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YEVAMOS 118

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1)
(a) We have learned that a woman is not believed to permit her Tzarah to marry. The reason that, in the Reisha of our Mishnah, the second Tzarah needs to contradict the first one and testify that her husband did not die, in order to be forbidden to marry, is not to preclude a case where she is silent - but for the Chidush of 'Lo Mes', to teach us that, despite the fact that she is clearly coming to upset her Tzarah, we do not say that really, her husband did die, only she said that he did not, in order to forbid her Tzarah to remarry (even though the prohibition extends to herself).
(b) We learn that a person will give a false testimony to implicate others, even though it means implicating oneself in the process - from Shimshon who, declared in Sefer Shoftim "Tamos Nafshi im Pelishtim" as he pulled the pillars, bringing the house down on the Pelishtim and on himself.

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2)
(a) Rebbi Meir argues with Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon in the second case in the Mishnah (when one of the Tzaros testified that their husband had died, and the other, that he was killed). Rebbi Elazar (ben Pedas) establishes the Reisha, where there is no Machlokes, and where the Tana permits the Tzarah who says that he died, to marry - like Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon.
(b) According to Rebbi Yochanan - even Rebbi Meir will agree in the Reisha, that she is permitted to marry, because 'Lo Mes' is not considered evidence at all (since the Rabanan believed the one who said 'Mes').
(c) We establish the Seifa of the 'Ed Omer/Ishah Omeres Mes, v'Ed Omer/Ishah Omeres Lo Mes, Lo Tinasei' - a Stam Mishnah, like Rebbi Meir - a proof for Rebbi Elazar (and a Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan).

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3)
(a) Our Mishnah now discusses a woman who went overseas with her husband and who returns alone and testifies that he has died, in which case - the Tana believes her with regard to herself, but not with regard to her Tzarah (whom she hates).
(b) Assuming her husband is a Kohen, Rebbi Tarfon even permits the latter to eat Terumah (even though it is l'Kula). Rebbi Akiva - maintains that although we do not accept the Tzarah's evidence vis-a-vis l'Kula, we do accept it l'Chumra, and she is forbidden to eat Terumah.
(c) In a case where the woman testifies that her husband died first and then her father-in-law, the Tana rules - that she is believed regarding herself, but not regarding her mother-in-law.
(d) Assuming that her father-in-law was a Kohen - Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva repeat the Machlokes that they had in the Reisha (regarding the Tzarah).

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4)
(a) Having ...
1. ... permitted the Tzarah to continue eating Terumah in the case of the Tzarah, Rebbi Tarfon nevertheless finds it necessary to repeat it in the case of the mother-in-law - where the hatred is less acute (due to the fact that it is not personal like it is by the Tzarah, as we explained above), and where perhaps, we will not discredit her testimony completely, and at least believe her l'Chumra.
2. ... refused to believe the woman who testified that her husband died, in the case of the mother-in-law, Rebbi Akiva found it necessary to repeat it in the case of the Tzarah - where, conversely, we might otherwise have thought that he will agree with Rebbi Tarfon that the one Tzarah (who hates the other one for personal reasons), will not be believed at all, even with regard to Terumah.
(b) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules - like Rebbi Tarfon.

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5)
(a) According to Rebbi Tarfon in our Mishnah - if a man betrothed one of five women, and does not recall which one, assuming that he does not want to marry all five, and each of them claims to be the one whom he betrothed - he must give each one a Get, but he pays only one Kesubah, which they divide among themselves.
(b) Rebbi Akiva disagrees. In his opinion - he is obligated to pay each one a Kesubah.
(c) They repeat the same dispute regarding theft - where a man stole from one of five people. He does not remember from which one, and each one claims that he is the owner.
(d) There too - Rebbi Tarfon obligates him to 'place the money that he stole among them and leaves them to divide it between them', whereas according to Rebbi Akiva, he must return what he stole to each one of the five.

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6)
(a) We can infer from the fact that the Tana mentions specifically ...
1. ... 'Kidesh' in the Reisha - that had he betrothed one of five women with Bi'ah (which is humiliating [should the betrothal turn out to be invalid]), Rebbi Tarfon would agree that he must pay each woman a Kesubah.
2. ... 'Gazal' (and not 'Lakach') in the Seifa - that, had he purchased something from one of five men (where no sin is involved), then even Rebbi Akiva would agree that he only needs to put down one payment.
(b) According to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, the dispute between Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva is by 'Bi'ah' in the Reisha, and by 'Gazal' in the Seifa. In the case of 'Kidesh' in the Reisha and 'Lakach' in the Seifa - Rebbi Akiva will concede that he needs to pay only one Kesubah and one payment (respectively).

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7)
(a) The opinion of the Tana Kama of Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar is not mentioned in the Beraisa. From Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar's statement that by 'Kidesh' and 'Lakach' Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva do not argue, we can infer - that according to the Tana Kama they do.
(b) The problem that creates with the wording in our Mishnah is - that according to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, the Tana ought to have mentioned 'Ba'al' in the Reisha (together with 'Gazal' of the Seifa), whereas according to the Tana Kama, he should have mentioned 'Lakach' in the Seifa (together with 'Kidesh' of the Reisha).
(c) We conclude that the author of our Mishnah is actually Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar - and 'Kidesh' does not refer to Kidushei Kesef (as we mistakenly believed until now), but to Kidushei Bi'ah.
(d) The Tana now finds it necessary to mention both cases ('Kidesh' and 'Gazal'). He needs to mention ...
1. ... Kidesh - to demonstrate the strength of Rebbi Akiva (who holds that Chazal penalized him even though he only transgressed an Isur d'Rabanan (betrothing with Bi'ah - as we learned above in the fifth Perek).
2. ... Gazal - to demonstrate the strength of Rebbi Tarfon, who does not penalize him, even though he transgressed an Isur d'Oraisa.

