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This week's Parasha-Page is dedicated to the memory of YISROEL MOSHE B"REB TZVI YEHUDA Rottenberg, whose 17th Yarzeit is on 5 Tevet, 5756. The dedication has been sponsored by his children: the Goldsteins, Rosenzweigs and Azrikans.

Parashat Vayigash 5756

HOW MANY MITZVOT DID OUR FOREFATHERS KEEP?

INTRODUCTION

[Yaakov] sent Yehudah ahead to Yosef in Egypt, to "teach" ("L'horot") before Yakov's arrival, to Goshen.
(Bereishit 46:28)
"He sent Yehudah before him" -- to set up a House of Study before Yakov's arrival, where Yakov would teach the words of the Torah and where his twelve sons and their families could study the Torah... . This teaches us that wherever Yaakov went he studied the Torah, just as his fathers had. The Torah had not yet been given, yet we are told concerning Avraham, "He kept My safeguards, My commandments, My decrees and My teachings" (Bereishit 26:5)... . [Avraham] kept all the minutiae of the Torah, teaching them to his children as well, as it says, "I chose him because he will command his children and his household after him to follow in the ways of Hashem; to carry out righteousness and justice" (ibid. 18:19).
(Bereishit Rabba 95:3)
The Midrash asserts that although they lived long before the Torah was given to us at Mount Sinai, our forefathers kept all the Mitzvot [=Divine commandments] that the Torah would command their descendants in the future. This idea is reiterated by Chazal in many other places (see e.g. Yoma 28b; Rashi to Bereishit 26:5; Rashi to ibid. 32:5 -- "Yaakov said, 'I dwelt by Lavan, yet I kept all of the 613 Mitzvot' "). The patriarchs taught these Mitzvot to their children, the twelve tribes. They, in turn, also kept all of the Mitzvot of the Torah (Tanna D'vei Eliyahu Ch. 6). And not only were our forefathers mindful of future *biblical* commands, they even heeded future *rabbinic* ordinances (Yoma 28b).

Did our ancestors consider the Torah's commandments to be applicable and mandatory for themselves? Not necessarily so. If the Torah had not yet been given, they could not have been *commanded* to keep any more than the seven Noachide Laws that applied to all people of the world. If so, in what respect was Avraham's family different from the other people of the world, during Avraham's lifetime?

Our forefathers, unlike the rest of the people of their generation, believed and trusted only in the Holy One, Blessed be He. Hashem, in return, revealed Himself to them and promised them a grand destiny. The family of Avraham therefore held themselves aloof from the rest of the world, seeing themselves as an elite group -- as the kernel of Hashem's chosen nation. They instituted certain laws of conduct in order to retain their individuality. This was done in the spirit of the Divine commandment to circumcise their sons, which physically separated them from the other nations (Ramban to Vayikra 25:10; Raavad to Masechet Avodah Zarah 36b. Further discussion of the exact religious status of our forefathers can be found, at great length, in Perashat Derachim Drush #1,2).

Hashem revealed to our forefathers the Mitzvot that he was going to give to the Jews at a later time. The forefathers, out of their profound love to do the will of God, voluntarily accepted upon themselves to perform these Mitzvot "ahead of schedule." It is an accepted principle that even if one is not subject to a given commandment, it is nevertheless considered meritorious for him to observe that Mitzvah. He is even rewarded for doing so (Rambam, Melachim 10:10). As the Gemara (Kiddushin 32a) tells us, "One who does a Mitzvah when he is commanded to do it, is greater (i.e. receives a greater reward) than one who does a Mitzvah without being commanded to do so." This implication is that in the latter case as well there is some amount of reward, albeit less than in the former case.

