1) IS THE KEDUSHAH OF "KLEI SHARES" EFFECTIVE OUTSIDE THE AZARAH TO DISQUALIFY A KORBAN?
OPINIONS: The Mishnah states that all Klei Shares are Mekadesh their contents only within the Azarah. Does this mean that the Klei Shares, while inside of the Azarah, are Mekadesh their contents only for the purpose of making them fit to be brought upon the Mizbe'ach, but outside of the Azarah the Klei Shares are nevertheless Mekadesh their contents with regard to making them Pasul? Perhaps the Klei Shares give their contents no Kedushah at all when they are outside the Azarah.
What Kedushah, if any, do the Klei Shares give to their contents outside of the Azarah?
(a) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES quotes a Girsa which includes this question in the text of the Gemara. In our text, the Gemara says that a Kli Shares used for liquids is not Mekadesh non-liquid items to make them fit to be offered on the Mizbe'ach, but it is Mekadesh them in order to make them Pasul. This means that if solids are placed in a Kli Shares used for liquids and then taken out of the Azarah, they become Pasul. The Shitah Mekubetzes records a Girsa that says that this statement was made not about a Kli Shares used for solely liquids, but about the Halachah that Klei Shares are Mekadesh their contents only in the Azarah. The Gemara says that outside of the Azarah, the Klei Shares are able to make their contents Pasul. For example, if the item was placed in a Kli Shares and remained there overnight, the Korban becomes Pasul.
This is also the opinion of the RA'AVAD (Kesav Yad, cited by the SHA'AR MORDECHAI) and RASHI in Menachos (63a, DH Kesheros). The Gemara there asks whether that Rebbi Shimon maintains that an oven which is a Kli Shares can be Mekadesh a Korban. Rebbi Shimon says that the Lechem ha'Panim are valid even if they are baked in "Beis Pagi." Rashi explains that "Beis Pagi" refers to a place outside the Azarah, which would make the bread baked there Pasul. This is because it was made Kadosh outside of the Azarah, since it was baked in an oven which was a Kli Shares. Rashi clearly maintains that a Kli Shares can make a Korban become Pasul outside the Azarah.
(b) However, the ZEVACH TODAH points out that the RAMBAM (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 3:20) writes that a Kli Shares that is half-full (and the Kohen has no intent to fill it with the normal amount used for a Korban) is Mekadesh its contents only to make them Pasul, and not to make them fit to be offered on the Mizbe'ach. (See the KESEF MISHNEH for the source for this statement.) The Zevach Todah says that the fact that the Rambam does not make this distinction with regard to anything else indicates that he disagrees with the opinions above and maintains that a Kli Shares makes nothing Kadosh, in any way, if it is outside of the Azarah.
This is also the view of RABEINU GERSHOM in Menachos (63a). Rabeinu Gershom explains that the question of the Gemara in Menachos is not that the Lechem ha'Panim should be Pasul when baked outside of the Azarah. Rather, the question is that Rebbi Shimon says that the Lechem ha'Panim are Kosher outside the Azarah. If a Kli Shares is Mekadesh a Korban only when it is inside the Azarah, then how can the Lechem ha'Panim be considered Kosher when it is still outside the Azarah? This explanation shows that Rabeinu Gershom, like the Rambam, maintains that a Kli Shares is not Mekadesh anything outside of the Azarah at all. This is also the opinion of TOSFOS and the RASHBA in Sukah (50a).
The Sha'ar Mordechai understands that the argument is based on how the Rishonim understand the logic behind the rule that a Kli Shares is Mekadesh a Korban only in the Azarah. Apparently, Rabeinu Gershom, the Rambam, and others understand that the rule is simply that the Kedushah given by a Kli Shares takes effect only in the Azarah. The other Rishonim, such as Rashi, understand that the rule is not based on the ability of a Kli Shares to be Mekadesh an item. Rather, the rule is based on the nature of Korbanos: items that need to become Kadosh in order to be offered on the Mizbe'ach acquire their Kedushah only when they are in the Azarah. The Gemara presents this fact in terms of a Kli Shares' inability to give that Kedushah unless it is in the Azarah, because the Korban becomes Kadosh only by entering the Kli Shares. However, the Gemara does not deal with the fact that a Kli Shares that is designated for Korbanos can disqualify items which enter its confines when it is outside the Azarah. (Y. MONTROSE)
2) AGADAH: ATONEMENT FOR MURDER AND PROMISCUITY
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the specific sins for which each of the Bigdei Kehunah atone. For example, the Gemara says that when the Kohen wears the Kesones, it is Mechaper for the sin of murder, and when the Kohen Gadol wears the Me'il, it is Mechaper for Lashon ha'Ra. The Gemara asks that Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that the atonement for murder is the bringing of the Eglah Arufah, and the atonement for Lashon ha'Ra is the offering of the Ketores. The Gemara answers that both statements are true. When the identity of the murderer is unknown, the Eglah Arufah provides atonement. When the identity of the murderer is known, but he was not warned properly before the act and therefore he cannot be killed in Beis Din, the wearing of the Kesones provides atonement. Regarding Lashon ha'Ra, the atonement depends on the type of Lashon ha'Ra that was spoken. The offering of the Ketores atones for Lashon ha'Ra spoken in private, since the Ketores, too, is offered in private. The Me'il atones for Lashon ha'Ra spoken in public, since the bells attached at the hem of the Me'il make noise, publicly, wherever the Kohen Gadol walks.
