1) "ZERIKAH BA'CHUTZ" WITH BLOOD OF "SHIRAYIM"

QUESTION: The Gemara inquires what Tana authored the Mishnah (111b). The Mishnah states that when one receives the blood of a Chatas in one vessel, and then he performs Zerikas ha'Dam with the blood in that vessel inside the Beis ha'Mikdash and then outside the Beis ha'Mikdash, he transgresses the prohibition of Zerikah ba'Chutz, performing the Avodah of Zerikas ha'Dam outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. Why is this considered Zerikah ba'Chutz? When the blood that is leftover in the vessel after the Zerikah is not poured on the Mizbe'ach, it does not disqualify the Korban. The blood is not the blood of Zerikah, and the act of sprinkling it outside the Beis ha'Mikdash does not constitute an act of "Zerikah" of a Korban. Consequently, sprinkling that blood outside the Beis ha'Mikdash should not constitute a transgression of Zerikah ba'Chutz!

The Gemara answers that the Tana of the Mishnah is Rebbi Nechemyah, who maintains that the placing of the leftover blood on the Mizbe'ach is essential to the Korban, and failure to place it on the Mizbe'ach disqualifies the Korban.

The Gemara asks that if Rebbi Nechemyah is the Tana of the Mishnah, then how can the Mishnah say that one is exempt when he performs the Kabalas ha'Dam with two vessels, and then sprinkles the blood of one vessel inside, and the blood of the other vessel outside? According to Rebbi Nechemyah, the blood in the second vessel (that was sprinkled outside) is essential to the validity of the Korban, and the person should be liable! The Gemara answers that in this case, Rebbi Nechemyah agrees that the person is exempt. Rebbi Nechemyah follows the view of the Tana Kama in the Beraisa cited earlier (34b) who says that if the blood is received in two vessels, once Zerikah is performed with the blood in one vessel, the blood in the second vessel is disqualified from being valid blood of Shirayim.

The RAMBAM (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 19:13) rules, in the first case, that sprinkling the leftover blood from a Kabalas ha'Dam that was done with a single vessel is considered Zerikah ba'Chutz only when it is done before the Zerikah is done inside the Beis ha'Mikdash, since at that time it is still fit to be offered inside the Beis ha'Mikdash. He does not rule like Rebbi Nechemyah, and, therefore, he rules that once the Zerikah was done inside, the remaining blood cannot be used, since the Shirayim are not essential to the Korban. However, the Rambam then writes that if the Kabalas ha'Dam was done with two vessels, then the blood in the second vessel is subject to the Isur of Zerikah ba'Chutz, whether it is sprinkled outside before or after the blood of the first vessel is sprinkled inside.

Based on the Gemara here, the RA'AVAD rejects the Rambam's conclusion unconditionally. The Gemara says that even according to Rebbi Nechemyah, the second vessel is not essential to the Korban and one cannot be liable for performing Zerikah ba'Chutz with it. Why does the Rambam differ from the conclusion of the Gemara?

ANSWERS:

(a) The KESEF MISHNEH quotes the MAHARI KURKUS who explains that the Rambam's source is the Mishnah itself. The Mishnah compares this case to a case of one who dedicated an animal as a Chatas, lost it, dedicated another animal as a Chatas, and then found the first animal. The Gemara asks, what is the Mishnah teaching with this analogy? The Gemara answers that the Mishnah is teaching that only when the first Chatas was lost does the second animal attain the Kedushah of a Chatas. If the first animal was not lost, the second animal has the status of an Olah. (Similarly, when one is obligated to bring a Chatas and he dedicates two animals, one becomes a Chatas and one becomes an Olah.) Since a Chatas cannot be donated voluntarily, only one animal can have the Kedushah of a Chatas.

Although this case teaches something about dedicating an animal as a Chatas, what does the Mishnah intend to derive from this case about performing Kabalas ha'Dam with two vessels? The Mahari Kurkus explains that the Rambam understands that the Mishnah's intention is to emphasize that receiving the blood in two vessels is similar to dedicating a second Chatas after the first Chatas is lost. Just as both animals have Kedushas Chatas (the first one, because it was designated as a Chatas, and the second one, because it was needed to insure that a Chatas would be brought), a second vessel of blood has the status of valid blood for Zerikah since it is needed to insure that the Zerikah will be done in case the first vessel spills. The Gemara concludes unlike Rebbi Nechemyah (who says that Zerikah from the first vessel causes the blood in the second vessel to become invalid for Zerikah), and that is why the Rambam rules that one is always liable for Zerikah ba'Chutz with blood from the second vessel.

The KEREN ORAH and CHOK NASAN argue that this cannot be the intention of the Rambam. The Rambam himself (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 2:21) rules that Zerikah from the first vessel does dissociate the blood in the second vessel from being part of the Korban. Moreover, it is not reasonable to suggest that the Rambam is altering the conclusion of the Mishnah, that one is exempt for using the blood of the second vessel for Zerikah outside the Beis ha'Mikdash, based merely on an analogy which the Mishnah itself uses to illustrate that very point.

(b) The Mahari Kurkus (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 19:13) himself concludes that this explanation seems forced into the Gemara, and perhaps the Rambam had a different Girsa in the Gemara. The CHAZON ISH (Zevachim 20:1:8) also suggests that there is a mistake in the text of the Rambam.