However, upon further investigation, there would seem to be scriptural and Midrashic evidence that contradicts the assertion that our forefathers kept all the Mitzvot of the Torah. In the specific area of marital laws, it would seem that they did not keep the laws of the future Torah:

[1] Rashi tells us (in this week's Parasha, 46:10), that Shimon married his sister Dinah. This marriage would seem, in fact, to contravene not only the laws of the Torah given to the Jews, but even Noachide Law! This system of law, which the Torah expects *all* human beings from the beginning of time to adhere to, includes laws against incest. There is, however, an opinion (in Sanhedrin 58a) that asserts that the Noachide laws against incest do not prohibit marital relations with a sister. Apparently, the Midrash that Rashi quotes is also of that opinion. However, our original question -- that as one who observed the Mitzvot of the future Torah, Shimon should not have married Dinah -- remains.

Another Midrash (quoted by Rashi to 46:26), posits that all of the twelve tribal ancestors were born with twin sisters, whom they subsequently married. This presents the same problem as the previous question. If the sons of Yakov kept the Torah of the future, how could they have married their own sisters?

[2] The Torah tells us specifically (Shemot 6:20) that Amram married his father's sister -- Yakov's granddaughter. This is an explicit violation of Torah law (Vayikra 18:12, 20:20). Although a *gentile* may marry his father's paternal sister (Sanhedrin 58b), how could the Midrash assert that the forefathers kept the laws of the future, *Jewish,* Torah.

[3] As Rashi explains (Bereishit 38:26), Yehudah married his daughter-in-law Tamar. Even if such a relationship is permitted for a gentile, isn't this is a violation of Torah law for Jews (Vayikra 18:15)?

[4] Yaakov married two sisters (Bereishit 29:16), which is in violation of Torah law (Vayikra 18:18). We find, in fact, in the words of Chazal [our Sages] in various places that Yaakov's marriage of two sisters is frowned upon (see Pesachim 119a, end of Midrash Ruth Rabbati).

Why didn't our ancestors keep the future marital laws of the Torah in the above-mentioned cases? This question has been raised, and discussed at length, by numerous commentators throughout the ages. (See, for example, Perashat Derachim ibid.; Pardes Yosef to Bereishit 26:5.) Let us take a look at some of the suggestions that have been made.

I

The Ramban (12th cent. Spain) is among the earlier of the commentators to address this issue. In his commentary on the Torah (Bereishit 26:5 and Vayikra 18:25), the Ramban suggests the following rule. The Midrash only means to assert that our forefathers kept all the Mitzvot of the Torah while they were in Eretz Yisrael [=Israel]. Out of Eretz Yisrael, however, they did not make a point of keeping all the Mitzvot of the future Torah. Yaakov's marriage of two sisters took place in Charan, which was outside of Eretz Yisrael. Similarly, Amram married his aunt in Egypt.

This approach does not seem to help for problems [1] and [3], however, since Yehudah, and presumably his brothers too, married their wives in Israel. It is remotely possible that all of Yakov's children married their sisters while on a visit outside of Eretz Yisrael, and then kept them as wives even after returning to Israel. Yehudah's marriage to Tamar, however, took place quite clearly in Eretz Yisrael. Perhaps Ramban accepts the reasoning of the Chizkuni (to Bereishit 38:26), who proposes that Yehudah's sons were never considered legally "married" to Tamar before they passed away (see Rashi to 38:7).

Alternatively, Yehudah's marriage may have actually been permitted according to the laws of "Yibbum" (a halachic situation in which the Torah permits one to marry a woman who is normally prohibited), as suggested by Rashba (to Yevamot 97b. See also Chizkuni to Bereishit 38:26, Ba'alei HaTosafot, in Moshav Zekeinim to Bereishit 38:17). Unfortunately, however, the Ramban himself seems to reject this opinion (in Bereishit 38:24 and Yevamot 97b).

I heard from a relative, HaRav Natan Lesinger of Jerusalem, the following rationale for the Ramban's suggestion:

There are two facets to the fulfillment of any Mitzvah in the Torah. The first is, that we benefit directly from keeping the Mitzvot. We derive personal gain, whether physical or spiritual in nature, or both, from the performance of each and every Mitzvah. The second aspect to keeping the Mitzvot, is that we have obeyed a Divine commandment -- an order decreed by Hashem which we must follow, regardless of any benefit derived. (See Kovetz He'arot, Chiddushei Agadot 3:2.)

