1) OFFERING AN UNDOMESTICATED ANIMAL AS A KORBAN
QUESTION: The Gemara records a dispute between Reish Lakish and Rebbi Yochanan with regard to one who brings as a Korban a type of animal that the Torah does not sanction as an eligible Korban. According to the first version of the Machlokes, Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree about one who offers a Behemah Teme'ah (a non-Kosher animal) on the Mizbe'ach. The Torah says that a Behemah Tehorah may be offered as a Korban, which implies that a Behemah Teme'ah may not be offered. Rebbi Yochanan says that since this prohibition is merely inferred from the verse and is not written explicitly, one who offers a Behemah Teme'ah upon the Mizbe'ach is not punished with Malkus. Reish Lakish says that one does receive Malkus for offering a Behemah Teme'ah, because even an inferred prohibition is considered a Lo Sa'aseh for which one is punished with Malkus.
The Gemara rejects this version of the dispute. It proves from a Beraisa that an inferred prohibition is considered an Aseh and not a Lo Sa'aseh, and thus everyone agrees that one does not receive Malkus. The Gemara suggests that the Machlokes between Reish Lakish and Rebbi Yochanan involves a different issue. The issue they are discussing is whether or not one is permitted, l'Chatchilah, to offer a Chayah (an undomesticated animal, such as a deer) on the Mizbe'ach. The Gemara explains that Rebbi Yochanan prohibits offering a Chayah, because the verse specifies that a Korban is a Behemah (a domesticated animal, such as a cow or lamb), implying that a Chayah is prohibited. Reish Lakish permits offering a Chayah. He explains that the verse mentions a Behemah only because one is obligated to bring a Korban when he pledges to bring a Behemah, but he is not obligated to bring a Korban if he pledges to bring a Chayah. One is certainly permitted, however, to offer a Chayah if he wants to do so.
The opinion of Reish Lakish seems problematic. If Reish Lakish maintains that the type of animal which the Torah mentions as eligible for a Korban is not the only type that is eligible, then he also should permit a female animal to be offered as a Korban Olah! The Torah does not say explicitly that a female animal may not be offered as an Olah. The Torah says only that an Olah is offered from a male Behemah Tehorah. Just as the word Behemah, according to Reish Lakish, does not exclude a Chayah from eligibility as a Korban, the word "Zachar" ("male") should not exclude a female animal from eligibility as a Korban Olah. The word "Zachar" should teach only that one is not obligated to bring a female, but he may bring one if he wants. Why, then, according to Reish Lakish does the law prohibit offering a female animal as an Olah? (OLAS SHLOMO)
ANSWER: The OLAS SHLOMO answers that perhaps Reish Lakish does not infer from the verse that a Chayah is prohibited for the following reason. When the Torah says that a Behemah Tehorah may be offered as a Korban, it may mean simply to prohibit offering a Behemah Teme'ah. Therefore, one cannot infer from the verse that a Chayah is prohibited. However, when the verse says that a male animal, "Zachar," must be offered, the only possible inference is that a female animal is excluded. Therefore, one may infer from the verse that a female animal is prohibited to be offered as an Olah.
Perhaps a logical basis may be suggested to support this distinction between a Chayah (which is permitted) and a female animal (which is not permitted), according to Reish Lakish. The Midrash (Vayikra Rabah 27:6) teaches that Hash-m told the Jewish people, "See how I tried not to overburden you: I told you to bring Korbanos only from the Kosher animals that are domesticated, and I did not require you to exert yourself to go find wild animals in the mountains to bring as Korbanos." This might be the basis for the suggestion of Reish Lakish that Hash-m did not require that we bring a Chayah, but allowed us to bring it if we want. Reish Lakish understands that the Torah mentions Behemah only because it does not want to trouble us to have to find a Chayah. In contrast, when the Torah mentions that a male animal must be brought as an Olah, there is no logical reason to suggest that the Torah is merely not obligating us to bring a female animal, but we may bring one if we want. (Rav E. Chrysler)
The answer of the Olas Shlomo may be used to solve another pressing difficulty in the Gemara. The Gemara initially assumes that Reish Lakish rules stringently and maintains that one transgresses an Isur Lav (punishable with Malkus) when he offers a Behemah Teme'ah as a Korban. However, when the Gemara reinterprets the Machlokes, it says that Reish Lakish is lenient and maintains that there is no Isur, not even an Isur Aseh, against offering a Chayah. While it is true that the Gemara needs to reinterpret the argument, why does the Gemara need to reverse which Amora is saying the lenient opinion and which is saying the stringent opinion?
