QUESTION: The Gemara cites a Beraisa that discusses the question of where a Levi flees if he kills accidentally. The question is based on the fact that all of the Arei Miklat belong to the Leviyim; they are the cities that were designated for the Leviyim as their residence. Since the Leviyim own the Arei Miklat, how is it possible for a Levi to be in "Galus," in exile, while in his hometown? The Beraisa says that a Levi who kills accidentally must go from one Ir Miklat to another Ir Miklat ("mi'Pelach l'Pelach"; see HAGAHOS HA'BACH to Makos 12b). The Beraisa continues and says that a Levi who stays in his own city is also protected from the Go'el ha'Dam.

These two statements seem to contradict each other. If a Levi is protected by staying in his city, then why does the first part of the Beraisa say that he must go to a different city? (See also Insights to Makos 12:2.)


(a) TOSFOS (DH Ir) and the RITVA in Makos answer that l'Chatchilah a Levi should flee to a different city. However, b'Di'eved, if he flees to his own city, he will be protected there.

The SHEYAREI KORBAN (Yerushalmi Makos 2:6) asks, how can there be a ruling of "l'Chatchilah" and "b'Di'eved" with regard to such a matter? The killer is seeking refuge from a Go'el ha'Dam by fleeing to the Ir Miklat. He will be putting his life in danger by going to another city, and he certainly should be permitted to remain where he is l'Chatchilah in order to save his life and avoid putting his life in danger.

Perhaps one may answer that the l'Chatchilah option applies in a case in which a Levi accidentally kills a convert, in which case there is no Go'el ha'Dam.

Alternatively, there may be other cases in which the accidental killer knows that the Go'el ha'Dam is not seeking to kill him. In such a case, it is better for him to get the greater Kaparah by going to a different city instead of remaining in his own city.

Perhaps Tosfos means that if the killer wants a greater Kaparah, he should go to another city despite the risk to his life, instead of remaining in his own city.

The CHASDEI DAVID (Tosefta Makos 2:2) suggests that this opinion is discussed in the Tosefta. The Tana Kama in the Tosefta states that a Levi must go from city to city. The Tosefta quotes Rebbi who says that half of the city for this killer is considered like the entire city. The Chasdei David understands that the Tana Kama says that the most preferable option is for the Levi to go to another city, while Rebbi holds that it is equally acceptable for him to travel to another neighborhood in his present city.

(b) Tosfos gives a second answer and explains that the first part of the Beraisa is teaching that it is preferable for the Levi to go to a different city for his own benefit, since going to a different city permits him to roam anywhere within the city limits. He may stay in his own city, but if he does so he must move to another neighborhood within the city. If he chooses the second option, however, his movement in the city will be limited. He will be able to roam around the entire city except for his original neighborhood. How limited will he be?

According to Tosfos here, he may roam around the entire city except for his original neighborhood. Tosfos in Makos (12b) writes that "he may not go from neighborhood to neighborhood." This implies that he is confined to a single neighborhood within the city. However, the ARUCH LA'NER in Makos suggests that Tosfos in Makos agrees with Tosfos here, and he means that the killer may not go back to his old neighborhood, since there is no reason for him to be more restricted than any other killer who may travel in all of the Ir Miklat.

The MINCHAS CHINUCH (Mitzvah #410) asserts that Tosfos in Makos argues with Tosfos in Zevachim. Tosfos there maintains that the Levi may not go out of his new neighborhood at all. This is also the opinion of the TOSFOS SHANTZ. The ME'IRI in Makos cites both opinions for how limited his movement will be.

(c) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Rotze'ach 7:5) has a different understanding of this Beraisa. The Rambam apparently learns that when the Beraisa says that the Levi is protected when he stays in his hometown, it refers only to when he killed outside of his hometown. However, when he killed within his own town, he must fulfill the first law of the Beraisa and flee to another city to seek refuge. In such a case, his hometown does not provide refuge for him.

This opinion is cited by the Me'iri in Makos and by the SEFAS EMES here in Zevachim. The MISHNEH L'MELECH says that the source of the Rambam's ruling is the Gemara here.

The YAD BINYAMIN here has difficulty with all of these explanations. The Beraisa explains that the verse, "Ki b'Ir Miklato Yeshev" -- "for in the city of his refuge he will dwell" (Bamidbar 35:28), refers to an "Ir she'Koltaso Kevar," a city that has already sheltered this accidental murderer. The Beraisa's wording of "Koltaso Kevar" implies that the verse refers specifically to an accidental killer who was saved once before from a Go'el ha'Dam in this Ir Miklat, but not to a Levi who happened to live in the city before he accidentally killed. Moreover, how can the Rambam learn that a Levi who accidentally kills outside of his city may stay in his city because of this verse? The verse implies that he may stay where he is if he kills, but not that he may run back to his original city. How does the Rambam apply this verse specifically to a case in which the Levi killed outside of his city? (See KIRYAS SEFER who cites a different verse as the Rambam's source, implying that he does not agree that the Gemara here is the Rambam's source, unlike the Mishneh l'Melech.)

(d) The RITVA in Makos (12b) indeed explains the Beraisa based on the argument that the Yad Binyamin expresses. The Ritva learns that the Beraisa is referring to a Levi who killed once by accident and went to Galus to a different city. If he kills again, he is required only to switch neighborhoods, because of the verse of "Ki b'Ir Miklato Yeshev."