The Midrash tells us that when we are outside of Eretz Yisrael, we keep the Mitzvot only "in order to retain our familiarity with them so that we may perform them as prescribed when we eventually return to Eretz Yisrael" (Rashi to Devarim 11:18). The Ramban (Vayikra 25:10) explains this to mean that the main purpose of the Mitzvot is accomplished only in Israel. What that means is that outside of Israel, the first aspect of the Mitzvot is lacking. The spiritual or physical benefit that we have from the Mitzvot accrues only through performing them in Eretz Yisrael. Nevertheless, we are certainly *obligated* to perform the Mitzvot even outside of Israel, since Hashem has commanded us to keep the Mitzvot there too -- even if He did so only so we should "retain our familiarity with them" (Gur Arye to Devarim loc. cit.). Thus, all that is left to the observance of Mitzvot outside of Eretz Yisrael is the other facet of Mitzvah observance -- the fact that they are commandments of Hashem, which must be obeyed.

In the days of our forefathers, there was not yet any Divine commandment to keep the Mitzvot of the Torah. Their observance of the Torah was only in order to reap the great spiritual benefits that come from Mitzvah observance. Hence, when they were outside of Eretz Yisrael there was no longer any point at all in their following the Torah's commandments. The first aspect -- that of personal benefit -- does not apply outside Israel according to what we have explained, while the second aspect -- that of following the decree of God -- did not apply before the Torah was given at Sinai!

(My rebbi, Hagaon Rav Yisroel Zev Gustman of blessed memory, offers a somewhat similar explanation for the Ramban's reasoning in his work "Kuntresei Shiurim" on Gemara Kiddushin, 20:6)

The Maharal (Gur Aryeh to Bereishit 46:10) rejects the Ramban's theory out of hand, claiming that "a rational mind will not be able to accept the Ramban's suggestion." He does not explain what it is that he finds so unreasonable about the Ramban's opinion, which is particularly surprising considering that he clearly accepts the Ramban's opinion regarding the importance of the Mitzvot in Israel (Gur Arye to Devarim 11:18). Perhaps his objection is that there is indeed a benefit to keeping the Mitzvot even outside of Israel -- namely, "so that we should retain our familiarity with them." Our forefathers, too, should have kept the Mitzvot outside of Israel for the very same reason that the Midrash gives.

It is more likely, however, that the Maharal rejected the notion that our forefathers only performed the Mitzvot because of the benefits they might accrue thereby. Rather, they kept the Mitzvot as an expression of their profound love for Hashem. They kept the laws of the future Torah because they knew that these laws represented His will. This rationale for keeping the Mitzvot ought to apply as much outside of Israel as inside it! (See also the Shelah's Kabbalistic footnote to the Ramban's opinion, in his discussion at the beginning of Parashat Vayishlach.)

II

The Chizkuni (13th century, Germany - in Vayetze, 29:29) and the Radbaz (15th cent. Spain - in his responsa, vol. 2, #696) suggest another approach to our question.

In Chagigah (3a) the Gemara refers to Avraham as "the first proselyte." This can be understood in a figurative sense -- Avraham was not technically a proselyte and he never underwent any formal process of conversion. The Gemara merely means to say that Avraham severed his ties with idol-worship and idol-worshippers, and began to serve Hashem (see Tosafot loc. cit.). However, it is also possible to take the comment of the Gemara literally, and to assert that Avraham was considered to be a proselyte in the strict sense of the word.

According to Jewish law, when a proselyte adopts the Jewish religion he is considered to have been "born afresh" at that time. He is no longer considered to have familial ties with his former, non-Jewish, family, at least as far as marital laws are concerned. He may therefore marry his own biological mother, sister, or daughter, if they later convert to Judaism (Yevamot 97b).

With this in mind, we can understand how the forefathers married what would seem to have been forbidden relatives according to Jewish law. The two "sisters" that Yaakov married were actually not sisters at all. After they adopted Yakov's way of life (which they certainly did before Yaakov married them), they were halachically considered to be converts. They thus became "reborn," losing all familial relationships that they had previously had.

