEMIRAS NEZAKAV- if he accepted upon himself to guard it from being damaged

14)[line 17]דלא אזיל איהו ומזיק אחריני קביל עליהD'LO AZIL IHU U'MAZIK ACHARINEI, KABIL ALEI- he accepted upon himself to make sure that it does not go out and damage others

15)[line 19]לא אסיק אדעתיהLO ASIK A'DA'ATEI- he would not imagine [could possibly happen, since this bull is so fierce that other bulls should be afraid of it]

16)[line 20]במוסרהMOSERAH- a tie-rope or the reins

17)[line 20]ונעל בפניו כראויV'NA'AL BEFANAV KA'RA'UY- when he closed the door properly [so that it could not be opened by a normal wind and the animal could not get out by itself]

18)[line 25]סתם שוורים לאו בחזקת שימור קיימיSETAM SHEVARIM LAV B'CHEZKAS SHIMUR KAIMEI- most people do not guard their bulls, but rather leave them [at a level that is not even a Shemirah Pechusah] and go. (Note: these identical words are used on Daf 15a to mean something entirely different - see Background to Bava Kama 15:12.)

19)[line 32]ואין ריבוי אחר ריבוי אלא למעטEIN RIBUY ACHAR RIBUY ELA L'MA'ET - one extension of the law that occurs in the Torah after an identical extension of the law limits the scope of the law [rather than extending it]

(a)This rule of Biblical interpretation interprets the occurrence of two Ribuyim (inclusive words) regarding an identical point as limiting the Halachah they describe, rather than extending it to include more items or to apply in more cases. That is, even though a single Ribuy extends the Halachah to additional items or cases to which one would have thought that the Halachah does not apply, a double Ribuy teaches not to extend the Halachah but rather to interpret it in a limited sense.

(b)The logical derivation for this rule is as follows: If we already know to apply the Halachah under discussion to a particular item (or case), it would not be necessary for the Torah to again teach that the Halachah applies even to that item. It is therefore evident from the second Ribuy that the first one was not meant to include that item. Likewise, the second Ribuy cannot have been written to include that item, for the Torah could have taught to include that item by writing only the first Ribuy. It must therefore be concluded that the double Ribuy means to teach that we should not learn to include the item in the Halachah under discussion. (This rule is closely related to the rule of "Shenei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Ein Melamdim" - see Background to Kidushin 58:13, and to the converse rule of "Ein Mi'ut Achar Mi'ut Ela l'Rabos - see Yoma 43a.)

(c)In all cases of Ribuy Achar Ribuy, the obvious question is why did the Torah write even a single Ribuy? Let the Torah write neither Ribuy and we would know by ourselves not to include the item, since there is no Ribuy to include it! (Obviously the item would not be included without a Ribuy, since we originally found it necessary to interpret the first Ribuy as including that item.) TOSFOS (to Yoma 60a DH Trei) asks a similar question (with regard to Mi'ut Achar Mi'ut) and answers that perhaps we would have included that item (or excluded it, in the case of Mi'ut Achar Mi'ut) without the first Ribuy, through a Binyan Av (see Background to Bava Kama 5:16) or a Kal va'Chomer (see Background to Bava Kama 25:1). The first Ribuy was not really necessary, but we would have justified the Ribuy as "Milsa d'Asya b'Kal va'Chomer Tarach v'Chasav Lah Kra" - "the Torah troubles itself to write out explicitly that which can be learned from a Kal va'Chomer" (see Kidushin 4a, Chulin 118b). The second Ribuy teaches not only to ignore the first Ribuy, but also to ignore the Binyan Av or Kal va'Chomer as well.

(d)In other instances (such as the one recorded in our Sugya) it is more obvious why a double Ribuy is necessary. The second Ribuy does not entirely negate the first, but rather it limits the first Ribuy (or it limits itself) to a narrower interpretation.

20)[line 39]צד תמות במקומה עומדתTZAD TAMUS BI'MEKOMAH OMEDES

When a Tam becomes a Mu'ad, the side of Tamus remains, and a Tam requires a proper guarding.

21)[line 40]מועד לקרן ימיןMU'AD L'KEREN YEMIN- when the bull is a Shor ha'Mu'ad with regard to its right horn, i.e. it became a Mu'ad after goring three times specifically with its right horn