SHEVUOS 25 (5 Teves) - Dedicated by Elliot and Lori Linzer in honor of the Yahrzeit of Meir Menachem ben Shlomo ha'Levi (Turkel).

1)

TOSFOS DH ELA KI KA'TANI

תוספות ד"ה אלא כי קתני

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains why the Gemara in Makos does not use our Gemara's answer.)

תימה דבסוף מכות (דף כב. ושם) דקאמר וליחשב נמי כגון דאמר שבועה שלא אחרוש ביו"ט ודחיק למימר האי תנא לית ליה איסור כולל ולישני כי הכא דלא קתני מידי דחייל אמידי דלאו בר מששא

(a)

Question: This is difficult. At the end of Makos (22a), the Gemara asks that we should also include someone who says that he will not plow on Yom Tov. It is difficult to say this Tana does not hold that an Issur Kollel takes effect. Why, then, doesn't the Gemara there answer as does our Gemara, that a prohibition that takes effect on things that are not tangible are not listed?

וי"ל דעדיפא מיניה משני התם

(b)

Answer: It is possible to answer that the Gemara there gives a better answer.

2)

TOSFOS DH CHOMER

תוספות ד"ה חומר

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains why this law regarding Nedarim and Nezirus must be derived from a Pasuk.)

בפ"ב דנדרים (דף טז:) נפקא לן מדכתיב לה' ובריש מסכת נזיר (דף ה. ושם) דרשינן מיין ושכר יזיר לאסור יין מצוה כיין הרשות

(a)

Observation: This is derived in Nedarim (16b) from the Pasuk, "to Hash-m." In Nazir (5a) we derive from the Pasuk, "From wine and Sheichar he should be separated" that wine used for Mitzvos is forbidden, just as regular wine is forbidden.

ותימה תרי קראי למה לי הא איתקוש נדרים ונזירות אהדדי בריש מסכת נדרים (דף ג.)

(b)

Question: This is difficult. Why do we need two such Pesukim? Nedarim and Nezirus are compared to each other in Nedarim (3a)! [This should be derived through a comparison, and should not require any Pesukim, let alone two Pesukim!]

וי"ל צריכי דנזירות אוסר כל יין עליו הלכך חייל איין מצוה כיין הרשות אבל נדרים שאינו אוסר עליו אלא המצוה כגון סוכה ושופר ולולב ותפילין אימא דלא חייל ואי כתיב נדרים ה"א לפי שאוסר המצות עליו אבל בנזיר שאוסר עצמו על היין לא חייל דנדרים גופייהו כשאוסר עצמו [על] הסוכה לא חייל

(c)

Answer: These Pesukim are required. Nezirus forbids all wine on the person. Therefore, it takes effect regarding wine used for Mitzvos just as it takes effect on regular wine. However, perhaps Nedarim where one only forbids himself from a Mitzvah such as Sukah, Shofar, Lulav, or Tefilin are not valid! If only Nedarim would be stated, I would think that this is because one forbids the item used to perform the Mitzvos upon himself. However, a Nazir who forbids himself from drinking wine might not have his vow take effect. Even when a person forbids himself from going into the Sukah by using a Neder it does not take effect!

3)

TOSFOS DH MAH

תוספות ד"ה מה

(SUMMARY: The Rishonim argue whether a Shevuah always forbids a person, or it can also forbid an item to a person.)

בפרק ב' דנדרים (דף טז:) פריך מ"ש נדר דכתיב כי ידור נדר לה' שבועה נמי הכתיב או השבע שבועה לה'

(a)

Question: The Gemara in Nedarim (16b) asks, why do we say regarding Nedarim that they are even valid when one forbids a Mitzvah (item) upon himself? This is because the Pasuk says, "When he will make a Neder to Hash-m (...his word should not become mundane)." (This teaches us that a Neder regarding a Mitzvah should also not become mundane.) The Pasuk also states regarding a Shevuah, "Or he will make a Shevuah to Hash-m (...his word should not become mundane)!" [Why, then, isn't this also the law regarding a Shevuah?]

