1) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "SHINUY BA'ALIM" AND "SHINUY KODESH"
QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that Shinuy Kodesh is more severe than Shinuy Ba'alim because it applies to all four of the Avodos -- Shechitah, Kabalah, Holachah, and Zerikah, while Shinuy Ba'alim does not apply to all four Avodos. RASHI explains that a Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim is meaningless except when the Kohen has intention to perform the Zerikah for a person other than the owner of the Korban. The reason for this is that the owner of the Korban relates to his Korban only insofar as he receives Kaparah, or fulfills his pledge, through the valid Zerikah of the blood of the Korban. Therefore, having in mind that the Shechitah, Kabalah, or Holachah is being done for a different person has no effect on the Korban.
What does the Gemara mean, then, when it cites verses to show that Shinuy Ba'alim is considered an invalidating thought in any of the four Avodos? Rashi explains that the Gemara means that Shinuy Ba'alim is considered an invalidating thought when the Kohen slaughters the animal with intention to perform the Zerikah for a different person (but not with intention that the Shechitah is being performed for a different person). This is the intent of the Gemara when it states that Shinuy Ba'alim does not apply to all four Avodos, since it is relevant only to thoughts involving Zerikah. The Gemara makes a similar statement with regard to the Chumra of Shinuy Kodesh in Pesachim (60b).
The Gemara in one other place alludes to this difference between Shinuy Kodesh and Shinuy Ba'alim. In the Gemara later (9b), Rebbi Yochanan asserts that if a person slaughters a Korban with the proper intention for the Shechitah, but with intention -- at the time of the Shechitah -- to perform the Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah, his thought is considered a Machshavah she'Lo Lishmah. The Gemara initially says that Rebbi Yochanan derives this law from the laws of Pigul. When a person slaughters a Korban with intention to perform the Zerikah after the proper time has passed ("Chutz l'Zemano"), he invalidates the Korban. In the Gemara later (10a), Rav Ashi finds another source to teach that having intent, during Shechitah, to perform the Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah is considered a Machshavah she'Lo Lishmah. He says that this Halachah may be derived through a Kal va'Chomer: if a Korban is not considered she'Lo Lishmah when one performs Shechitah with intent for a different owner, but it is considered she'Lo Lishmah when he performs Zerikah with intent for a different owner, then with regard to Shinuy Kodesh, where the law is that when one performs the Shechitah with intent for a different Korban it is considered she'Lo Lishmah, certainly if one performs the Shechitah with intent to perform the Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah, the Korban is considered she'Lo Lishmah. It is evident from the Gemara there that the laws of a Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim differ from the laws of Shinuy Kodesh.
The RAMBAM (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 13:1 and 15:1) records the laws of Shinuy Kodesh and Shinuy Ba'alim, but in no place does he mention any distinction between the two. The MISHNEH L'MELECH (15:1) asks that the Rambam seems to contradict the Gemaras mentioned above. How is the Gemara here to be understood according to the ruling of the Rambam?
(a) The ME'IRI in Pesachim (60b) writes that it seems that the Rambam understands that the Halachah does not follow the Sugya here in Zevachim. Why, though, should it not be the Halachah? On the contrary, the Gemara here implies that it is the Halachah, since the Gemara does not mention that this Chumra of Shinuy Kodesh is "Lav Davka" as it mentions with regard to the other two Chumras of Shinuy Kodesh!
The KEREN ORAH (10a) points out that there is a similar Sugya in the Yerushalmi in Pesachim (5:2), where the Yerushalmi also seeks a source that it is considered she'Lo Lishmah when a person slaughters a Korban with intent to perform Zerikah for the sake of a different Korban. The Yerushalmi, however, does not make the simple Kal va'Chomer from Shinuy Ba'alim that Rav Ashi makes here in order to prove that it is she'Lo Lishmah. This implies that, according to the Yerushalmi, Shinuy Ba'alim is the same as Shinuy Kodesh and is not limited to Shechitah done with intent to perform Zerikah for another person. Perhaps the Rambam follows the view of the Yerushalmi that argues with the Bavli. (The Rambam occasionally follows the Yerushalmi and not the Bavli.) In addition, it is possible that in the Rambam's Girsa of the Gemara, the Gemara here does not specify which of the two Chumras of Shinuy Kodesh are "Lav Davka." Perhaps the Rambam learns that the Chumra that Shinuy Kodesh applies to four Avodos is "Lav Davka," and that in truth both types of Shinuy apply to all four Avodos.
