Answer #2: Even if the jumping legs are counted here in the three similarities, and we will say that that they are not written in order to add three more characteristics but rather include legs that will grow after awhile, there should be no question. (The Bach takes out the words, "from all of their sides.")

Answer #2 (cont.): It must be that when the Gemara in Eiruvin (28a) states that two similar characteristics are required according to the opinion that the last K'lal is specific, and three similar characteristics are required according to the opinion that the first K'lal is specific (as explained above), it does not specifically mean that two or three similar characteristics must be found in every K'lal u'Perat u'K'lal.

Answer #2 (cont.): According to the opinion that the first K'lal is specific, it would even have to be similar in (all) five characteristics (in our case).

Proof: Otherwise, you should ask a question on the Gemara in Eiruvin (ibid.) from the Gemara in Nazir (35b). The Gemara there states that wherever there are two K'lal and one P'rat we include anything that is similar in one characteristic. Wherever there are two P'rat and one K'lal, we include whatever is similar in two characteristics. (How can the Gemara in Eiruvin require a minimum of two characteristics while the Gemara in Nazir requires a minimum of only one?)

Proof (cont.): Rather, it is logical to conclude that the two characteristics in Eiruvin and the one in Nazir are following the same principle (which is applied in a case specific fashion, as we will explain). The case in Eiruvin is where there are two important characteristics shared by the P'rat, and a third that is not so important. This is indeed the case regarding the K'lal u'P'rat teaching mentioned there where the P'rat is "cattle, sheep, wine, and beer" as discussed in the Gemara in Eiruvin (28a).

Proof (cont.): In Nazir (35b), there is only one important similar characteristic in the K'lal u'P'rat u'Klal mentioned in that Gemara. There is another characteristic that is not so important. This is why the Gemara in Nazir stated that in such a case only one characteristic is required, namely the important one that has no equal.

Proof (cont.): Similarly, if they were both equally important and a third characteristic was not as important, these two characteristics are equivalent to one important characteristic, being that they are equally important. We should require that anything included in this teaching should be similar to this P'rat in these two important characteristics, as which one can we say should not be enforced?

Proof (cont.): This is why the Gemara in Eiruvin (ibid.) requires anything included in the P'rat to be similar to it in two characteristics even according to the opinion that the last K'lal is specific, as it is similar to requiring one similar characteristic in the teaching quoted in Nazir (ibid.). (In other words, all important characteristics are required, with the number of these characteristics, varying depending on the P'rat in each teaching.)

Implied Question: The Gemara in Eiruvin (ibid.) requires three similarities according to the opinion that the first K'lal is specific. (Why would three be necessary?)

Answer: It is possible to answer that this opinion understands that not only must the important similar characteristics be matched, as is held by the opinion that the last K'lal is specific, but rather even the third not so important characteristic must be similar to all of them. The same would apply if there were five characteristics. Whatever is derived would have to match all of these characteristics (according to the opinion that the first K'lal is specific).

Proof (cont.): It is now understandable when there is a requirement for more than three similarities to the P'rat, as in all ways, whether important or unimportant, like the third (unimportant) characteristic, the item must be totally similar to the P'rat according to the opinion that the first K'lal is specific.

Proof (cont.): There is also no difficulty according to the opinion that the last K'lal is specific when we require more than two characteristics, as long as there indeed are more than two characteristics that are equally important.

Explanation: According to these words (i.e. this answer), we require more than three similarities according to the opinion that the first K'lal is specific, even though there are only two equally important characteristics, and there are some characteristics that are less important. This opinion requires that whatever is derived as similar must have all of these characteristics.

Explanation (cont.): According to the opinion that the last K'lal is specific, we only require two important characteristics. Therefore, we should not require not having a long head according to the opinion that the last K'lal is specific, as Rashi explained (the Bach takes out the word "there").

Explanation (cont.): Accordingly, we must say that not having a tail and a long head are characteristics that are relatively unimportant compared to those that are required in the Beraisa in the Tzad ha'Shaveh. We therefore would not require them if we held that the last K'lal is specific.

Observation: It is now understandable why we include a long head from a Salam, but do not include something that does not have four wings or whose wings do not cover most of it. This is because these latter signs are much more important than not having a long head (and are therefore required as part of the P'rat).

Opinion: However, the explanation of the Riva can be given without this reasoning. He explains that there is no grasshopper that is missing a characteristic such as four wings or wings covering most of its body that is not also missing another characteristic. It will either be missing the characteristic of its head not being long or another characteristic of the four important characteristics mentioned in our Mishnah. However, it is possible regarding its head being long that it is only missing the characteristic of its head not being long (but is not missing anything else).