Similarly, Yakov's sons and their sisters were technically not related to each other. Before the giving of the Torah, each individual had to accept upon himself the service of Hashem on his own, even if his father already had done so. Thus, the sons and daughters of Yakov were themselves considered to be converts, and to have lost all familial ties to each other in the process. Similarly, Yehudah's daughter-in-law was not prohibited to him, since Yehudah's son was no longer considered to be related to him. Amram's aunt was not prohibited to him because of their familial relationship, either. Numerous later commentaries offer this answer as well (Maharsha Yoma 28b s.v. Mitzvotai; Yefe Toar on Bereishit Rabba, 16:6; Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi to Vayikra 20:17; "the opinion of some" quoted by Maharal to Bereishit 46:10; Levush Ha'ora to Bereishit 32:5.)

(Problem [3], of Yehudah marrying his daughter-in-law, is not completely resolved by this approach. There is a rabbinic injunction prohibiting a convert from marrying close relatives of his that have converted. Although this doesn't apply in the case of paternal siblings (Yevamot 97b), such as the sons of Yakov and their sisters or Amram's father and his sister Yocheved (see Sanhedrin 58b), it does apply in the case of Yehudah and his son. Perhaps we must once again resort to the laws of Yibbum to explain Yehudah's actions according to this second suggestion, as the Chizkuni himself indeed does -- see above.)

It should be noted that the Gemara (Sanhedrin 58b) says explicitly that the Torah itself (i.e., not just the Sages) would forbid members of Yakov's family to marry those relatives that are normally forbidden to gentiles. According to the theory under discussion, that all the pre-Sinai "Jews" had the status of proselytes, how can the Gemara have a problem with them marrying their "relatives?" Since each member of the family was considered to be a proselyte, any other family members were technically not their relatives at all!

The answer to this is that the forefathers were certainly not true, full-fledged proselytes. The concept of "proselyte" was not actually operative until the giving of the Torah. Only as far as their undertaking to perform the Mitzvot of the future Torah before the Torah was given, did they accord themselves the status of proselytes. Insofar as they considered themselves potential recipients of the Torah, they considered themselves converts to "Sinai Judaism" -- just as their decendants who actually received the Torah were considered to be converts (Gemara Keritut 9a). But when it came to incestual prohibitions that apply to *gentiles,* they could not actually invoke the rule that they, as proselytes, may marry their relatives. Since there was, as yet, no Jewish religion, there was no formal "conversion" to Judaism. (Perashat Derachim, Drush 1, p. 13; Maharal ibid. This outlook would seem to imply that our forefathers did not keep the Mitzvot simply "for extra credit." Rather, when they kept the Sinai Mitzvot they saw themselves as if they had actually received the Torah, and "converted," themselves.)

(This approach can even justify Yaakov's claim, in Rashi to Bereishit 32:5, that he observed all 613 of the future Mitzvot while in Lavan's house. According to the Ramban mentioned above, and many of the other explanations as well, we must assume that the number 613 was not meant to be taken literally.)

III

Some commentators suggest that the Midrash does not mean to say that the forefathers kept all the Mitzvot of the Torah *unequivocally.* Rather, that they did so *in general* -- provided that there were no circumstances that called for them to refrain from keeping them. For instance, when Shimon married Dinah, Rashi (Bereishit 46:10) explains that there were very specific reasons that compelled him to do so. Because of these reasons, he was willing to forego his usual habit of observing all the future Mitzvot of the Torah. The same may perhaps be said of the other cases in question (Da'at Zekeinim MiBa'alei HaTosafot, Bereishit 37:35).

