Opinion: It appears that both one who destroys (beard etc.) and allows them to be destroyed are liable, just as is true regarding shaving around the head. This is as the Gemara says in Nazir (57b) both the one shaving around and allowing to be shaved around are implied by this prohibition.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the Gemara in Nazir (ibid.) derives from the Pasuk, "They should not shave around" which is plural, and regarding a beard the Pasuk only states "Do not destroy" in a singular form. [Why, then, are we sure that both participants are liable when it comes to shaving a beard?]

Answer: Regarding the prohibition against Kohanim shaving the Pasuk states, "They should not shave" in a plural form. We derive laws regarding the prohibition of Kohanim shaving from the regular prohibition against shaving and visa versa regarding "shaving that destroys" in Nazir (58b). We similarly see that both topics derive from each other using the Gezeirah Shaveh of "Pe'as" in Kidushin (35b).

It clearly states in the Tosefta in Makos that if someone destroys the Pei'os of the beard of his friend, they both are liable.

Opinion: It is forbidden for a Jew to allow a Nochri to shave around his head and to destroy his beard, as Rav Huna states in Nazir (57b) that if someone shaves around the head of a minor he is liable. The same is true in the opposite scenario (one may not allow a minor to shave him), as we do not compare the liability of the one shaving around the head to the one allowing it to be done.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that Rav Ada bar Ahavah argues on Rav Huna there because the Pasuk says, "They should not shave around his head" implying both the one who shaves and the one who allows the shaving. We therefore compare (according to Rav Ada) the one who shaves to the one who allows it, and we say that whenever the one who allows it is liable the one who shaves is liable. [This would exclude if a minor is involved.]

The Gemara there implies that according to Rav Ada bar Ahavah there is not even a Rabbinic prohibition. This is apparent from Rav Ada's question to Rav Huna, "Your minor sons, according to you, who shaves them?" Rav Huna answered, "One is liable (for shaving them)." This implies that according to Rav Ada it is permitted even for a man to shave minors. [This should mean that it is permitted to shave one's sons. How can we say it is forbidden?]

Answer: The law does not follow Rav Ada. This is apparent from the fact that the general opinion of the Gemara in Bava Metzia (10b) is like Rav Huna.

This is as the Gemara says there, "The difference between them is a man who says to a woman that she should shave a minor for him." According to the version of the Gemara that makes the liability dependent on a person who is obligated in the Mitzvah, here a woman is not a person who is obligated, and therefore the one who sends her to do it should be liable. This implies that if a man would do the actual shaving he would (certainly) be liable.

Opinion: Additionally, it appears that even Rav Ada says that the one who allows the area around his head to be shaved is liable, even if the one who shaves him is not commanded in this Mitzvah. He only said that the person who shaves is exempt if he is shaving someone who is not liable. This is apparent from the fact that the Gemara does not bring up the case of a man who says to a minor or Nochri to shave an adult for him. This would be a difference according to Rav Ada.

Question#1: It is possible to push this aside because according to Rav Huna that we do not compare the shaver to the one allowing himself to be shaved, the adult will simply not allow himself to be shaved (this is why no such case was brought up in the Gemora).

Implied Question#2: One also cannot bring proof from the Gemara's statement in Yevamos (5a) that the positive commandment of Metzora pushes aside the negative prohibition of shaving around one's head, as the Pasuk states, "his head." This implies that everyone agrees that this is forbidden to be done by a woman or Nochri. If it would be permitted according to Rav Ada, why should the negative prohibition be pushed aside? It is possible to uphold both Mitzvos!

Answer: It is possible to push aside that the Pasuk is required to say that the negative commandment is pushed aside when there is no woman or Nochri available.

Implied Question: One should not say that a leper might be obligated to wait until he can find a woman or Nochri.