(b) Other Acharonim attempt to prove that whether or not Shinuy Ba'alim applies in the same way as Shinuy Kodesh is the subject of dispute even in the Bavli itself. The SEFAS EMES (7a) and the CHAFETZ CHAIM (in ZEVACH TODAH, 7a) suggest that the Rambam might have learned that this Halachah depends on the Machlokes between Rava and Rav Chisda in that Gemara. The KEREN ORAH (4b) shows another Safek in the Bavli, in the Gemara here, upon which this Halachah might depend. The Chafetz Chaim concludes, however, that it is odd for the Gemara to state this Halachah regarding Shinuy Ba'alim as though it is unanimously accepted, if it is actually the subject of a Machlokes elsewhere and is not followed as the Halachah.
(c) The CHAFETZ CHAIM (in ZEVACH TODAH later, 10a) suggests that there are two types of Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim. A Kohen can slaughter a Korban thinking that the Shechitah is for another person other than the owner, or a Kohen can slaughter a Korban thinking that the Korban belongs to a person other than the owner. The Gemara says that a Shinuy Ba'alim during Shechitah is acceptable only when it is the first type of Shinuy Ba'alim -- when the Kohen slaughters the Korban with intent that the Shechitah should be for another person, but the Kohen knows that the Korban belongs to the first person. In contrast, if the Kohen slaughters the Korban with intent that the Korban belongs to another person, then the Korban indeed will be considered she'Lo Lishmah, because it is evident that the Kohen -- who has in mind that the Korban belongs to another person -- will also perform the Zerikah for that other person. Thus, it is as if the Kohen had in mind to perform Zerikah for the other person as well.
Accordingly, the Gemara here and later (10a) may be referring to the first type of Shinuy Ba'alim, and it is teaching that this type of Shinuy Ba'alim is not considered a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah at the time of Shechitah. However, the Rambam -- who seems to equate Shinuy Kodesh with Shinuy Ba'alim -- may be referring to the other type of Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim: the Kohen has in mind to bring the Korban for another person (and not just to perform the Shechitah for another person) at the time of Shechitah. However, the Chafetz Chaim concludes that if this indeed is the way the Rambam learns, the Rambam still should mention that there is another type of Shinuy Ba'alim that does not apply to Shechitah.
RAV SHACH zt'l in AVI EZRI (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 15:1) and the EVEN HA'AZEL (end of 13:1) make a similar suggestion. They add that even if the Kohen slaughters the Korban for the sake of a person other than its owner, it is considered she'Lo Lishmah, because he probably intends to perform the Zerikah for the other person as well. They suggest that the Gemara later (10a) does not mean that Shechitah done for a different person is not considered she'Lo Lishmah. Rather, it means that it would not have been considered she'Lo Lishmah had it not been for the fact that the Kohen intends to do the Zerikah for a different person as well.
However, they have difficulty explaining the Gemara based on this approach. Why is Shinuy Kodesh considered more severe than Shinuy Ba'alim?