The same Sugya is recorded in the Gemara in Erchin (16a). However, the Gemara in Erchin records many sins for which a person is punished with Tzara'as, and among them is the sin of Lashon ha'Ra. The Gemara there asks that if Tzara'as atones for the sin of Lashon ha'Ra, then the Me'il must not atone for it. The Gemara there answers that it depends on whether the transgressor's Lashon ha'Ra had detrimental consequences or whether it had no consequences. If the person's Lashon ha'Ra had detrimental consequences, then he is punished with Tzara'as. If it had no practical consequences, then the Me'il atones for it. The Gemara there proceeds to record the discussion of the Gemara here concerning the statement of Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi.
The Gemara there seems to ignore an obvious question. Two of the things that the Gemara in Erchin lists as causes of Tzara'as are murder and promiscuity. The statement regarding the atonement provided by the Bigdei Kehunah includes the Kesones as an atonement for murder, and the wearing of the Michnasayim as atoning for promiscuity. Why does the Gemara not immediately ask, as it does with regard to the atonement for Lashon ha'Ra, that both murder and promiscuity have double atonements? This question is especially relevant for the atonement for murder, since the Gemara itself asks later why murder needs both the atonements of the Eglah Arufah and the Kesones.
(a) RASHI in Erchin (DH Ahanu) answers that the Gemara there knows that the atonement provided by the Bigdei Kehunah for murder and promiscuity is an atonement for the Jewish nation as a whole, and not for the individual perpetrator. This is based on verses that describe how the public is endangered by these sins of the individual. With regard to murder, the verse says, "... for the blood will obligate the land" (Bamidbar 35:33, see ONKELUS). Regarding promiscuity, the verse states, "... and the land became Tamei, and I punished it for its sin" (Vayikra 18:25). These verses show that atonement is needed in order to prevent the Jewish nation as a whole from being banished from Eretz Yisrael as a result of these sins. In contrast, there is no source that the public is endangered as a result of the individual's transgression of Lashon ha'Ra.
TOSFOS here (DH Mechaprim) also mentions Rashi's answer. Part of this explanation is given by Rashi (DH Bar Ketala) in the Gemara here, when he explains that the murderer himself does not gain atonement through the Kesones. (See PANIM ME'IROS who proves this from the Gemara in Makos 10b.)
Tosfos in Erchin (DH Ha) asks that this approach seems inconsistent with the Gemara in Shevuos (39a) that says that all Jews are responsible for any sin committed by another Jew, as long as they have the ability to protest and try to stop him. Why, then, does the Gemara assume that the public does not need a general atonement for the individual's transgression of Lashon ha'Ra (against which no other Jew protested)? Tosfos continues and says that if the Lashon ha'Ra was spoken in private and no one was able to protest, then in a similar case of murder and promiscuity committed in private, the public also is not held responsible.
(b) TOSFOS quotes others who explain that the Gemara in Erchin itself addresses this question. The Gemara answers that the need for atonement depends on whether the sinner's transgression was effective or not. This answer refers also to sins of murder and promiscuity. If someone actually killed, then he is punished with Tzara'as. If he did not actually kill, but rather he embarrassed someone, an act tantamount to killing (see Bava Metzia 58b), then the Kesones atones. Similarly, Tzara'as is a punishment for one who is promiscuous. One who commits an act which is merely compared to promiscuity (see Shabbos 55b) receives atonement from the Kohen's wearing of the Michnasayim.
Similarly, the SHITAH MEKUBETZES quotes the ROSH who answers the same question regarding Gasei ha'Ru'ach. This sin is listed as a cause for Tzara'as, and it is also listed as a sin for which the Mitznefes (of the Kohen Gadol) atones. The Rosh says that the reason why the Gemara does not ask about this double atonement is similar to the reason given by Tosfos. If a person became haughty and sinned as a result of his arrogance (as did Uziyah ha'Melech when he attempted to offer the Ketores), then he is punished with Tzara'as (like Uziyah). A person who merely feels haughty but does not actively sin as a result receives atonement from the Kohen Gadol's wearing of the Mitznefes. This explanation is also given by the RASHASH.
(c) The MAHARSHA here gives a different explanation. When the Gemara in Erchin says that the Bigdei Kehunah atone for such serious sins as murder and promiscuity, it means that they atone for these sins only when they were committed unintentionally. If they were committed knowingly and willfully (and are not subject to punishment by Beis Din, such as when there is no proper warning), the sinner is punished with Tzara'as. This is why the Gemara asks only about Lashon ha'Ra, since one cannot transgress the sin of Lashon ha'Ra unintentionally. Since both atonements for Lashon ha'Ra involve Lashon ha'Ra spoken willfully, the Gemara asks why both atonements are necessary. (Y. MONTROSE)