ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler of Kollel Iyun Hadaf
Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld
SHABBOS 3 (20 Tishrei) - Dedicated by Al and Sophia Ziegler of Har Nof, Jerusalem, and their son Jared, in loving memory of Al's mother, Chaya bas Berel Dov Ziegler, on the day of her Yahrzeit - and towards her grandson Jared's continued growth in Torah and Yir'as Shamayim.
(a) The Gemara only asks why the Tana only refers to 'eight' cases, when really there are twelve. It does not ask that really there are sixteen - because the Tana does not refer to those cases which are Patur and Mutar, only to those where at least an Isur mi'de'Rabbanan has been performed.
(b) When Shmuel said that the only three cases in the whole of Shabbos where Patur means Patur and Mutar, are 'Tzeidas Tzevi', 'Tzeidas Nachash' and 'Meifis Mursa' - he was referring to cases where an act was performed, to teach us that nevertheless, the person who performed them did nothing wrong, but not to cases of Patur u'Mutar such as those in our Mishnah, where the man did nothing.
(c) The Gemara answers the question that we originally asked; Why does the Tana list eight cases, and not twelve - by explaining that the Tana refers only to those cases where the Ani or the Ba'al ha'Bayis made the Akirah and not the Hanachah (but not vice-versa), as we discussed already in the Mishnah, because it is possible for him to complete the Melachah. It does not refer to those cases where he makes the Hanachah only (because there, he can never come to complete the Melachah).
(a) The Torah writes "me'Am ha'Aretz, ba'Asosah", from which Chazal derive two things: 1. One is not Chayav if one performs only part of the Melachah. 2. If two people perform a Melachah (where one person could have performed it on his own, they are both Patur.
(a) Rav Asked Rebbi whether 'Akiras Gufo ka'Akiras Cheifetz Dami' or not - meaning that if someone started walking with the load already on his back or in his hand, is it called an Akirah or is it only called an Akirah if he actually picked up the object from its current location.
(b) Rebbi answered - that it is indeed called an Akirah and that if he walked out with the object on his back, he would be Chayav.
(c) When Rebbi said 've'Eino Domeh le'Yado ... Gufo Nayach, Yado Lo Nayach' - he meant to say that carrying something on one's back is not the same as someone whose hand is stretched inside a house (like the hand of the Ani in our Mishnah), and who then carries something which a second person placed into it, out into the street. He is Patur, since the hand is not actually placed in the domain where it is situated (i.e. the hand is in the air, and not on the ground of the house). In that case, its location is the same as that of the body to which it is attached, which explains why he will not be Chayav for then taking the basket of bread into the street.
(d) Rebbi Chiya scolded his nephew Rav - for asking Rebbi a Sha'aleh to do with Shabbos, when he was learning a different Masechta, and not about Shabbos.
(a) According to Abaye, a person's hand does not follow his body when it is in the Reshus ha'Rabim - from the fact that when the Ba'al ha'Bayis takes the object from the extended hand of the Ani, he is not Chayav; and it does not follow the body in the Reshus ha'Yachid, from the fact that the Ani is not Chayav when he takes from the extended hand of the Ba'al ha'Bayis.
(b) Abaye asks - whether Chazal did not decree, that if someone extends his hand holding an object into another domain, his hand should not have the Din of a Karmelis, which would mean that he would be obligated to keep his hand there the entire Shabbos, since it is forbidden to move an object (making a Hanachah included) from a Karmelis into any other domain on Shabbos.
(c) The literal meaning of 'Karmelis' - is a type of forest, which is neither a public thoroughfare, nor a private domain.
(d) The air below ten Tefachim in a Reshus ha'Rabim, has the Din of a Reshus ha'Rabim. Therefore the Rabbanan penalized him for attempting to transfer from there to a Reshus ha'Yachid. Whereas above ten Tefachim, it has the Din of a Makom Petur (via which one is permitted to transfer). Consequently, Chazal did not penalize him.
(a) Is it not strange to penalize someone who stretches out his hand with an object after nightfall, when he is likely to drop it from fatigue some hours later (and be Chayav Kareis or at least a Chatas), and not to penalize him when he stretched it out before nightfall, when he can in any event, not become Chayav, even if he does let go of the object? Surely, if anything, the other way round would appear to be more appropriate?
(b) It seems, the Gemara contends - that Chazal are not concerned with the person who has sinned transgressing further (as if to say, their decrees will remain in force, and if he goes on to sin, he has only himself to blame). Consequently, someone who placed bread in the oven, is forbidden to remove it (as this constitutes an Isur de'Rabbanan, as we shall see), even if it is in order to spare himself from the Chiyuv Chatas.
(c) The Rabbanan forbade one to remove baked bread from the side of the oven to which it is sticking - not because it is a Melachah, but because it is a Chochmah.
(a) The Gemara then suggests that the She'eilah will not be resolved, even according to the original version of the statement, and differentiates between Shogeg and Meizid. The Beraisa which penalizes him, speaks when he transgressed be'Meizid, and the one which does not, be'Shogeg. Rav Bibi's She'eilah however, is not resolved ...
1. ... by 'Shogeg - because the reason that Chazal did not decree by a regular case of Shogeg is not in order to prevent him from sinning, but because there is no real Isur, only a penalty, which is not applicable if the transgressor did not intend to sin; whereas removing bread from the oven is a firm Isur de'Rabbanan, which the Rabbanan may well not have waived.
2. ... by 'Meizid - because even if they were strict in decreeing the man's hand to be a Karmelis (when he stretched it put on purpose), that may be only because he has the option of not dropping the object and of not sinning. Whereas in the case of Rav Bibi bar Abaye, where he is bound to be Chayav should the bread remain in the oven, perhaps they will waive their decree to prevent him from sinning.
(b) We can explain the Machlokes between the Beraisos, even if both Beraisos are speaking be'Shogeg - and one holds that they did decree Shogeg because of Meizid, whilst the other holds that they did not.
(c) We can even establish both Beraisos be'Shogeg, and also that Chazal did not penalize Shogeg because of Meizid - and the one Beraisa speaks about dropping the object in the same courtyard where he is standing, the other where he wants to drop it in another courtyard. The reason for this is - because Chazal only decreed when he achieves his original aim of moving the object from one Chatzer to another, but not when he has not (see also Tosfos 4a. DH 'Kahn').