(d) Perhaps a new approach may be suggested to explain the words of the Rambam. The Gemara later (10a) first attempts to use a different Kal va'Chomer to teach that it is considered she'Lo Lishmah when a Kohen slaughters the animal with the intent to perform Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah. The Gemara suggests a Kal va'Chomer from the Halachah of slaughtering the Korban in the improper time. The Gemara says that a Korban which is slaughtered with intention that the Shechitah should be performed "Chutz l'Zemano" is valid, yet if one slaughters it in order to perform the Zerikah "Chutz l'Zemano," then the Korban is Pasul. Since the law is that when a person does Shechitah with intent to offer the animal as a different Korban it is considered she'Lo Lishmah, if he does Shechitah with intent that the Zerikah be done for a different Korban then certainly it should be she'Lo Lishmah. RASHI (DH Hareini Shochet and DH Hareini Shochto) explains that having intention, during the Shechitah, that the Shechitah is being done "Chutz l'Zemano" is a meaningless intention, because the Shechitah is actually being done in the proper time.
Perhaps Rav Ashi's Kal va'Chomer from Shinuy Ba'alim is based on the same type of logic. That is, there are two types of Shinuy Ba'alim. One type is when a Kohen slaughters the Korban of Shimon having in mind that the Shechitah should be done for Reuven, who he knows does not own the Korban. The other type is when a Kohen slaughters the Korban of Shimon and he thinks that Shimon is Reuven. Although the first type of Shinuy Ba'alim indeed gives the Korban the status of she'Lo Lishmah, the second type of Shinuy Ba'alim is a meaningless thought, since, at the time of Shechitah, the owner is standing next to the Korban and the Kohen intends that the Korban belongs to that person. The fact that the Kohen thinks that Shimon is a different person cannot render the Korban she'Lo Lishmah, as long as the Kohen intends for the Korban to be brought for the person (who is the true owner) who is standing before him. However, during the Zerikah, there is no parallel, meaningless thought of Shinuy Ba'alim, because the owner is not standing in front of the Kohen at the time that the Kohen performs the Zerikas ha'Dam upon the Mizbe'ach. Therefore, if the Kohen performs Zerikah with intention that the Korban is for the wrong person, then it indeed is considered she'Lo Lishmah. This might be the meaning of the Gemara later, and the Gemara here, when it says that Shinuy Kodesh applies to more Avodos than Shinuy Ba'alim. The Gemara means that this type of Shinuy Ba'alim (the second type) does not apply during the Shechitah (since the owner is there), but it does apply during the Zerikah.
The Rambam, on the other hand, is justified in not citing this distinction between Shinuy Kodesh and Shinuy Ba'alim, because this distinction is self-evident. This kind of Machshavah of Shinuy Ba'alim during Shechitah is obviously meaningless.
What, then, does the Gemara later (10a) mean when it proves that a Shechitah with intention to do Zerikah for another Korban invalidates the Korban based on a Kal va'Chomer from Shinuy Ba'alim? Shechitah done with intention to do Zerikah with Shinuy Ba'alim does not disqualify the Korban! How, then, can a Kal va'Chomer from Shinuy Ba'alim teach that such a Machshavah with Shinuy Kodesh invalidates the Korban?
The answer is that the Gemara is not assuming that such a Machshavah invalidates the Korban in the case of Shinuy Ba'alim. Rather, it sees from Shinuy Ba'alim that more Machshavos can invalidate the Korban at the time of Zerikah than at the time of Shechitah, since the second type of Shinuy Ba'alim does not apply during the Shechitah. Consequently, a wrong thought during Zerikah is more severe than during Shechitah. If Shechitah with intention that the animal is being slaughtered for a different type of Korban is Pasul, then certainly slaughtering an animal with intention that the Zerikah should be done for a different type of Korban should be considered a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah.