(e) The Ritva mentions the first explanation of Tosfos and differentiates between going to a different city l'Chatchilah and moving to a different neighborhood within the same city b'Di'eved, but he adds that the reason for this is that a Levi who kills once is like a Yisrael who kills twice. The Yad Binyamin asserts that the Ritva's words answer his question of why Tosfos calls this city a place that "saved" the Levi even though he never killed before. Since the Torah says that this is one of the places where the Levi must live, it is considered as if it "saved" the Levi even though he never before killed. (Y. MONTROSE)



OPINIONS: The Beraisa (117a) records a dispute about what type of Korban may be offered on a Bamah (when Bamos were permitted). Rebbi Meir says that any Korban brought as a Neder or Nedavah may be offered on a Bamah, while any obligatory Korban may not be offered on a Bamah. The Chachamim maintain that only Olos and Shelamim may be offered on a Bamah, but not a Minchah, even if it is a Neder or Nedavah.

The Gemara later (119b) discusses the statement of Rebbi Yehudah in the Mishnah (113a) who, like the Chachamim in the Beraisa, maintains that a Minchah may not be offered on a Bamah. The Gemara says that the source for this opinion is the verse (Vayikra 17:5) that uses the word, "Zevachim," or "slaughtered offerings," to describe the types of Korbanos that may be offered on a Bamah. With this word, the Torah refers only to offerings that are slaughtered, excluding Menachos and other offerings that are not slaughtered.

When the Chachamim say that a Minchah may not be offered on a Bamah, do they mean that no Menachos may be offered on any type of Bamah, or do they permit certain types of Menachos to be offered on certain types of Bamos?

(a) TOSFOS (DH v'Rabanan) explains that the Chachamim maintain that no type of Minchah may be offered on a Bamah, neither on a Bamas Yachid (private Bamah) nor on a Bamas Tzibur (public Bamah).

Tosfos asks questions this opinion. Rebbi Yehudah, like the Chachamim, says that Menachos are not offered on a Bamah (113a). However, in the Beraisa here (117a), Rebbi Yehudah says that whatever Korban was brought in the Ohel Mo'ed was brought in Gilgal as well. This implies that Menachos were offered on Bamos in Gilgal. If Rebbi Yehudah and the Chachamim are of the same opinion with regard to offering Menachos on a Bamah, then the Chachamim should agree that Menachos were offered on the Bamos in Gilgal, contrary to Tosfos' assertion.

Tosfos answers that although Rebbi Yehudah maintains that Menachos were offered on the Bamos in Gilgal, and he differentiates between Bamos in Gilgal and Bamos during other eras, it is not logical to say that Rebbi Yehudah differentiates between a Bamas Yachid and a Bamas Tzibur. Since the source that a Minchah is not offered on a Bamah is the verse of "Zevachim" mentioned above, there is no source, or reason, to differentiate between a Bamas Yachid and a Bamas Tzibur.

The KEREN ORAH (118a) has difficulty with the words of Tosfos. The Mishnah states that a Bamas Tzibur, unlike a Bamas Yachid, requires a Kohen. In order for a Kohen to be eligible to perform the Avodah, he must first offer a Minchas Chinuch (inaugural Minchah offering). If the Chachamim maintain that no Minchah may be brought on any Bamah, how were the Kohanim able to bring their Minchas Chinuch offerings?

A similar question is posed by the RADAL (Rav David Luria). The Gemara in Rosh Hashanah (13a) says that the Minchas ha'Omer was offered in Gilgal, when the Korbanos were brought on a Bamas Tzibur, as the Mishnah describes, and the people proceeded to eat the new wheat that day. This shows that they did offer a Minchah on a Bamas Tzibur.

The YAD BINYAMIN is perplexed by Tosfos' reasoning that Rebbi Yehudah does not differentiate between a Bamas Yachid and a Bamas Tzibur. According to the Chachamim, there is reason to differentiate between the two types of Bamos. The Chachamim prohibit offering a Minchah when there is a Mishkan because of the Derashah that "Yesharos Takrivu," which teaches that only Nedarim and Nedavos may be offered on a Bamah. When the Chachamim expound the verse of "Zevachim" and understand that it excludes Menachos, logic dictates that just as other Korbanos which are Chovos are not brought on any Bamah, the verse is teaching that Menachos are also not brought on any Bamah. Accordingly, there is reason to say that the Chachamim do not differentiate between a Bamas Yachid and a Bamas Tzibur with regard to Menachos. On the other hand, Rebbi Yehudah, unlike the Chachamim, clearly says in the Beraisa that even obligatory Korbanos (Chovos) are brought on a Bamas Tzibur. Since almost all Korbanos may be brought on a Bamas Tzibur according to Rebbi Yehudah, it is logical that he understands that the Torah excludes only Menachos from being brought on a Bamas Yachid.

(b) The MISHNEH L'MELECH (Hilchos Korban Pesach 1:3) asserts that it is logical to say that Rebbi Yehudah maintains that Menachos were brought only on a Bamas Tzibur. This may be inferred from Rebbi Yehudah's first statement in the Beraisa as cited by Tosfos, as well as from his statement later in the Beraisa that "the Bamah on top of his roof was used only for Olos and Shelamim." The former statement implies that Menachos were brought on a Bamas Tzibur, and the latter shows that only Olos and Shelamim, not Menachos, were brought on a private Bamah. (It is important to note that the Mishneh l'Melech does not address the question of Tosfos.)

The Mishneh l'Melech points out that Tosfos in Sotah (16a, DH l'Rabos) implies that according to Rebbi Yehudah, a Minchas Sotah was brought during the times of Nov and Giv'on, when Bamos were used. The Mishneh l'Melech says that he does not think it is logical to differentiate and say that only a Minchas Tzibur was brought and not a Minchas Yachid. He concludes that Tosfos' opinion requires further elucidation. If, however, this distinction between a Minchas Tzibur and a Minchas Yachid is correct, then it would answer the questions of the Keren Orah and the Radal on Tosfos. (Y. MONTROSE)