ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler of Kollel Iyun Hadaf
Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld
12TH CYCLE SHABBOS 46-48 - dedicated by Mrs. Rita Grunberger of Queens, N.Y., in loving memory of her husband, Reb Yitzchok Yakov (Irving) ben Eliyahu Grunberger. Irving Grunberger helped many people quietly in an unassuming manner and is dearly missed by all who knew him. His Yahrzeit is 10 Sivan (which coincides with the study of Chulin 128 this year).
(a) Rebbi ruled by a (metal) Menorah like Rebbi Shimon. We explain this to mean - either that he ruled by a (metal) Menorah leniently, like Rebbi Shimon ruled by an old earthenware one; or that he ruled by a (metal) Menorah strictly, and by an old earthenware lamp like Rebbi Shimon.
(b) In the town of Rebbi Yeshoshua ben Levi, Rebbi Avahu moved a lamp; wherea, in the town of Rebbi Yochanan he declined to do so. Personally - he must have agrees with Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who followed the opinion of Rebbi Shimon (that a Menorah is not Muktzah - otherwise he would not have moved one under any circumstances). However, in Rebbi Yochanan's territory he declined to do so, in deference to Rebbi Yochanan, who declares it Muktzah.
(a) Rav Yehudah permits moving an earthenware oil-lamp after it has gone out - because he rules like Rebbi Shimon with regard to 'Muktzah Machmas Mi'us'. Nevertheless, he forbids a lamp that has been lit with paraffin, because, due to its bad smell, it is not fit to be used for any other purpose, unlike an oil lamp, which is. (Note: The lamps in those days were probably flat, rather than tall, like ours' usually are.)
(b) Rabbah and Rav Yosef permit even a paraffin lamp, because it can be used to cover vessels - in spite of its rather repugnant smell.
(c) One may not pick up stones - even for the purpose of covering vessels - since stones, like all raw materials, do not fall under the category of vessels (which may be moved on Shabbos), like an oil lamp is.
(d) We prove that even vessels whose basic use is forbidden on Shabbos, are nevertheless not Muktzah - from various rings and bracelets, which the Beraisa permits to be carried in a court-yard (but not in the street), despite the fact that Chazal forbade them to be worn, and they have no other regular use (in the way that a hammer has - See Tosfos Yeshanim at foot of page).
(a) Rava was upset with Rav Ivya for placing his dirty shoes on his bed.
(b) So he set out to humiliate him by asking him difficult questions, on the presumption that Rav Ivya would be unable to answer.
(c) When Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said 'Berich Rachmana de'Lo Kesifei Rava le'Rav Ivya' ('Blessed be Hash-m who did not allow Rav Ivya to be put to shame!') - he was referring to Rava's failure to achieve what he set out to do, due to the fact that Rav Ivya was on the ball, answering all the questions correctly.
(a) Rebbi Shimon permits the oil that remains in a lamp - because the owner actually anticipates using the remaining oil when the lamp goes out; whereas a person is unlikely to anticipate on Erev Yom-Tov that his healthy animal is going to become blemished on Yom-Tov. And besides, who says that he will find a Chacham to inspect the animal and declare it blemished?
(b) On the other hand - a woman is permitted to eat fruit which she forbade with a Neder and which her husband released only on Shabbos - because, when she initially makes the Neder, she actually has in mind that it will only stand if her husband upholds it, and that, should he not wish to do so, he will annul it.
(c) Fruit that someone forbade on himself with a Neder, is permitted when it is released by a Chacham - because, unlike the inspection of a Bechor, this does not require a Chacham (which it is not always easy to find), but any three Jews, who may stand in for the Chacham, and release the vow. And that should not be difficult to find.
(a) The Gemara initially thinks that Rebbi Shimon's reason for the prohibition of moving a lamp whilst it is alight, is because he might extinguish the light whilst transporting it.
(b) Indeed this is a 'Davar she'Ein Miskaven' - Nevertheless, Chazal were stringent with regard to extinguishing a lamp (seeing as to do so deliberately involves a Chiyuv Kares - notwithstanding the fact that it is usually a Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah le'Gufah; however, they were strict with regard to the Melachah of Mechabeh, treating it like a Melachah d'Oraysa). Whereas someone who drags a bench along the ground, is not Chayav, even if he deliberately makes a furrow, since it is not the conventional method of digging furrows. Consequently, it constitues no more than a 'Melachah ke'le'Achar Yad', for which one is Patur. Therefore they did not issue any decrees, but permitted it Lechatchilah, there where one does not intend to make a furrow.
(c) This answer however, is unacceptable - in view of the Mishnah in Kil'ayim, which permits salesmen to wear clothes which contain Sha'atnez, in order to demonstrate them to potential customers, provided they do not specifically intend to derive benefit from them in sunny or rainy weather. So we see that, even in a case when an intentional act results in an Isur d'Oraysa (wearing Kil'ayim), Chazal nevertheless permitted a 'Davar she'Ein Miskaven'.
(d) The author of this Mishnah must be Rebbi Shimon - because the criterion of whether one may or may not wear the garment, is whether one intends to derive benefit from the garment or not, a criterion that is constantly quotes in his name.
(a) The Tzenu'im - used to hold the garment over themselves on a stick, so that they would not derive benefit from the garment - even inadvertently.
(a) We finally conclude that Rebbi Shimon's reason for prohibition moving the lamp whilst it is alight is because the lamp, the oil and the wick are a Basis to the flame, which is certainly Muktzah because it is not a K'li (a category of Muktzah known as 'Muktzah Machmas Gufo' - Refer also to note on 45a, at the conclusion of review answer 2.)