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________________________________________________________ ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS ON TOSFOS THE YISRAEL SHIMON HA'LEVI TURKEL MASECHES KIDUSHIN prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler of Kollel Iyun Hadaf ![]() daf@dafyomi.co.il, www.dafyomi.co.il Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld ________________________________________________________
TOSFOS DH NIR'IN DIVREI TALMID click for question(a) We can learn from here that - Rebbi Yirmiyah was Rav Huna's Talmid. (b) We query this from a Gemara in Berachos however. From Rebbi Yirmiyah there, who asked Rav (when he Davened Kabalas Shabbos on Erev Shabbos) 'Mi Badalt', we can extrapolate that - Rebbi Yirmiyah was a Talmid-Chaver of Rav (Rav Huna's Rebbe). Otherwise, he ought to have addressed Rav as 'Mar' and not as 'you' (which is disrespectful). (c) To reconcile the two contradictory Gemaras - we conclude that there must be two R. Yirmiyahs. TOSFOS DH BEIN HI BEIN AVIHAH YECHOLIN LE'AKEV click for question(a) To reconcile this statement with Rav's earlier statement 'Chayshinan Shema Nisratzeh ha'Av' - we establish the earlier Gemara where the father was silent, whereas there where the father protested, it is clear that he did not issue his consent. (b) The Chidush in telling us that she is permitted to retract is - that even though he father protested, she is still empowered to retract. (c) In spite of the fact that her father may betroth her against her will, her protest will have an effect, even after her father consents to the Kidushin - because the right to betroth her against her will is confined to where he initiates the Kidushin, but not where he agrees only after she has initiated it. (d) This is because - his right to protest is considered a merit; but had he known that his daughter protests, he himself would have considered it a Chov (detrimental), and he would never have consented in the first place. (e) According to Rashi's explanation - that the father gave his consent only after the girl had protested, the question does not even get off the ground, since having protested before the father's consent took place, her Kidushin is already void by the time he gave his consent. TOSFOS DH K'RA BA'I click for question(a) Rav established the Pasuk ("Im Ma'ein Yema'en Avihah") is speaking about where the man enticed her without any intention of betrothing her, prompted this question. (b) What the Gemara is asking is - seeing as the Bi'ah was not meant as Kidushin, she is not his wife, whether she of her father protest or not, so why does Rav need to establish the Beraisa at all? (c) If the Pasuk was referring to where the man seduced her Le'Shem Ishus - then the Chidush would be that both she and her father have dual rights to protest and negate the Kidshin. click for question(a) The Chidush cannot be that should the father subsequently betroth her to the seducer, she has the right to protest - since that would infringe on his right to betroth her against her will. (b) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answers 'Lomar she'Meshalem K'nas ki'Mefuteh' by which, after establishing the Pasuk by Pituy she'Lo le'Shem Ishus (like Rav) he means - that just as the Mefateh is obligated to pay K'nas if her father objects to his marrying her, so too, will he have to pay K'nas if she objects. (c) Her Miy'un is not effective - to override her father's consent to the Mefateh marrying her. (d) Her Miy'un will be effective even with regard to prevent herself from becoming the Mefateh's wife however - there where her father died after the seduction took place. TOSFOS DH AMAR RAV YOSEF, I HACHI HAYNU DI'TENINA click for question(a) 'I Hachi' is - (not a question but) a statement, and the Mishnah that he cites is a proof for Rav and Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak. (b) It seems that Rav Yosef often used this expression in this manner - like we find in Shabbos, where he said 'I Hachi, Haynu di'Metargeminan Sasgona'. (c) Abaye refutes Rav Yosef's proof (' ... ve'Im Pitah le'Shum Ishus, Kidushin Lamah Li?') - by arguing that, even he would have seduced her in order to betroth her, she would still require a fresh Kidushin with the consent of her father. click for question(a) Others have the text 'Ela Amar Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak' - in which case he is coming to establish the Pasuk where the Mefateh seduced the girl le'Shem Ishus (not like Rav). (b) He reconciles Rav Asi (who rules 'Avihah ve'Lo Hi') with the Beraisa (which permits her to object as well) - by establishing the latter (not with regard to her not becoming his wife against her father's will, but) with regard to his having to pay K'nas, just as he would have had to do had the father objected (as we explained earlier). (c) And when ... 1. ... Rav Yosef says 'I Hachi, Haynu di'Tenanina ... ', he now means - to query Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak ... , whereas ... 2. ... Abaye answers 'Tzericha Kidushin le'Da'as Avihah' - he is coming to refute Rav Yosef's question, and to reinstate the answer of Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak. TOSFOS DH VA'AFILU BE'KAMAYSA click for question(a) According to Rashi ... 