Question: According to the way we explained the Gemaros in Eiruvin (28a) and Nazir (35b) there is a difficulty. Why does the Gemara in Bava Kama (117b) have to say that Rebbi Eliezer derives Ribuy u'Miutei? Even if he would derive in the fashion of K'lali u'P'rati we could understand his position as being according to the opinion that the last K'lal is specific, and therefore only one important characteristic is required.

Question (cont.): In other words, the most important characteristic would be required. We would say (in that case) that just as the P'rat is regarding something that itself is worth money, so too only items that are worth money are included. This excludes documents (that are not worth money due to the paper, but rather due to what they say). However, it does not have to be something that can be carried. Therefore, land is not excluded, as this is not an important characteristic.

Proof: This (being something that can be carried) is clearly a less important characteristic (than being worth money itself), as even when the methodology of Ribah-Mi'et-v'Ribah is applied, the only thing excluded is documents, not land.

Answer: Being that it is apparent from the Gemara in Sanhedrin (45b) and Nazir (35a) that Rebbi Eliezer indeed holds that we derive using the Ribuy u'Mi'ut methodology, the Gemara in Bava Kama (117b) also gives this answer.

Question: It requires study to determine whether when Gemaros such as the Gemara in Kidushin (24b) regarding damages of a tooth or eye, the Gemara in Bechoros (37a) regarding a limping or blind animal, and other Gemaros say, "Just as the P'rat is something that is carried and itself is money etc." it is only according to the opinion that first K'lal is specific.

Question (cont.): Perhaps we will say that this is even according to the opinion that the second K'lal is specific. Even if the two characteristics are not completely equal, being that they are close to being equal they are considered equal and are like one characteristic. We only literally require one characteristic when the second characteristic is clearly very inferior to the first (clearly important) characteristic.

Question (cont.): This appears more probable, in order that this teaching which is found throughout these Gemaros requiring something carried and itself worth money should be according to all opinions. Indeed, they are close to being of similar importance.

Question (cont.): This would also answer why the Gemara in Bava Kama (117b) says that Rebbi Eliezer must derive using the Ribuy Mi'ut methodology, and would mean that we do not have to give the somewhat forced answer stated above (h).

Question: Why does the Gemara not cite the difference between as being other locusts that are not of the species that are written, because they have the four Simanim mentioned in the Mishnah as well as having not long heads ...

Question (cont.): Which, according to Tana de'bei Rav, will be forbidden, even though they possess the four Simanim listed in the Mishnah, because the 'K'lal' is limited to what is written in the 'P'rat' (and no more)?

Answer #1: Perhaps there is no such locust that has five Simanim, which does not belong to one of the species that the Torah lists.

Answer #2: Alternatively, the Gemara tells us a Chidush, that Tana de'bei Rebbi Yishmael permits even a locust with a long head.

Clarification: At the end o the Sugya, Rashi explains that these locusts do not require Shechitah, seeing as the Torah mentions them after fish ...

Clarification (cont.): "Zos Toras ha'Beheimah" - is literal, and so is ""ve'ha'Of".which also excludes Sheretz ha'Of, incorporating the little creepy-crawlies. "ve'Chol Nefesh ha'Chayah ha'Romeses ba'Mayim" - refers to fish, and "u'le'Chol Nefesh ha'Shoretzes al ha'Aretz" - to locusts. Rashi citing the Halachos Gedolos..

Observation: Rashi only needed to quote the B'hag because he extrapolastes the Heter from the Pasuk, since it is evident in many places in Shas that locusts are permitted without Shechitah:

Proof #1: At the end of Perek Rebbi Akiva (Shabbos 90:) 'One is not permitted to put away a Tamei locust or a child (to play with), in case it dies, and the Katan eats it - But a Tahor one is permitted.

Proof #2: At the beginning of Perek Dam Shechitah (K'risus, 21.) the Gemara says 'Let us preclude the blood of fish and locusts which are completely permitted, which the Gemara explains to mean that they do not require Shechitah.

Proof #3: In Perek Ein Ma'amidin (Avodah-Zarah 38: and 38:) where Rav says 'If Nochrim set fire to a marsh, all the locusts there are forbidden' and the Gemar explains that this is because 'We do not knoew which ones are Tamei and which ones are Tahor'. We are not however, concerned about the fact that they have not been Shechted.

Proof #4: And the Gemara at the end of the Perek permits purchasing from a Nochri locusts that come from the warehouse or the storeroom ...

Proof #5: Ad similarly we learned there that locusts that come from a ship or from a store are forbidden (only) because one tends to sprinkle wine on them.