ומשני הא דאמר ישיבת סוכה עלי הא דאמר שלא אשב בסוכה

(b)

Answer: The Gemara (ibid.) answers there is a difference between him saying that he forbids the sitting of a Sukah from him (Neder), and saying he will not sit in a Sukah (Shevuah).

משמע דבנדרים לפי שאוסר סוכה על עצמו ראוי שיחול הנדר שאוסר הסוכה עליו כקרבן וסוכה אינה מצווה לעשות מצוה אבל שבועה שאוסר עצמו על הסוכה אין השבועה חלה דמשועבד הוא לעשות מצוה

(c)

Observation: This implies that being that when one makes a Neder he forbids the Sukah to himself, it is understandable that the Neder should be valid. The Sukah becomes forbidden to him like a Korban, and the Sukah itself is not commanded in performing any Mitzvos. However, when making a Shevuah, a person forbids himself from sitting in a Sukah. This Shevuah is invalid, as he is already committed to indeed sit in a Sukah.

ותימה א"כ מה חומר יש בנדרים מבשבועה שבועה נמי חיילא כה"ג כי אמר ישיבת סוכה עלי שבועה דאסר חפצא עליה דבאסר חפצא עליה חלה נמי שבועה

(d)

Question: This is difficult. If so, why is this considered to a more stringent aspect of Nedarim over Shevuos? A Shevuah would be valid if he said that sitting in a Sukah is forbidden to him. In such a case he only forbids the item (i.e. Sukah) to himself, and the Shevuah should therefore take effect!

כדאמר בשילהי (פ"ק) (דף יג - צ"ל כט.) ובפ' ד' נדרים (דף כד:) גבי שבועת שוא באומר יאסרו כל פירות שבעולם עלי בשבועה אם לא ראיתי גמל פורח באויר

1.

Proof: This is as the Gemara says later (29a) and in Nedarim (24b) regarding a Shevuas Shav, where someone says, "All of the fruit in the world should be forbidden upon me with a Shevuah if I did not see a camel flying in the air." [This is a valid Shevuah because he forbade the fruit to himself instead of forbidding himself from the fruit.]

והדאמר בריש נדרים (דף ב:) איידי דתנא נדרים דמיתסר חפצא עליה תנא נמי חרמים דמיתסר חפצא עליה ולאפוקי שבועה דאסר נפשיה מן חפצא

2.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Nedarim (2b) says that being that the Tana stated Nedarim, where a person forbids items to himself, he also stated Charamim where a person forbids items to himself as opposed to Shevuos where a person forbids himself from an item. [This implies that there is no such thing as a Shevuah where one forbids an item to himself!]

היינו דהוי נמי כה"ג דאסר נפשיה מן חפצא אבל נדרים וחרמים אינן אלא בענין דמיתסר חפצא עליה

3.

Answer: This just means that Shevuos can also be made by a person forbidding himself from an item. However, Nedarim and Charamim are only made by forbidding an item from himself.

וי"ל דהיינו חומר בנדרים דבכל ענין דחל על דבר הרשות חל על דבר מצוה דהיינו כשאוסר חפץ על עצמו אבל כשאוסר עצמו על החפץ אינו חל אפי' בדבר הרשות כשאומר קונם גופו על החפץ דקונם היינו כקרבן ולא שייך על עצמו אבל בשבועה בכל ענייני שבועה אינה חלה על דבר מצוה כדבר הרשות דהיינו כשאוסר עצמו על החפץ

(e)

Answer#1: The stringency in Nedarim is that whenever it would take effect on a regular item, it would take effect on a Mitzvah item. This is when he forbids the item to himself. However, when he forbids himself from the item it does not even take effect if he is forbidding himself from a regular item. For example, saying "Konam my body on an item," with Konam meaning that it should be like a Korban, is not possible regarding a Neder. However, a Shevuah does not take effect on a Mitzvah item like it does on a regular item when he forbids himself from an item.