Support for this way of reading the Gemara may be found in the words of Rav Ashi. When Rav Ashi expresses his Kal va'Chomer, he is careful to omit the three words "Shechato Al Menas," implying that he is not discussing a case where the Kohen slaughters an animal with intention to do the Zerikah for a different person, but rather he is discussing a case in which the Kohen does the Zerikah for a different person, and it is from this case that he makes his Kal va'Chomer. (M. KORNFELD)
2) THE SOURCE THAT "BECHOR," "MA'ASER BEHEMAH," AND "PESACH" MUST BE OFFERED "LISHMAH"
QUESTION: The Gemara proves that a Kohen must bring a Korban Shelamim with specific intent for the correct owner and for the correct type of Korban. The Gemara asks what the source is that this requirement applies to other Korbanos as well. Perhaps this requirement applies only to Shelamim, the laws of which are more stringent than other Korbanos, because Shelamim requires Semichah, Nesachim, and Tenufas Chazeh v'Shok. RASHI explains that most other Korbanos require Semichah as well, and the Gemara's question from the Chumra of Semichah of Shelamim is only from the three types of Korbanos which do not require Semichah -- Bechor, Ma'aser Behemah, and Pesach. Since these Korbanos do not require Semichah, they should not require Kavanah Lishmah. The Gemara answers that all other Korbanos are compared by the verse to Shelamim, as the verse says, "Zos ha'Torah..." (Vayikra 7:37).
How does that verse teach that Kavanah Lishmah is required for Bechor, Ma'aser Behemah, and Pesach? Those three Korbanos are not mentioned in the verse! If the Gemara means that those three Korbanos are included in the category of Shelamim (since they are Kodshim Kalim), then why is it necessary to invoke the Hekesh to show that these Korbanos must be offered Lishmah? The Gemara already knows that Shelamim must be offered Lishmah from the verses cited earlier!
ANSWER: The Gemara apparently is relying on the Beraisa cited later (7b), which teaches that the words "b'Yom Tzavoso... l'Hakriv Es Korbeneihem" (Vayikra 7:38) in the verse which follows the verse of the Hekesh refer to Bechor, Ma'aser, and Pesach, and thus the Hekesh includes those Korbanos as well.
3) A KORBAN THAT IS NOT "MERATZEH" BUT NEVERTHELESS IS VALID
QUESTION: After the Gemara derives the source that teaches that a Korban slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah does not attain atonement (Meratzeh) for its owner, the Gemara asks what the source is that the Korban itself remains valid even though it is not Meratzeh. Perhaps a Korban slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah is entirely Pasul! The Gemara answers that the verse, "Motza Sefasecha" (Devarim 24:23), teaches that the Korban is valid even though it is not Meratzeh.
RASHI (DH Lifselu) writes that the Gemara's question is that a Korban brought she'Lo Lishmah should be entirely Pasul, because it was not brought according to the proper procedure, and the Zerikah of the Dam of the Korban will not permit its meat to be eaten.
Rashi's words are difficult to understand. Why does Rashi explain that the focus of the Gemara's question is that the meat of the Korban should be prohibited to eat when it is offered she'Lo Lishmah? The Gemara seems to be asking a much stronger question. A Korban offered she'Lo Lishmah should be entirely Pasul and it should be prohibited to continue offering it! (That is, if the Shechitah was done she'Lo Lishmah, then the Korban should be Pasul and the Kohen should not be permitted to perform the Zerikah and the other Avodos at all, and certainly he may not offer the Korban upon the Mizbe'ach!) Why does Rashi limit the Gemara's question to asking that the meat of the Korban should be forbidden to be eaten? (CHIDUSHEI HA'GRIZ)
ANSWER: The NETZIV in MEROMEI SADEH (2a) and the TAHARAS HA'KODESH here explain that Rashi is answering the question of TOSFOS (DH Eima). Why does the Gemara suggest that we derive from the verse not only that a Korban she'Lo Lishmah is not Meratzeh but that the Korban itself is Pasul? There is a rule in the laws of Kodshim that states that the failure to adhere to a certain requirement that is taught by only a single verse does not invalidate the Korban. That is, with regard to the laws of Korbanos, a requirement that appears once in the Torah is assumed to be l'Chatchilah, and failure to fulfill that requirement does not invalidate the Korban. Only when the Torah repeats the law is that law "Me'akev" -- the Korban is disqualified even b'Di'eved if that law is not fulfilled.