What circumstances prompted the other "transgressions" of Jewish marital law? Some commentators suggest that Yakov, and perhaps his children too, had Kabbalistic reasons for marrying the people they married (see Rashba, responsa, vol. 1, #94; Radbaz, responsa, vol. 2, #696; Ohr HaChaim to Bereishit 49:3; Midrash Talpiot, Anaf Yaakov). Alternatively, perhaps when it came to finding partners in marriage, they did not accept upon themselves to necessarily adhere to the Mitzvot of the future Torah. Appropriate mates are always difficult to find (and they were especially so at that point in time), so once a fitting wife was found they could not afford to pass up the opportunity to marry her (Maharal to Bereishit 46:10 -- who was actually preceded in this suggestion by the Ba'alei HaTosafot, Breishit 37:35). (Rav Yakov Kaminetsky, in Emet L'Yakov --Bereishit 26:5 -- proposes a very plausible reason for at least Yakov's "forbidden" marriage.)

Perhaps we may suggest that Hashem specifically arranged it that the forefathers were not careful, or were not able due to unusual circumstances, to keep the Torah's laws of marriage, as follows. The Gemara (Yoma 22b) explains why King David turned out to be a more G-d-fearing king than King Saul. It was because David had a "skeleton in his closet" -- namely that he was of humble descent, being the great grandson of Ruth, the Moabite convert. This "taint" in his rootstock kept him from taking his lofty position to heart, and from becoming arrogant.

Similarly, perhaps Hashem wanted the Jewish people, who were to be a "kingdom of priests" (Shmot 19:6), "princes" (Shabbat 67a) and a chosen nation, to have a humbling "flaw" in their own ancestry. That is why Hashem arranged for the marriages of Yakov to be in "violation" of Torah law. (The Midrash Ruth Rabbati, Ch. 8, actually presents Yakov's marriage of two sisters in the context of David's decent from Ruth the Moabite.) Similarly, Yakov's children, the progenitors of all the tribes, bore their children to their sisters. The same logic can be applied in the cases of Yehudah and of Amram. Yehudah and his daughter-in-law were the progenitors of David, the kings of Israel and the Messianic line. Amram and his aunt were the progenitors of the priestly Kohain and Levite families, who were in charge of the sacrificial service in the Temple for all time. In all these cases, a line of people of elevated status descended from a "forbidden" relationship. Hashem saw to it that these chosen lineages would be "tainted" with a geneological "skeleton in the closet," in order to keep them from becoming arrogant.

I later found that the Radak (Bereishit 38:26) uses this "skeleton in the closet" approach to explain Yehudah's marriage of Tamar, while Chizkuni (Shmot 6:20) uses it to explain Amram's marriage of Yocheved. I praise Hashem for leading me in the path of these great Torah commentators.

Some commentators assert that Hashem gave specific instructions to our ancestors to marry the women that they married, for they were all prophets and could receive such a communication from Hashem. Obviously, our forefathers would not be expected to keep the laws of the future Torah in opposition to Hashem's direct order. (Yefe Toar on Bereishit Rabba 11:8 and 70:13; Maharal, Bereishit 46:10; Or HaChaim, Bereishit 49:3; Maharsha Yoma 28b s.v. Mitzvotai). It seems a bit much to claim that such a prophecy was communicated to these people, however, since we find no open mention of it in the Torah or in the words of Chazal. Alsheich takes the more moderate stance of claiming that our ancestors saw some indication from heaven in the circumstances surrounding their marriages that these women were to be their proper mates. For example, when Yakov saw that Lavan had fooled him and given him Leah as a wife, he realized that she too ought to be his wife. (The Maharsha Yoma 28b s.v. Mitzvotai suggests a similar line of reasoning. We may add that when Yakov's children saw that they each were born with a twin sister, they realized that they were meant for each other -MK.)

IV

The Maharal (to Bereishit 46:10 and Vayikra 20:17) proposes a very original approach to our question. The forefathers, suggests the Maharal, kept only the positive commandments of the Torah, not the negative ones. The forefathers kept the Mitzvot as one who is not commanded to, yet takes it upon himself to keep the Mitzvot anyhow. Such a course of action is praiseworthy, and indeed rewarded, only if it is done through positive actions. *Refraining* from transgressing what one is not prohibited from doing, though, is not an act that is rewarded, the Maharal asserts. The laws of marriage that were abrogated by the forefathers were, of course, all negative commandments. Thus, these laws were not relevant to them.