ורבינו אלחנן תירץ בשם ר"י דבשבועה אפי' כשיאמר ישיבת סוכה עלי שבועה אסר נפשיה מן חפצא דלשון שבועה לא שייך אלא על עצמו וקונם לא שייך אלא על החפץ שאוסר על עצמו כקרבן ולכך חלה נמי שבועה על השינה דאסר נפשיה עליה אבל בנדר אסר שינה עליו ואין בה ממש

(f)

Answer#2: Rabeinu Elchanan answers in the name of the Ri that regarding a Shevuah, even if he would say, "The sitting of a Sukah is to me a Shevuah" he has forbidden himself from the item (not the item from himself). This is because the term Shevuah by definition means forbidding himself, and Konam by definition means he is forbidding an item to himself like a Korban (and not forbidding himself). This is also why a Shevuah does take effect regarding sleeping, as he has forbidden himself. However, if a person takes a Neder to forbid sleep to himself, he has forbidden something that is intangible (and it is therefore clearly invalid).

ובפ"ב דנדרים (דף טו.) מסיק רבינא דנדרים נמי חלים מדרבנן על דבר שאין בו ממש

1.

Proof: In Nedarim (15a), Ravina concludes that Nedarim take effect according to Rabbinic law (not Torah law) on something that is intangible.

והשתא אתי שפיר הא דאמר בריש נדרים (דף ב:) לאפוקי שבועות דאסר נפשיה מן חפצא

2.

Observation: It is now understandable that the Gemara in Nedarim (2b, says that Nedarim) excludes Shevuos, as a Shevuah is an oath where one forbids himself from an object.

ור"ת מפרש דלקמן (דף כט.) ובפ' ד' נדרים (דף כד:) לא מיירי שאמר בלשון זה יאסרו עלי בשבועה אלא ה"ק כשאומר לשון שע"י שבועה אוסר פירות עליו ומיירי שאומר שבועה שלא אוכל פירות

(g)

Answer#3: Rabeinu Tam explains that later (29a) and in Nedarim (24b), the Gemara is not discussing a case where he said, "They should be forbidden upon me with an oath." Rather, it means that he says a phrase that means that through a Shevuah fruits should be forbidden to him. The case is when he says that he swears that he will not eat fruit.

וברוב ספרים ל"ג בשבועה אבל אמר יאסרו בשבועה אינו כלום אפי' בדבר הרשות משום דאסר חפצא עליה והשתא נמי ניחא חומר בנדרים מבשבועות

(h)

Text: Most Sefarim do not have the text "with a Shevuah." However, saying, "they should be forbidden to me with a Shevuah" is nothing, even when trying to forbid a regular item. This is because he is forbidding an item to himself. We now indeed understand why Nedarim are more stringent than Shevuos (the question in (d) above).

4)

TOSFOS DH AINI

תוספות ד"ה איני

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains why this question was not asked earlier regarding a person who swears that he will not eat.)

למאי דס"ד השתא דלעולם קאמר תימה דתקשה ליה בריש פירקין (דף יט:) גבי שבועה שאוכל ושלא אוכל

(a)

Question: Based on the Gemara's current train of thought that he means he will never sleep, this is difficult. The Gemara should have asked this as a question earlier (19b), regarding the Mishnah that discusses a person who makes a Shevuah that he will or will not eat!

וי"ל דגבי אכילה ליכא למיטעי דלעולם קאמר ולא הוצרך התנא לפרש דלאלתר קאמר

(b)

Answer#1: It is possible to answer that regarding eating there is no way to mistakenly think that he means forever. (See the Maharsha who asks that there does not seem to be any difference between eating and sleeping in this regard.) The Tana therefore had no need to explain that he meant for the immediate future.

א"נ התם נמי שייך שפיר לעולם כגון שנשבע על ככר שלפניו

(c)

Answer#2: Alternatively, there too it can mean forever. The case could be where he swore on a loaf in front of him (that he will or will not eat it). (This is why there is no question that it is impossible, as he could easily keep his Shevuah regarding this loaf.)

5)

TOSFOS DH U'SHMUEL

תוספות ד"ה ושמואל

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains that the Gemara earlier was surmising what Shmuel held, not quoting Shmuel.)

וא"ת והא לעיל קאמר שמואל טעמא משום דליתא בלהבא

(a)

Question: Earlier, Shmuel stated that the reason was because he cannot control whether or not someone will do so or not do so in the future. [How can he now say a different reason?]