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8)
(a) The Mishnah now rules that if a woman testifies that she bore her first son overseas, and that after he died, her husband died too, she is believed and is permitted to perform Yibum - because she is merely corroborating her Chazakah (and due to the principle 'ha'Peh she'Asar Hu ha'Peh she'Hitir' [in the same statement as she forbade, she permitted]).
she could just as well have remained silent).
(b) If, under the same circumstances, she inverts the order of her son's and husband's deaths - she is not believed to break her Chezkas Yibum and remarry l'Shuk. Nor is she permitted to perform Yibum, leaving her with no choice other than Chalitzah.
(c) In spite of the fact that, in the latter case, she is not believed to break her Chazakah, she is forbidden to perform Yibum - due to the principle 'Shavyah Anafshah Chatichah d'Isura' (a person is believed when he declares something forbidden to him).
(d) From the Lashon 'v'Chosheshin li'Dvarehah' we can extrapolate that we only believe a woman regarding herself, but not regarding her Tzarah, even l'Chumra (to require Chalitzah).
(e) Abaye goes on to prove from there - that the Halachah is like Rebbi Tarfon, who permits the Tzarah to continue eating Terumah, in spite of her Tzarah's testimony (seeing as it is a 'Machlokes, v'Achar Kach Stam' - which is Halachah).

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9)
(a) Our Mishnah rules that if a woman who traveled overseas with her husband and son, returns with the news that first her husband died and then her son, she is believed - because she is merely corroborating her Chazakah (of Mutar l'Shuk), but not if she inverts the order - where she is contradicts it.
(b) She nevertheless requires Chalitzah - due to the principle 'Shavyah Anafshah Chatichah d'Isura'.
(c) If she left home without children, and she then returns with the news that she bore a son overseas, and that both of them died, first ...
1. ... her son and then her husband - she is believed (and is permitted to perform Yibum), because she corroborates the Chazakah.
2. ... her husband and then, her son - she is not believed, though she does have to perform Chalitzah (for the same reason as in the previous case).

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10)
(a) If a woman testifies that her mother-in-law bore a son (a Yavam) overseas, and that first ...
1. ... her husband died and then the Yavam or ...
2. ... the Yavam died first and then her husband - she is believed ...
(b) ... due to the principle 'ha'Peh she'Asar Hu ha'Peh she'Hitir', and because she is merely corroborating her original Chazakah.
(c) The Mishnah finally rules that ...
1. ... a woman who testifies that her Yavam died, so that she can marry l'S'huk, or that her sister died, so that she may marry her husband - is not believed, and neither is ...
2. ... a man who testifies that his brother died, so that he may perform Yibum with his wife, or that his wife died, so that he may marry her sister.

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11)
(a) A man cannot normally appoint a Shaliach l'Kabalah - because the moment the Shaliach l'Kabalah (who acts on behalf of the woman) receives the Get, she is divorced, even though she is not present, and seeing as a Get is normally to the woman's disadvantage (since she loses various monetary benefits), we apply the principle 'Ein Chavin l'Adam Ela b'Fanav'.
(b) Rava asked Rav Nachman whether, if a man who has a brother, appoints a Sh'li'ach l'Kabalah, the Get will be valid. It might ...
1. ... be valid - because of the strong likelihood of the Yevamah disliking the Yavam.
2. ... not be valid - because sometimes, she is fond of him.
(c) By giving his wife a Get through a Shaliach l'Kabalah - she will be divorced immediately (as we explained earlier), in which case, should her husband die (a fact which he is clearly anticipating), she will be Patur from Yibum.

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12)
(a) Rav Nachman answered Rava from our Mishnah. He proves from the Mishnah where, when she left ...
1. ... with a child, the Tana says 'Choletzes' and not 'Tinasei' - that, when she obligates herself to perform Yibum, we do not assume that that she is lying because she is fond of the Yavam.
2. ... without a child, he says 'Choletzes' and not 'Tisyabem' - that, when she exempts herself from Yibum, we do not assume that she is lying because she dislikes him.
(b) Based on these two rulings, Rav Nachman resolved Rava's She'eilah - by ruling that, here too, she requires Chalitzah (since we can neither be sure that it is to her advantage nor that it is to her disadvantage).
(c) When Ravina asked Rava whether, if a man who is currently quarreling with his wife, appoints a Shaliach l'Kabalah, it is considered to her advantage or to her disadvantage, Rav Nachman replied with a principle from Resh Lakish - that a woman will do anything to avoid remaining single and get married, a proof that it is to her disadvantage.
(d) Abaye says - that a woman whose husband is as small as an ant, proudly places her seat among the married couples.

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13)
(a) Rav Papa says in this regard - that if a man whose profession is combing wool (a lowly profession) calls a woman to come and sit at his gate, she will (because she wants to get married at all costs).
(b) Rav Ashi says - that she will even marry a man whose family is stigmatized, just in order to be married, and she will not even ask him for lentils.
(c)The last word however, goes to the Tana of the Beraisa. He says - that a woman who marries any of the above will commit adultery, whilst insisting that her children are her husband's.

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