The Maharal answers with this principle a question of Tosafot's in Niddah (61b). We may add that the language of the Gemara in Kiddushin 32a would seem to point in this direction as well. The Gemara says that "someone who *does* [a Mitzvah] when he is commanded to do it is greater than someone who *does* [a Mitzvah] without being commanded to do so." The wording that the Gemara uses ("Ve'Oseh") implies that one who is not commanded is awarded only if he *does* the Mitzvah, through the performance of an action, not if he merely *keeps* the commandment ("Mekayem") by either acting or by refraining from acting.

Further explanation for the distinction drawn by the Maharal may be inferred from the words of Ramban to Shemot 20:8. The Ramban explains that there is a basic difference between positive commandments and negative commandments. Fulfilling positive commandments, he asserts, demonstrates one's *love* for Hashem, while not transgressing the negative commandments demonstrates one's *fear* of Hashem. If so, in the case of the forefathers, where they were not yet commanded by Hashem to refrain from any act, there could be no demonstration of *fear* for Hashem by refraining from doing this action. If Hashem never forbade me to do something, I am not showing any fear for Him by abstaining from doing so! On the other hand, if I know that some day He will issue a command to *perform* a certain act, I know that this action pleases Him. By doing it even without being commanded to, I indeed show my love for Him by pursuing actions that please Him.

We may suggest another reason to distinguish between positive and negative commandments, in respect to the forefathers' commitment to fulfilling the Torah. Perhaps the reason the forefathers wanted to fulfill the Torah's commandments was so that their children would be familiar with the course of action prescribed by the Torah when the time would come that they would become incumbent upon them. (This is close to the concept that we quoted above -- section I -- from the Midrash in Devarim, about keeping the Mitzvot outside of Eretz Yisroel.) This would be similar to the rabbinical injunction of "Chinuch," whereby a father trains his child to follow the laws of the Torah before the age of Bar Mitzvah, although the child is not yet commanded to keep the Torah's edicts at that age. In this manner, the child will be used to keeping the Mitzvot when the age of obligation arrives.

Tosafot in Nazir 28b (s.v. B'no) is of the opinion that the concept of Chinuch pertains only to positive commandments -- one can only be trained to *do* something, not to *not do* something. The forefathers, whose commitment to the future Torah was also in order to "train" themselves and their children in the performance of the Mitzvot, only adhered to the positive commandments. Only the performance of the positive commandments would be necessary when training their children in these precepts for the time that the Torah to be given.

(It is to be noted that the Maharal's words stand in stark contrast to those of Maharsha, Yoma 28b s.v. Ki'yem, who offers textual proof from the Talmud to show that the forefathers kept even negative commandments.)

V

The Brisker Rav (Rav Yitzchak Zev Soloveitchik of Brisk and, later, Jerusalem -- Parashat Lech Lecha, stencil edition, Ma'atikei Shmu'ah II p. 45 from Imrei Chen 2:1), suggests another, unique, approach to our problem with the forefathers' marriages.

There is an opinion in Sanhedrin 57b that gentiles are forbidden to marry *all* of the incestual relationships as defined for Jews in Vayikra 18. According to this opinion, the question may be asked, how could Yaakov possibly marry two sisters? Even ignoring the Midrashic assertion that he kept all the Mitzvot of the Torah, he was certainly bound to keep the Noachide Laws that applied even to non-Jews!

This question is posed by the Ramban, Rashba and Ritva in their commentaries to Yevamot 97b. The answer they give is that even this opinion in Sanhedrin does not mean that literally *all* incestual relationships of the Torah are forbidden to non-Jews. Only all of the *blood* relationships are forbidden to them, as opposed to the relationships which are formed through marriage (the "in-laws"). The reason for this distinction is that the relationships-by-marriage described in the Torah are referring to relationships through *Jewish* marriages, which consist of the two steps of "Kiddushin" and "Nissu'in." Non-Jews marriages are performed differently -- a non-Jew is halachically unable to institute a "Kiddushin" (see Rambam, beginning of Hilchot Ishut). Their marriage is thus of a different nature than that referred to in the Torah's list of incestual relationships.