Answer: This is apparent from the fact that the Gemara needed to say in Chulin (141a) that the positive commandment regarding a leper should come and push aside the positive commandment regarding Shilu'ach ha'Ken. We do not say that he should wait until he can find another bird. [The Gemara there is discussing a person who took a mother bird from her nest when her children were there. He already transgressed the negative prohibition against taking the mother bird in that situation. However, the Gemara says we would think he could take the mother bird to use as a Korban Metzora, fulfilling the positive Mitzvah of "v'Lakach la'Mitaher," and that this would push aside the positive commandment of "Shalei'ach Tishalach." The Gemora does not assume that he should simply get another bird, and not push aside "Shalei'ach Tishalach." Similarly, there is no reason to say that a Metzora should wait until he would find a woman or Nochri.]

Proof: However, it is possible to bring a proof (that Rav Ada says that the one who allows the area around his head to be shaved is liable, even if the one who shaves him is not commanded in this Mitzvah) from the Gemara in Nazir (57b). The Gemara asks, "Perhaps they are not impure and they are having their heads shaved for no reason (which is prohibited)?" Shmuel answers that the case is where a woman or minor are the Nezirim in question. The Gemara there deduces that Shmuel holds that shaving around the entire head is called the prohibition of Hakafah, from the fact that he does not say that it is talking about an adult.

Now, if Rav Ada only permits someone who is not obligated in the Mitzvah of shaving around one's head to do the shaving (for someone who is obligated), there still is a question on Shmuel. The Gemara should ask that the case should be where the Nazir is an adult, and a person who is not obligated in the prohibition against shaving around one's head will do the shaving for him.

This is because Shmuel holds like Rav Ada, as is apparent from the fact that he permits shaving around the head of a woman or minor. The implication is that the one doing the shaving is indeed a regular adult, as the Gemara did not say the case is where a woman or minor are shaving a woman or minor.

Explanation: The case is where there is one warning (from the witnesses), and where he shaves both at one time, or one after the other within a few seconds. This is in order that he cannot say he forgot (the warning).

If this was referring to many warnings, Rebbi Eliezer would not argue at the end of Makos (20a). He says that if he took them all off at once, he is only liable for one transgression. [He would not say this if there were separate warnings for each hair.]

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that there a Pasuk is required to teach us that one is liable for every bald spot and every scratch (over a dead person). Here, a Pasuk is not necessary. [Why not?]

Answer: This is because the different parts of the Pei'os make them into separate prohibitions. However, Rebbi Eliezer does not agree that this makes them into separate prohibitions.

Explanation: The reason that they are written next to each other is enough, as is stated in Nedarim (2b).

Question: When the Mishnah discusses the types of leprosy (in Meseches Nega'im), why doesn't it also state all of these things that are similar to each other in that they all mandate one to bring a Korban Olah v'Yored?

Answer: They do not all have the poorest option (a Metzora cannot bring the poorest type of Korban, while the others can).

Question: Even so, why aren't types of leprosy stated in our Mishnah before types of carrying on Shabbos? Leprosy at least has a poor option and is more like Shevuos!

Answer: The Korbanos of brought due to Shevuos and Shabbos are in order to atone for sins, while the Korbanos of a Metzora are to enable him to eat Kodshim.

Implied Question: The Gemara cannot answer that it explains first what it last discussed (instead of what is listed first). (Why not?)

Answer: This is because the last thing discussed was Maros Nega'im (not Yedios ha'Tumah).

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that their details are more lengthy than Shevuas Bituy, as the discussion about impurity is in the first two chapters of our Meseches, and the discussion regarding Shevuas Bituy is only in the third chapter. [How, then, can our Gemara say it is more lengthy?]

Answer: Even so, the discussions regarding all of the types of Shevuos combined are more lengthy, as they involve Shevuos of Bituy, Eidus, Pikadon, and of Dayanim.

Explanation: This is despite the fact that they are not similar. Regarding Yedios, the Mishnah explains the types of cases and only later (14b) states that they are two that are four. [This does not count the first listing of our Mishnah (2a) which listed all types of things that are "two that are four."] Regarding Shevuos, the Mishnah first states that they are "two that are four" (19b) and it then explains the cases.