וי"ל דאין זה מדברי שמואל אלא הש"ס מפרש כן אליביה וכענין זה יש בכמה מקומות בש"ס

(b)

Answer: This (the reason given earlier) is not from Shmuel's own words. Rather, the Gemara is giving a possible explanation of Shmuel. This is seen in many places throughout Shas (i.e. see TOSFOS YOMA 40B, DH V'ASAHU).

6)

TOSFOS DH RAV

תוספות ד"ה רב

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains how Rav can hold that slaves are like land.)

הק' ה"ר עזרא הנביא דהשתא רב דריש ריבויי ומיעוטי ובהגוזל קמא (ב"ק דף צו:) סבר רב כר"מ דאמר אומרים בעבדים הרי שלך לפניך דאין נגזלים כמקרקעי ומאן דאית ליה דעבדים כמקרקעי דריש כללי ופרטי כדמוכח לקמן בפ' שבועת הפקדון (דף לז:) ובהגוזל בתרא (ב"ק דף קיז:)

(a)

Question: Rabeinu Ezra Ha'Navi asks that Rav here derives using the "Ribuy and Miut" -- "inclusive and exclusive" method of understanding the Pesukim. In Bava Kama (96b), Rav holds like Rebbi Meir who says that we say regarding the theft of slaves that one can give back the slave and simply tell the owner, "Here is what is yours before you," as they are not actually stolen, just like land is not actually stolen. However, the opinion that holds that slaves are like land derives this using the "Klal and Perat" -- "inclusive and exclusive" method of understanding the Pesukim, as is apparent later (37b) and in Bava Kama (117b). [How, then, can Rav also hold that slaves are like land?]

וי"ל דאית ליה שום מיעוט דממעט עבדים כדפרישית לעיל בפ"ק (דף ד: ד"ה ר"ע)

(b)

Answer: He must hold of a Pasuk which is exclusive, implying that slaves are not like regular items (and are like land), as I explained earlier (4B, DH REBBI AKIVA).

24b----------------------------------------24b

7)

TOSFOS DH MI ISA

תוספות ד"ה מי איתא

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains why the Gemara does not say the case is on Shabbos or Yom Tov.)

וליכא לאוקומה בשבת ויו"ט

(a)

Implied Question: One cannot establish that the case is on Shabbos or Yom Tov (when one cannot put on Tefilin). (Why not?)

דלמאי קתני לא הנחתי אי לאו לאשמועינן אע"ג דליתיה בלא אניח

(b)

Answer#1: Why would the Mishnah state, "I didn't put on (Tefilin)" unless the purpose was to teach that even though there is no possibility that he can Halachically skip a day of putting on Tefilin he is still liable?

אי נמי משני אפי' למ"ד (מנחות דף לו:) שבת זמן תפילין הוא

(c)

Answer#2: Alternatively, the Gemara is giving an answer even according to the opinion that Shabbos is a time when one could put on Tefilin.

8)

TOSFOS DH HU MOSIV

תוספות ד"ה הוא מותיב

(SUMMARY: Tosfos asks why the Gemara did not answer that this is according to Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah.)

ה"מ לאוקומה כר' יהודה בן בתירא דלא בעי לאו והן

(a)

Implied Question: The Gemara could have established that this is according to Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah, who does not require that there be a permitted possibility to either do or not do this action in order to bring a Korban Shevuah. (Why didn't the Gemara do so?)

אלא ניחא ליה לאוקומה ככ"ע

(b)

Answer: The Gemara would rather establish that this is according to everyone.

9)

TOSFOS DH V'AMAR ULA

תוספות ד"ה ואמר עולא

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains why the Gemara did not just ask a question from the Mishnah on 29a.)

תימה תקשה ליה מגופא דמתני' דקתני (לקמן דף כט.) איזהו שבועת שוא נשבע לשנות את הידוע הא אינו משנה את הידוע חייב משום שבועת ביטוי אע"ג דליתיה בלהבא

(a)

Question: This is difficult. There should be a question on Ula from the Mishnah itself! The Mishnah later (29a) says, "What is a Shevuas Shav? It is if someone swears to change something that is known." This implies that if he does not change something that is known, he is liable because of Shevuas Bituy, even though it is not possible to be in his control to do so in the future.