RASHI (DH Ki Pligi) explains that there actually is no basis to reverse the opinions. Rather, Rebbi Yakov, who presents the second interpretation of the argument, had a tradition that Reish Lakish indeed maintained the lenient opinion, and not the stringent opinion as originally assumed.
According to the approach of the Olas Shlomo, one may suggest another explanation for why the opinions are reversed. Perhaps the words that Reish Lakish and Rebbi Yochanan originally spoke in the study hall indeed addressed the issue of a Behemah Teme'ah. Reish Lakish said that when the Torah says that a Behemah Tehorah should be brought, it means that one should not bring a Behemah Teme'ah (i.e., it is prohibited with a Lav). Rebbi Yochanan said that the Torah means that one may bring only a Behemah Tehorah (and bringing a Behemah Teme'ah transgresses only an Aseh). Originally, the Gemara thought that Reish Lakish meant that there is a Lo Sa'aseh involved in bringing a Behemah Teme'ah, and that was the point of dispute with Rebbi Yochanan, who said that there is only an Aseh. When the Gemara rejects that interpretation, it suggests a new interpretation for the original words of Reish Lakish and Rebbi Yochanan. When Reish Lakish said that the Torah means that one may not bring a Behemah Teme'ah, he meant that one may bring any animal other than a Behemah Teme'ah -- meaning that one may bring a Chayah! The verse is excluding only a Behemah Teme'ah. Rebbi Yochanan argued that the verse is excluding any animal which is not a Behemah Tehorah, and therefore even a Chayah is prohibited with an Aseh. (M. KORNFELD)
2) THE "PESUL" CAUSED BY "CHUTZ L'MEKOMO"
QUESTION: Reish Lakish asks whether a Pasul (a person who is ineligible to perform the Avodah) who performs the Avodah causes the blood left in the animal to become Shirayim. (That is, after the Pasul performs the Avodah, is it possible for a valid Kohen to be Mekabel new blood from the animal and begin the Avodah anew?)
Rebbi Yochanan answers that a Pasul does not make Shirayim, with the exception of an Avodah performed with a thought of Pigul, of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo. If a Kohen performs an Avodah with a thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo, then the Korban becomes disqualified, and even if another Kohen is Mekabel more blood from the animal, he cannot perform the Avodah with that blood. The reason Rebbi Yochanan gives for differentiating between the Pesulim of Pigul and all others is "Ho'il u'Meratzeh l'Figulo" -- this means that the Avodah of Chutz l'Zemano is considered a valid Avodah with regard to creating an Isur Kares of Pigul. The Gemara earlier (28b) says that a Korban does not acquire an Isur of Kares of Pigul when the Kohen thinks a thought of Pigul during the Avodah unless the rest of the Avodos of the Korban are performed in the proper manner. Pigul takes effect only on a Korban that is considered to have been properly offered in all other respects. Since every Pigul involves an Avodah that was done with a thought of Pigul, and yet the Torah says that one is Chayav Kares since the animal was otherwise offered properly, it is clear that a Korban offered with an Avodah of Pigul is, in some measure, considered a valid offering. (See RASHI to 42b, DH Ki Hadar.)
The Halachah that a Korban must be offered properly in order for it to be Pigul and to bear an Isur of Kares (for one who eats it) was stated with regard to the Isur of Chutz l'Zemano, eating a Korban outside of its prescribed time. However, eating a Korban that was offered Chutz l'Mekomo, outside of its prescribed place, is not punishable with Kares. Therefore, there is no reason for the Torah to state that the rest of the Avodos must be performed properly for the Isur to take effect. Whether or not the rest of the Avodos were done properly, the meat of the Korban is forbidden, either because of the Pesul of Chutz l'Mekomo, or because one or more of the other Avodos were not done properly! Why, then, should the Pesul of Chutz l'Mekomo make the blood Shirayim? A thought of Chutz l'Mekomo is not "Meratzeh l'Figulo."