Question: What is pressing the Gemara to explain Shevuos in this manner? The Gemara has a question later that if this is according to Rebbi Yishmael, didn't he say that he is not liable etc. Why not say "they are four" refers to cases of "I will throw" and "I will not throw?" This enables us to establish the Mishnah according to Rebbi Yishmael!

Answer: It is possible to answer that later (19b) the Mishnah explicitly says that "they are four" refers to "I ate" and "I didn't eat." Being that the Mishnah there is clearly coming to explain our Mishnah (2a), this must be the true explanation of our Mishnah.

Implied Question: One should not ask that the Mishnah should say "two that are eight," including "I will throw," "I will not throw," "I threw," and "I didn't throw." [Why not include all of these cases regarding a neutral action?]

Answer: This is because the Mishnah only writes something along with its contrast, as Rashi explains in our Mishnah. [Being that the Mishnah's "two" are based on "To do bad" or "to do good" (Vayikra 5:4), the Mishnah only discusses a direct contrast of those two cases.]

Question: You should also ask regarding Yedios. The Mishnah requires him to first know in order to have to bring a Korban, as the Mishnah says, "Whatever has knowledge in the beginning etc."

Rebbi Yishmael does not require prior knowledge, as is apparent in our chapter (9a). The Gemara says that according to Rebbi Yishmael when there is no prior knowledge and there is knowledge in the end, he must bring a Korban. The Gemara also says later (19b) that this is according to Rebbi Yishmael who does not require prior knowledge.

Answer: It is possible to answer that from Yedios it is not possible to ask a question. It is possible to say that the knowledge referred to by the Mishnah is the knowledge from his teacher. Rebbi Yishmael holds like Rebbi who says that knowledge from one's teacher is called knowledge.

This is as the Yerushalmi states that Rebbi Yishmael holds like Rebbi, and Rebbi holds like Rebbi Yishmael.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that our Gemara argues on the Yerushalmi, and holds that Rebbi Yishmael does not require prior knowledge, not even knowledge from his teacher. This is apparent from the fact that the Gemara does not establish later that the goat brought in the "outside" (regular part of the Beis Hamikdash) atones for not having prior knowledge, even knowledge from one's teacher. This implies that one must even bring a Korban when he had absolutely no prior knowledge.

This is also implied later (14b). Rebbi Yirmiyah asks, if a person from Bavel comes to Eretz Yisrael and he does not know where the place of the Mikdash is, what is the law? The Gemara says that if this question is according to Rebbi Yishmael, no prior knowledge is required! The Gemara concludes that its question is according to Rebbi who requires that he at least have knowledge from his teacher. This implies that Rebbi Yishmael does not require having any prior knowledge. [How, then, can we answer above that Rebbi Yishmael does require the knowledge of one's teacher?]

Answer: Even so, if the Mishnah could be according to Rebbi Yishmael, we should say that Rebbi Yishmael certainly requires the knowledge of his teacher. However, being that the truth is that the Mishnah is according to Rebbi, we say that Rebbi Yishmael does not require prior knowledge at all. The only Tana that we find indeed holds that one requires prior knowledge from his teacher is Rebbi.

Implied Question: However, the Mishnah (14b) that is coming to explain our chapter slightly implies that we require a complete knowledge. This is as it says that if one became impure and he "knew," implying that he knew for sure after he became impure. This is as opposed to "knowing" from one's teacher, which is before he becomes impure (and does not seem to fit the definition of "knowing" in this Mishnah, which is knowing for certain). [How, then, can Rebbi Yishmael require prior knowledge from one's teacher?]

Answer: It appears that from Yedios one cannot ask, as one could push himself to answer like we answer there (19b), that despite the fact that he does not know this from the Pesukim, he knows it as a Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai (that one must know from his teacher).

Observation: The Gemara can ask on this answer and on the answer regarding lashes from the second part of the Mishnah that it is apparent that our Mishnah is referring to all of the cases making one liable to bring a Korban.

Question: It is understandable to establish the Mishnah as being according to Rebbi Yishmael. Even though Rebbi Yishmael holds one is only liable on the future, even so it is understandable why the Mishnah says, "that they are four" being that he is purposely committing a sin. [In other words, he is liable for two cases of Korban, "I will eat" and "I will not eat," and he sins if he purposely swears, "I ate" or "I did not eat."]

