(a) What can we learn from here regarding the relationship between Rebbi Yirmiyah and Rav Huna?

(b) We query this from a Gemara in Berachos however. What can we extrapolate from Rebbi Yirmiyah there, who asked Rav (when he Davened Kabalas Shabbos on Erev Shabbos 'Mi Badalt'? What ought he otherwise to have said?

(c) How do we reconcile the two contradictory Gemaras?

(a) How will we reconcile this statement with Rav's earlier statement 'Chayshinan Shema Nisratzeh ha'Av'?

(b) What is now the Chidush in telling us that she is permitted to retract?

(c) Seeing as her father has the right to betroth her against her will, on what grounds will her protest have any effect, now that her father gives his consent to the Kidushin?

(d) Why is that?

(e) According to Rashi's explanation, the question does not even get off the ground. What does Rashi say?

(a) What did Rav say that prompted this question?

(b) What exactly is the Gemara asking?

(c) What would be the Chidush if the Pasuk was referring to where the man seduced her Le'Shem Ishus?

(a) Why can the Chidush not be that should the father subsequently betroth her to the seducer, she has the right to protest?

(b) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answers 'Lomar she'Meshalem K'nas ki'Mefuteh'. What does he mean by that? How do we ultimately establish the Pasuk?

(c) In which regard is her Miy'un not effective?

(d) Under what circumstances will her Miy'un be effective even with regard to prevent herself from becoming the Mefateh's wife?

(a) What exactly, are the connotations of 'I Hachi'?

(b) It seems that Rav Yosef often used this expression in this manner. Where else do we find the same expression used by Rav Yosef?

(c) How does Abaye refute Rav Yosef's proof (' ... ve'Im Pitah le'Shum Ishus, Kidushin Lamah Li?')

(a) Others have the text 'Ela Amar Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak'. How does he then establish the Pasuk?

(b) How does he reconcile Rav Asi (who rules 'Avihah ve'Lo Hi') with the Beraisa (which permits her to object as well?

(c) And what does ...

1. ... Rav Yosef now mean when he says 'I Hachi, Haynu di'Tenanina ... '.

2. ... Abaye mean when he answers 'Tzericha Kidushin le'Da'as Avihah'?

(a) Rashi explains the question. What is ...

1. ... the case?

2. ... the question?

(b) What problem do we have with calling the first dates a Milveh? What ought they to be called, according to the Gemara in the third Perek?

(c) What does the Gemara there rule with regard to someone who says to a woman 'Hiskadshi li le'Achar Sheloshim Yom', by which time the money was used up?

(d) How do we reconcile our Gemara with the Gemara there? What is the difference between the two cases?

(a) What problem do we have with this theory, based on the Gemara in the first Perek?

(b) How do we reconcile our Gemara with the Gemara there?

TOSFOS DH U'SH'MA MINAH, MA'OS BE'ALMA CHOZRIN

(a) Practically speaking, what does this mean in a case where the man says to the woman ...

1. ... 'Hiskadchi li bi'Perutah Zu, u've'Zu, u've'Zu', and before the Kidushin has been completed, he retracts?

2. ... 'Hiskadchi li bi'Temarah Zu, u've'Zu, u've'Zu', and before he finishes speaking, she eats the first two dates?

(b) What would the Din be in the latter case if one were to hold 'Ma'os Matanah'?

(c) Why is that?

(d) What precedent do we have for this in the third Perek?

(e) In which case will the principle 'Ma'os Matanah' then apply?

(a) According to our interpretation in R. Ami, we propose that the Machlokes between him and Rav and Shmuel hinges on whether Ma'os Pikadon or Ma'os Matanah. Which Machlokes are we referring to?

(b) We have already explained why, according to R. Ami, 'Haysah Ocheles Rishonah,Einah Mekudeshes ad she'Yehei be'Achas Meihen Shaveh Perutah' can refer to the Seifa ('be'Zu, eu've'Zu u've'Zu, Im Yesh Shaveh Perutah be'Chulan Mekudeshes ... '). Why, according to Rav and Shmuel, is this not possible?

(a) What is the alternative text?

(a) How does this ruling affect ...

1. ... the Kohen?

2. ... the owner?

(b) Seeing as the owner did not fulfill his obligation (of giving Terumah from the Eino Nakuv), by what right did the Chachamim exempt him from now separating Terumah from the Eino Nakuv?

(a) Why do we initially attribute the statement 've'Gezel be'Yad Kohen to a Takalah with regard to the Kohen's dough, rather than to the owner?

(a) The Gemara in Temurah cites a Machlokes as to whether wherever somebody contravenes a Torah prohibition, his action is effective or not. What is the reason of the opinion which holds that it is effective?

(b) How do those who hold that it is not, counter it?

(a) Why does the current form of logic of R. Ila'i pose a question on the latter opinion?

(b) What do we answer? Why is it that even those who hold elsewhere 'Lo Mehani', will concede that here, 'Mehani' (like R. Ila'i)?

(c) Which two sins?