(c) RAV CHAIM SOLOVEITCHIK (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos) suggests a novel principle in order to explain the words of the Rambam. There is a fundamental difference between blood of Shirayim and blood that is "Nidcheh" from being Shirayim. For blood of Shirayim, a requirement to be poured on the Yesod of the Mizbe'ach takes effect. This means that the blood of Shirayim is no longer supposed to be used for Zerikah. For this reason, the Rambam rules that such blood is not subject to the Isur of Zerikah ba'Chutz. Rav Chaim suggests that this has even broader implications. After the first sprinkling of blood, a vessel of blood from a Chatas (which, b'Di'eved, is valid with only one Matanah) becomes blood which has the status of both blood of Zerikah and blood of Shirayim. On the other hand, blood from a second vessel which is "Nidcheh" is not blood which has a different stats from the blood of Zerikah; rather, it is ordinary blood of the Korban which is no longer needed because the Korban was completed without it. No Halachah states that it is not supposed to be used for Zerikah. Indeed, until the Avodah of the Korban is completed, it is blood that still may be used for Zerikah.

Based on this difference, Rav Chaim explains the words of the Rambam as follows. The Rambam first writes that one who sprinkles some of the Zerikos outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is liable. He continues with this case and says that one who performs the first Zerikos outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is liable. However, one who does only the rest of the Zerikos outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is exempt, since the blood attains the status of Shirayim after the first Zerikah. This is not so in the case of two vessels of blood. The blood of both vessels is valid for Zerikah until all of the Zerikos are completed. Since the Rambam is discussing his original case in which all of the Zerikos have not been completed yet, it follows that the blood in the second vessel is subject to the Isur of Zerikah ba'Chutz at any time. (See CHAZON YECHEZKEL 12:5, who argues with Rav Chaim's principle and asserts that blood after the first Zerikah is not called Shirayim.) (Y. MONTROSE)

112b----------------------------------------112b

2) OFFERING A KORBAN WHILE ONE IS A "METZORA"

QUESTION: The Mishnah states that one who is "Mechusar Zeman" who offers his Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is not liable for Ma'aleh ba'Chutz, since his Korban is not fit to be offered at this time. The Mishnah gives examples of Mechusar Zeman: a Zav, Zavah, Yoledes, and Metzora. A person in any of these four categories who offers his or her Chatas and Asham outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is exempt. However, if he offers his Olah or Shelamim while he is "Mechusar Zeman," he is liable, because these Korbanos (which may be offered voluntarily, as Nedavos) may be offered while one is "Mechusar Zeman."

The Mishnah seems to contradict the Gemara in Moed Katan (15b). The Gemara there cites a Beraisa that says that a Metzora may not send any of his Korbanos to be offered while he is a Metzora. The RAMBAM (Hilchos Bi'as ha'Mikdash 2:11) understands that this means that he cannot offer his Korbanos even b'Di'eved during this time. How is the Gemara in Moed Katan to be reconciled with the Mishnah here?

ANSWERS:

(a) The MIKDASH DAVID (27:5) suggests a simple solution. When the Gemara in Moed Katan says that a Metzora cannot send his Korbanos, it means that he cannot fulfill his obligation to bring his Korbanos at that time. This is also the explanation of the Rambam. However, the law is that a Korban can be valid even though the owner does not fulfill his obligation with that Korban (Zevachim 2a). The Mishnah here is saying that since a Metzora is able to offer Korbanos in such a manner during this time, if he offers his Korbanos outside the Beis ha'Mikdash he transgresses the Isur of Ma'aleh ba'Chutz. This explanation is based on the words of the Tosefta (1:2) which explicitly states that the Olah of a Metzora is valid but does not fulfill the obligation of the owner.

The Mikdash David is not satisfied with this explanation. The Rambam (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 18:9) writes that one who is Mechusar Zeman is liable for Ma'aleh ba'Chutz "because an Olah is a present." The Rambam understands that the basis for this Halachah is that the Olah counts towards its designated purpose, as a present to Hash-m. The TOSFOS YOM TOV also cites a text of the Rambam in Perush ha'Mishnayos (Eretz Yisrael edition) which contains a similar statement. According to this statement of the Rambam, the original question returns. Moreover, this statement also contradicts the aforementioned Rambam (Hilchos Bi'as ha'Mikdash 2:11) in which the Rambam implies that one cannot fulfill his obligation to bring his Korbanos at all while he is "Mechusar Zeman." The LECHEM MISHNEH (Hilchos Nezirus 10:6) and the RASHASH also infer from the words of the Rambam that the person's Korban fulfills his obligation.

(b) The YAD BINYAMIN defends the explanation of the Mikdash David. When the Rambam writes that "an Olah is a present," he does not mean that the Metzora fulfills his obligation to bring his Korban which is a present. Rather, he means that an Olah is always fit to be placed on the Mizbe'ach, since it is a present, even when it will not fulfill the owner's obligation. The Yad Binyamin adds that this is also the implication of the KIRYAS SEFER. (See AVI EZRI, Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 18:9, who discusses both possibilities.) (See more on this topic in Insights to Nazir 60:1.) (Y. MONTROSE)

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