However, if the Mishnah will be established as according to Rebbi Akiva, why does it say "two that are four" at all, being that the last two cases are where he transgressed accidentally and does not even require a Korban? [The Maharsha explains that according to Rebbi Akiva, there are only two cases where someone brings a Korban. In both he forgot he was impure, and then he either ate Kodesh or went into the Mikdash. The other two cases are when he ate Kodesh or went into the Mikdash never knowing that he was impure. However, in these latter cases his liability is even less than accidental, as he never even knew he was impure. He does not even bring a Korban. Why, then, does the Mishnah say they are "two that are four?"]

Answer: It still understandably considers this "two that are four" being that he transgressed accidentally.

Implied Question: The Gemara did not ask from the fact that all of the cases of carrying on Shabbos make one liable. [Why did it ask instead from types of leprosy?]

Answer: This is because we only know that the types of carrying all make one liable because we compare it to types of leprosy later (see 5a).

Explanation: Later (4a), the Gemara explains why we do not establish the Mishnah as according to Rebbi Akiva.

Explanation: The Gemara here is according to Rabin who says (21a) that if someone swears he ate or did not eat (and lied), it is called a "Shevuas Sheker." The Torah's warning not to do so is the Pasuk, "Do not swear in my name falsely." If someone swears he will eat or will not eat (and does not fulfill his words), he transgresses the Pasuk, "He should not make his word void." What is a Shevuas Shav? It is when someone swears to change something that is established as known.

We indeed conclude in our Gemara according to Rabin, as we say that the Torah explicitly included that a Shevuas Sheker is regarding something that happened in the past. However, Rav Dimi says there that someone who swore he ate or did not eat (and lied) has made a Shevuas Shav. We would not then require this teaching (as he holds that it is incorrect) that the Torah included etc.

According to Rav Dimi, "two that are four" cannot be established, as neither group of cases is more relative than the other to lashes (as opposed to Rabin who says that the cases of past tense are only included because we compare them to Shevuas Shav).

Question: According to the conclusion of the Gemara that Rebbi Yishmael holds that one receives lashes for transgressing a negative prohibition even though he does not do an action, the Ri has difficulty. Why does the Mishnah explain one set of Shevuos as being more established than the other?

Answer#1: It appears that even though regarding lashes they are all equal, it is still appropriate to write "two that are four." This is because two of these types of Shevuos also make one liable to bring a Korban, (and is pertinent) even though the Mishnah is only referring to cases of lashes. [The two that deal with the future mandate lashes and a Korban, while "that are four" are of a somewhat lesser category, as they only make one liable to receive lashes and not a Korban. It therefore is understandable that we categorize them as "two that are four."]

Answer#2: The Ritzba explains that this Gemara is according to Rabin, as we explained above (a). According to him, the Mishnah explains "I will eat" and "I will not eat" more than "I ate" and "I did not eat" because the simple explanation of "You should not swear etc." implies regarding things that will happen in the future. This is as Rashi explains regarding Rav Dimi that the Torah means, "One should not swear in my name in order to lie regarding this oath after awhile." Even Rabin admits to this.

Implied Question: Rabin (and Rava) takes the Pasuk, "You should not swear etc." out of its context, and establishes it as meaning, "I ate" and "I did not eat." [Why does he do this if the Pasuk itself implies Shevuos regarding future events?]

Answer: This is because Shevuos regarding the future are derived from the Pasuk, "You should not make your word mundane."

This is why the Mishnah here considers "I ate" and "I didn't eat" to be considered "that are four." They are not considered to be explicitly stated, as the Pasuk only implies Shevuos regarding the future.

It does not establish the Pasuk as being regarding a case of "I ate" and "I didn't eat" because it does not want to establish the Pasuk as merely adding an extra negative commandment (to those cases). [Instead, it understands that it is talking about cases of "I will eat" or "I will not eat."]