Proof #6: And earlier (daf 64: DH Gi'ulei Beitzim'), Tosfos cited a Beraisa that permits someone to eat fish and locusts whether they are alive or dead without compunctions.

Implied Question: Even though 'Ochel' is La'av Davka, bearing in mind that eating them alive is forbidden, due to the La'av of 'Bal Teshaktzu' (eating something that is disgusting), as is clear in Perek Rebbi Akiva (Shabbos 90:).

Answer: The Tosefta nevertheless said 'Ochel' to teach us that there is no Isur of Eiver min ha'Chai, since they do not require Shechitah (See also Tosfos, Avodah-Zarah 38., DH 'le'Olam').

Question #1: From where did the Rabbanan know this?

Question #2: Similarly above (on Daf 63:) where the Beraisa states that there are only seven hundred species of Tamei ish, from where did they know this, to extrapolate that all the rest are Kasher?

Refuted Answer: We cannot answer that they learned it from Adam, who gaved them all names, and who handed down to future generations that they are Tamei, since he knew them all ...

Refutation: Since the Pasuk implies that it was only the animals and the birds that Adam gave names!

Refutation (cont.): Even though he knew the Name of Hakadosh-Baruch- Hu, as the Medrash Rabah (Bereishis 17) Darshens "Ani Hash-m" - 'that is the Name that Adam gave Me!'

Conclusion: By fish however, we do not find it?

Answer #1: From the Pasuk "from all that Adam called by name" we can learn that he gave the fish names too, in which case we can say that the Rabbanan learned it from Adam.

Answer #2: And if we say that Adam did not call the fish names, then we will have to assume that they received it Halachah le'Moshe mi'Sinai.

Clarification: In the first Perek (Daf 22:DH 'Itzrich') Tosfos explained why one cannot ask here why we need a Pasuk to prevent us from erring ...

Clarification (cont): Like it asks there 'Do we need a Pasuk to preclude a Safek?'

Clarification: The Torah issues various statements, which enable us to learn from them the meaning of 'Kaskeses'/

Question: What will we then learn from "es Zeh Tochlu"?

Answer: So that one should say that 'Just as the P'rat refers specifically to flowing water ... ' , in which case we will declare what is in pits ... forbidden' since we Darshen it le'Isur' ...

Answer (cont.): Therefore the Torah writes "Tochlu", to teach us that 'Just as the P'rat refers specifically to what grows on the ground', to permit those in pits ... that have fins and scales, just like those in the seas and the rivers'.

Implied Question: And why will we then shortly say the opposite ...

Answer: That is according to the way we Darshen it le'Heter.

Question: What sort of proof is that? Perhaps that latter Pasuk refers to the inference from "seas and rivers" - that when it doesn't have fins and scales, one may not eat them, but if they have, one may - but in vessels, even if they do, one may not eat them?

Question (cont.): And it now transpires that the first Pasuk is as it stands. Because what makes you think that the first Pasuk comes for the inference, and the second Pasuk as it stands?

Answer: Because with regard to the first Pasuk, it doesn't matter i it refers to the inference, seeing as the Torah writes "Osam Tocheilu", implying "Osam", but not others. Consequently, it is as if it had specifically written 'and not others'.

Question: How does this Pasuk imply that the fish are permitted inside vessels? Perhaps it is (only) coming to preclude them from the La'av ...

Question (cont.): In other words, inside vessels there is no La'av, but an Asei there is, as is evident from the first Pasuk - even if they have fins and scales?

Answer #1: This latter Pasuk does not contain a La'av, for so it writes "And all that do not possess fins and scales in the seas, in the rivers from all that teems in the water, and from all living creatures in the water, they are an abomination to you!". And it is in the following Pasuk that the Torah inserts the La'av - "They shall be an abomination to you, from their flesh you shall not eat!"

Answer #2: Moreover, it is not logical to say that fish inside vessels shall be more stringent that ish in the seas and the rivers - when they have fins and scales; and when they don't, they are more leniet, in that they are only subject to an Asei.

Question: second answer is preferable (to the first one), since on what grounds shuld we permit fish in vessels from the Pasuk where they have ins and scales; Let the Pasuk not mention "seas and rivers", and we will know that they are permitted in vessels from the Pasuk where they do not have fins and scales.

Answer: We must therefore say that we would have thought that the Pasuk where they do not have fins and scales cmes to preclude fish in a vessel from the La'av, but an Asei remains. Whereas there where they do have fins and scales, they are permitted even in vessels too. And that is why we need the first Pasuk to permit inside vessels completely, even if they they have no fins and scales.