When Yaakov married Leah, his marriage was not a "Jewish marriage." Before the Torah was given, there was no *binding factor* called "Kiddushin," even for someone who wished to accept upon himself the *performance* of the Mitzvot of the Torah. Rachel was thus not the type of "sister-in-law" that the Torah forbids in Vayikra 18:18! According to this concept, the Brisker Rav explains, it would be permitted even for someone committed to all the laws of the Torah (e.g. the forefathers) to marry such an "in-law." Since the Torah never referred to "in-laws" whose relationships were caused by non-Kiddushin marriages, there is no reason to consider marrying that "in-law" as incest! This is why Yakov felt free to marry two sisters. This also explains how Yehudah was allowed to marry his daughter-in-law -- she was not what the Torah referred to as a "daughter in law."

This approach solves difficulties [3] and [4], but it does not seem to help for difficulties [1] and [2]. How did Amram marry his *aunt*, and the sons of Yakov marry their *sisters*? However, perhaps we can expand this idea to apply to these two cases as well.

A Jew is forbidden to marry his half sister, whether this "half" is because of a common father or because of a common mother (Vayikra 18:9). A Ben Noach, however, is only forbidden to marry his half sister if they share a common mother; if they share only a common father they may marry. The same is true for an aunt who is the sister of one's father: If she is a half-sister of the father, she is forbidden in the case of a Jew. In the case of a non-Jew, it depends by which "half" she is a sister. In Sanhedrin 58b the Gemara tells us that Amram's aunt was not his father's full sister. She was only his half-sister, through a common father. Thus, it would not be wrong for Amram, as a non-Jew, to marry her.

The reason for this difference between Jewish and non-Jewish law is that paternal decent is not considered to be a familial relationship for non-Jews (Yevamot 98a). Taking the logic of the Brisker Rav a bit further, then, we may add that the Torah, when it forbade marrying one's aunt, was referring to an aunt who is a full sister of one's father or a half-sister through a common *Jewish* father or mother. The case of an aunt who is a father's half-sister through a common *non-Jewish* father is a different type of relationship altogether, since a non-Jewish father is not considered to be a familial relationship, halachically. This case is not discussed at all in Vayikra 18, and is thus not forbidden even for a non-Jew who wishes to follow Torah law! This is why Amram married his paternal half-aunt.

Similarly, Yakov's children would be permitted to marry their sisters (provided the brother and the sister who married each other were not from the same mother -- Reuven marries Gad's twin sister, etc.). This answers questions [1] and [2], of how Amram and Yakov's children married whom they married! I later noticed that this answer is actually alluded to already by Sechel Tov (Bereishit 29:29), Chizkuni (ibid.) and Radbaz (vol. 2, responsa 696). (It is to be noted, that according to this approach, the words of the Brisker Rav are no longer necessary to answer the question of Yakov's sibling wives. Is is possible that Rachel and Leah -- and Bilhah and Zilpah, who were also sisters according to Chazal -- were born to Lavan from different wives, as the above commentaries indeed state explicitly. The only question the Brisker Rav's addition answers, then, is the Yehudah and Tamar question, which we already found can be answered in two additional ways -- section I)

One problem still remains, however. How could Shimon marry Dinah? They shared the same *mother,* and not only the same father! Perhaps we can answer this by referring to a Midrashic interpretation found in Targum Yonatan ben Uzziel (Bereishit 30:21). According to the Targum, Dinah was originally conceived by *Rachel* and Yosef by Leah, but later the two fetuses were miraculously exchanged by an angel. Thus, Dinah did not really share the same mother with Shimon! If they were only siblings through a common non-Jewish father, their marriage was not of the type prohibited by the Torah in Vayikrah 18.


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