The Acharonim propose that Rashi is answering this question by suggesting that the Gemara does not really suggest that we derive from the verse that the Korban is Pasul if it is not brought Lishmah, since the Gemara knows that failure to fulfill a law taught by a single verse cannot disqualify a Korban. Rather, the Gemara is suggesting that a single verse should suffice to disqualify the Korban from being eaten, even if the Korban itself is valid and can be offered upon the Mizbe'ach. (The Taharas ha'Kodesh points out that a similar concept is found with regard to a Korban that is brought b'Tum'ah, where the Korban can be offered on the Mizbe'ach but cannot be eaten.) That is the Gemara's question.
The Gemara answers that the verse of "Motza Sefasecha" teaches that the Korban may even be eaten.
How does this answer the question of Tosfos? Normally, when a requirement of a Korban is mentioned in a single verse, not only is the Korban valid but it may even be eaten. Why, then, should a single verse make a Korban that is slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah be forbidden to be eaten? The Taharas ha'Kodesh answers that the verse of "Motza Sefasecha" teaches not only that a Korban slaughtered she'Lo Lishmah may be eaten, but even that any Korban that is missing any requirement of the Torah may be eaten, unless the Torah mentions the requirement twice. (This is similar to the answer in the end of Tosfos DH Eima, in which Tosfos asserts that "Motza Sefasecha" is the source that teaches that two verses are required to render a Korban invalid.)
(b) Perhaps Rashi is answering the question of Tosfos in another manner. The SHITAH MEKUBETZES (#10) explains that it is true that a single verse normally does not disqualify a Korban when the verse's requirement is not fulfilled. For example, although the Torah says that a person must mix the Minchah with oil, if he does not mix it, the Minchah is still acceptable. In the case of the Gemara here, however, the Torah is not teaching a new requirement. Rather, the Torah is teaching the way in which one must perform the Avodos that have already been taught (Shechitah, Kabalah, Holachah, and Zerikah). The Torah is teaching how to perform those Avodos. Therefore, if a person does Shechitah (or any of the other Avodos) she'Lo Lishmah, one might have thought that the Korban indeed is Pasul. One would have reasoned that since a Korban that lacks Shechitah, or any of the four Avodos, is obviously Pasul, a Korban in which the Shechitah or other Avodos is done she'Lo Lishmah is also Pasul, because it is considered as though the Avodah was not done at all.
This is what Rashi means as well. Rashi writes that a Korban offered she'Lo Lishmah should be invalid because it was not offered "k'Hilchaso," meaning that an Avodah that was done she'Lo Lishmah should be considered as though the Avodah was not done at all. This is what Rashi means when he concludes by saying that the Zerikah will not permit the meat to be eaten. He does not mean to limit the Pesul to the meat, implying that the Korban is valid with regard to the other Avodos. Rather, he means that the Pesul in the Zerikah makes it as though there was no Zerikah at all, and therefore the meat will not be permitted (and, similarly, the Eimurin will not be permitted to be offered upon the Mizbe'ach). Rashi mentions Zerikah (and assumes that the Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah was in the Zerikah), because the Zerikah is the final Avodah, the Avodah which accomplishes the permitting of the meat to be eaten and the Korban to be offered upon the Mizbe'ach (see Bava Kama 76a). However, the same applies when any one of the previous Avodos is lacking; the Zerikah will not be able complete the process of offering the Korban and will not permit the meat to be eaten. Therefore, by the same logic, it will not be permitted to complete any of the Avodos after a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah, since the Korban is Pasul.
Why does Rashi mention only that the Zerikah permits the meat to be eaten, and not that it permits the Korban to be offered on the Mizbe'ach? The answer may be that the Mishnah later (83a) teaches that any Korban which became Pasul in the process of being offered and then was placed on the Mizbe'ach is to be left on the Mizbe'ach, b'Di'eved. This shows that the valid Zerikah is not necessarily the only thing that allows the Korban to be placed on the Mizbe'ach. However, a valid Zerikah is the only process that can permit a Korban to be eaten. Therefore, when Rashi describes a Zerikah that is invalid, Rashi describes it as a Zerikah which cannot permit the meat to be eaten. (M. KORNFELD)