Question: This is difficult. Why does the Gemara quote Rava? On the contrary, it should have brought the teaching of Rebbi Yochanan who says that from the fact that the word "l'Shav" is quoted twice we say that if the second time is not required to teach about a Shevuas Shav, it should be used regarding a Shevuas Sheker!

From this statement of Rebbi Yochanan he would receive lashes even in a case where he made a Shevuah that "I will eat" or "I will not eat," if it were not for Rava's teaching.

Answer: It is possible to answer that the Gemara's question is as follows. It is understandable that one receives lashes for the Shevuos "I ate" and "I didn't eat" as this is Rava's teaching. However, "I will eat" and "I will not eat" are negative prohibitions that do not entail an action. [Why should he receive lashes?]

The Gemara answers that Rebbi Yishmael holds that doing a negative prohibition (even) without performing an action still makes one receive lashes. This means that we no longer use Rava's teaching. Rather, he derives from the word "l'Shav" being stated twice that if this is not needed (twice) regarding a Shevuas Shav, it should be used to teach about Shevuas Sheker. This is both about a case where he said, "I will eat," and he did not eat, and about a case where he said, "I did eat" and he didn't.

Explanation#1: Rashi explains that this (teaching regarding which Rava said the Torah "explicitly" includes etc.) is derived from the fact that it is says, "l'Shav" twice.

Implied Question: This does not seem correct, as this is not explicit. On this very teaching the Gemara asks later (21a), "And what is the difference?" This means that (the Gemara is asking) even in a case where he says that he will eat and he doesn't, this case should be included.

Explanation#2: Rather, it appears that the correct explanation is that of Rabeinu Chananel. He explains that when Rava says, "The Torah explicitly included etc." he means that in the first Dibros the Pasuk says, "Do not answer about your friend and be a "Sheker" witness" (Shemos 20:12) and in the second Dibros the Pasuk says, "a "Shav" witness" (Devarim 5:16). This teaches us that Shav and Sheker are the same thing.

Implied Question: Rashi explains that we do not have this text. [The text referred to is a question asked by the Gemara that in Makos (13b) Rebbi Yishmael holds that one does not receive lashes for transgressing a negative prohibition without doing an action. How do we know this isn't the correct text?]

Answer#1: This is because according to the conclusion of the Gemara here he (Rebbi Yishmael) can indeed hold that one does not receive lashes on this type of prohibition. The Gemara asks there (Makos 13b), if so, a negative prohibition that does not an involve an action should also be punished with lashes! This is according to the conclusion of our Gemara (that Rebbi Yishmael holds that such a negative prohibition is not punished with lashes).

Answer#2: Alternatively, one can answer that the Gemara in Makos (13b) wants to answer that when Rebbi Yishmael says that people who are liable to be punished with death by Beis Din are included in the punishment of lashes, it is even according to the opinion that one does not receive lashes for a negative prohibition that does not involve an action. [This is despite the fact that he himself may hold that one does receive lashes for this type of prohibition.]

According to what was explained above that Rebbi Yishmael holds that one would receive lashes here from the teaching of saying "l'Shav" twice, this is understandable (see end of Tosfos above, DH "k'di'Rava").

Explanation: However, Reish Lakish does not hold that the fact that it is a negative prohibition that does not involve an action is reason to be exempt from lashes, as he holds one does receive lashes in such a case.

Question: This is difficult, as in Sanhedrin (65b) Reish Lakish exempts muzzling (regular animals) and leading animals that are Kilayim with one's voice, as he holds that moving one's lips is not an action. [This indicates that he holds that one does not receive lashes for a negative prohibition that does not entail an action.]

Answer: Reish Lakish in Sanhedrin (ibid.) is discussing the opinion of the Rabbanan. In Bava Metzia (90b), Rebbi Yochanan asked a question on Reish Lakish from a Mishnah that if one declares an animal to be in exchange for a Korban, it is effective and he receives lashes. [This is unlike (b).] Reish Lakish answers that the Mishnah is according to Rebbi Yehudah's opinion, while he himself agrees with the Rabbanan.