(a) TOSFOS in Menachos (79a, DH v'Hadar) writes that it is true that a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo is not Meratzeh. What the Gemara means is that Chutz l'Mekomo is learned from Chutz l'Zemano through a Hekesh (Vayikra 7:18).
(b) RAV YOSEF ENGEL in GEVUROS SHEMONIM (#34) points out that RASHI here seems to disagree with Tosfos. Rashi (DH Ho'il u'Meratzeh) writes that the Korban is accepted with regard to becoming Pigul and Pasul. Rashi clearly introduces the word "Pasul" to account for Chutz l'Mekomo, which is not Pigul but only Pasul, and yet Rashi still says that the Korban must be offered in a way in which it becomes accepted in order for the Pesul of Chutz l'Mekomo to take effect! What does Rashi mean? Even if the other Avodos were not performed properly, the Korban becomes Pasul, not necessarily because of the thought of Chutz l'Mekomo, but simply because of the failure to perform those Avodos properly! In what regard can one say that Chutz l'Mekomo does not take effect to disqualify the Korban when the other Avodos were not performed properly?
1. The MISHNEH L'MELECH (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin, end of 18:7) also infers from the Gemara that the Pesul of a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo takes effect only when the rest of the Avodos were done properly (although he makes no mention of Rashi or Tosfos quoted above). He suggests that perhaps the Torah's prohibition against eating a Korban that is Pasul ("Lo Sochal Kol To'evah," Devarim 14:3) does not apply to a Korban that became Pigul if the rest of the Avodos were not done properly. Although the animal may not be eaten, the Lo Sa'aseh does not apply (there is no punishment of Malkus). The same may be said about Chutz l'Mekomo. The Torah is teaching that there is no Malkus for eating a Korban which was offered with a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo if the other Avodos were not done properly.
2. The BRISKER RAV (Chidushei ha'Griz, 13b, DH Mah Shelamim) points out that the RAMBAN, in his additions to the list of Mitzvos Lo Sa'aseh of the Rambam (addition #5), writes that there is a separate Lo Sa'aseh in the Torah for eating a Korban that was offered Chutz l'Mekomo. (The RAMBAM in Lo Sa'aseh #32 ascribes a unique La Sa'aseh only to Chutz l'Zemano.) According to the Ramban, perhaps the second Lav of Chutz l'Mekomo will not apply if the other Avodos were not done properly. There will be only a single Lav of Pesulei ha'Mukdashin. (Perhaps the Machlokes between Rashi and Tosfos here parallels the Machlokes between the Rambam and Ramban in Sefer ha'Mitzvos, with regard to whether or not there is a separate Lav for Chutz l'Mekomo.)
Rashi's opinion may answer another question that is asked on the Halachos of Pigul. The Gemara earlier (28b) requires two verses to teach that a Korban does not become Pigul if the other Avodos were not done properly, and if the person offering the Korban had a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo during the other Avodos. Why is a second verse necessary to teach that a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo prevents the animal from becoming Pigul? Why should a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo be different from any other disqualifying factor (which also prevents the animal from becoming Pigul)? (See Chidushei ha'Griz, 26b, DH Ein Machshavah; see also TOSEFES KEDUSHAH, 29a.)
According to Rashi, the answer may be as follows. Just as Chutz l'Zemano is considered to be Meratzeh and therefore makes Shirayim, Chutz l'Mekomo is also Meratzeh in a certain sense and therefore makes Shirayim. Consequently, with regard to the laws of Pigul, one might have thought that although there was a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo, the Korban is considered to have been offered properly, and the Isur of Chutz l'Zemano will still apply. Therefore, the Torah must specifically teach that it does not apply.
This also answers a question that is asked on the Rambam's explanation of the Mishnah (32a). The Rambam writes that the reason why a thought of Chutz l'Zemano, or a thought of Chutz l'Mekomo, does not make Shirayim if it is thought by a Pasul is that a thought of Pigul cannot take effect if some other aspect of the Avodah was done improperly. The fact that a Pasul is performing the Avodah makes the Avodah improper, and it negates the thought of Chutz l'Zemano. How does this explain why the Pesul of Chutz l'Mekomo does not take effect when a Pasul performs the Avodah? The Rambam must understand that even Chutz l'Mekomo takes effect only when the rest of the Avodos were performed properly.