וכן נמי מדתנן (שם) אם לא ראיתי נחש כקורת בית הבד משום דאי אפשר להיות הא אפשר להיות חייב משום שבועת ביטוי אע"ג דליתיה באראה כקורת בית הבד

1.

Proof: This is also implied by the Mishnah (ibid.). It discusses a person who swears, "If I did not see a snake as thick as the beam of a press" and says that this is a Shevuas Shav, because no such thing exists. This implies that if it would be possible to see this, he would be liable because it is a Shevuas Bituy, even though he has no control regarding whether or not he would indeed see a snake that is that big. [The Gemara earlier said that it must be in one's ability to either do or not do what he has stated in order for him to have to bring a Korban Shevuah.]

ומיהו לפי מה שמפרש רבא דה"ק באומר יאסרו כל פירות שבעולם עלי אם לא ראיתי כו' ניחא דלא מצי דייק מההיא דשבועה היא מאכילת פירות

(b)

Answer#1: However, according to Rava's explanation that he said, "All of the fruit of the world should be forbidden to me if I did not see etc." this is understandable. Our Gemara cannot deduce anything from there, as the oath there is regarding whether or not he will be forbidden from eating fruit. (If he forbids himself from eating all fruit he has made a Shevuas Shav because he cannot refrain from eating all fruits, see TOSFOS 29A DH B'OMER.)

א"נ התם אפשר שיטרח עד שיראה נחש כקורת בית הבד הואיל והוא בעולם

(c)

Answer#2: Alternatively, there it would be possible for him to control whether or not he would see a snake as thick as a beam from a press, being that it is in the world.

10)

TOSFOS DH YADATI

תוספות ד"ה ידעתי

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains that this is not a Shevuas ha'Eidus.)

לאו היינו שבועת העדות דמיירי כגון שאינו צריך עכשיו לאותה עדות

(a)

Explanation: This is not referring to a Shevuas ha'Eidus, as the case is where he does not currently require this testimony.

11)

TOSFOS DH ACHAS

תוספות ד"ה אחת

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains how our Gemara and the Toras Kohanim derive opposite things from the same word.)

תימה דבת"כ דריש מלאחת בשבועה שלא אוכל פת חטין ושעורין וכוסמין דחייב על כל אחת ואחת והכא דריש מיניה דאינו חייב אלא אחת

(a)

Question: This is difficult. The Toras Kohanim derives from the Pasuk, "l'Achas" -- "for one" that if someone swears not to eat bread from wheat, barley, and rye he is liable for each one separately. However, our Gemara derives from this Pasuk that he is only liable for one prohibition altogether!

ויש לומר דבת"כ מפיק מלאחת והכא דריש מאלה דמשמע מקצת אלה הכתובים בפרשה אתה מחייבו ולא על כל אלה

(b)

Answer: It is possible to answer that in Toras Kohanim the derivation is from the word "l'Achas," while our Gemara derives from the word "from these." This latter word implies that he is only liable for some of these that are stated in the Parshah, not everything.

אי נמי מלמ"ד דלאחת קא דריש ושמואל דריש כוליה לדרשה דת"כ

(c)

Answer#2: Alternatively, our Gemara derives this from the Lamed in the word "l'Achas." Shmuel derives from the entire word the lesson derived by the Toras Kohanim.

12)

TOSFOS DH L'CHAYVO

תוספות ד"ה לחייבו

(SUMMARY: Tosfos observes that the Beraisa could have stated a different teaching.)

המ"ל לחייבו אפי' מושבע מפי אחרים בלא עניית אמן משא"כ בשבועת ביטוי

(a)

Observation: It could have said that this was in order to make witnesses liable, even if they are sworn by others who say the oath and they do not say Amen. This is as opposed to a Shevuas Bituy where this would not be the case.

OTHER D.A.F. RESOURCES
ON THIS DAF