1. ... the case is - where one of the first dates is worth a Perutah question and the last one is not, and what the Gemara is asking is ... 2. ... seeing as the Kidushin is not complete until the she has received all the dates, the first dates are a loan, in which case she ought not to be betrothed? (b) The problem we have with calling the first dates a Milveh, according to the Gemara in the third Perek is - that, seeing as the money was given to her in the form of Kidushin, it ought rather to be called 'Kidushin money'. (c) The Gemara there rules that if someone says to a woman 'Hiskadshi li le'Achar Sheloshim Yom' (by which time the money was used up) - she is Mekudeshes (because the money was given to her in the form of Kidushin. (d) We reconcile our Gemara with the Gemara there inasmuch as there - technically, the Kidushin were completed before the money was used up, whereas here, the dates were eaten before the completion of the Kidushin. TOSFOS DH EIMA GAMRA U'MIKNAYA click for question(a) The problem we have with this theory (based on the Gemara in the first Perek) is - that, as we learned there, she does not have the power to become betrothed with less than a Shaveh Perutah (even if she wants to). (b) We reconcile our Gemara with the Gemara there - by differentiating between the Halachic fact that she cannot and the theory that it is in her hands, used as a 'Tzerichasa', which can readily be used in theory. 46b----------------------------------------46b TOSFOS DH U'SH'MA MINAH, MA'OS BE'ALMA CHOZRIN click for question(a) Practically speaking, what this means in a case where the man says to the woman ... 1. ... 'Hiskadchi li bi'Perutah Zu, u've'Zu, u've'Zu', and before the Kidushin has been completed, he retracts, or is - that the money that she already received is a Pikadon and must be returned; and the same will apply there where he says ... 2. ... 'Hiskadchi li bi'Temarah Zu, u've'Zu, u've'Zu', and before he finishes speaking, she eats the first two dates. (b) If, on the other hand, one were to hold 'Ma'os Matanah', then the Din in the latter case would be - that the Kidushin would take effect even on the dates that she already ate, even if the first date alone was worth a Perutah ... (c) ... seeing as a. what she ate was hers and b. he did not retract. (d) The precedent for this in the third Perek is - where a man betroths a woman with money after thirty days, she when the time falls due the Kidushin takes effect, even though she has already used up the money. (e) The principle 'Ma'os Matanah' will apply - there where the man retracts. click for question(a) According to our interpretation in R. Ami, we propose that the Machlokes between him and Rav and Shmuel - (as to whether the conclusion in our Mishnah 'Haysah Ocheles Rishonah, Einah Mekudeshes ad she'Yehei be'Achas Meihen Shaveh Perutah' can refer to the Seifa ('be'Zu, eu've'Zu u've'Zu, Im Yesh Shaveh Perutah be'Chulan Mekudeshes ... ') or not (as we learned on Amud Alef) hinges on whether Ma'os Pikadon or Ma'os Matanah. (b) We have already explained why, according to R. Ami, 'Haysah Ocheles Rishonah, Einah Mekudeshes ad she'Yehei be'Achas Meihen Shaveh Perutah' can refer to the Seifa. According to Rav u'Shmuel, this is not possible however - because, since they hold 'Ma'os Matanah', she will be Mekudeshes, even if they merely combine to make up a Shaveh Perutah, and it is not necessary for any one of them to be worth a Perutah. TOSFOS DH DE'ITMAR click for question(a) The alternative text is - 'Itmar' (rendering the Machlokes that follows ('ha'Mekadesh Achoso') unconnected to Rava's previous statement. (b) Regarding the Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel (regarding 'ha'Mekadesh Achoso') Rav says 'Ma'os Chozrim'. Shmuel holds - 'Ma'os Matanah'. (c) We consider the alternative text preferable to the above text - on the basis of the fact that even though Rav holds by 'ha'Mekadesh Achoso', Ma'os Chozrin, because everybody knows that Kidushin does not take effect on one's sister, but by 'ha'Mekadesh be'Milveh', he may well concede to Shmuel that Ma'os Matanah. (d) Besides that, the earlier text creates a contradiction in Rav - who with regard to our Mishnah, learned earlier that 'Ma'os Matanah, whereas now we quote him as saying 'Ma'os Chozrin. TOSFOS DH MIN HA'NAKUV AL SHE'EINO NAKUV TERUMAH (TOSFOS YESHANIM) click for question(a) This ruling affects ... 1. ... the Kohen - inasmuch he is not obligated to return what he received to the owner. 2. ... the owner - in that he remains Patur from separating Terumah from the Eino Nakuv. (b) Despite the fact that the owner did not fulfill his obligation (of giving Terumah from the Eino Nakuv), on the Chachamim exempted him from now separating Terumah from the Eino Nakuv - since the obligation on the Eino Nakuv is, in the first place, only mid'Rabanan ('Heim Amru, ve'Heim Amru'). TOSFOS DH VE'KA'SAVAR BA'AL HA'BAYIS NISKANAH ISASO (TOSFOS YESHANIM) click for question(a) Initially, we attribute the statement 've'Gezel be'Yad Kohen to a Takalah with regard to the Kohen's dough, rather than to the owner - because whereas the Kohen knows that he is Mochel the Tircha, the owner does not. TOSFOS DH IM EINO KADOSH, NESI'US CHET LAMAH click for question(a) The Gemara in Temurah cites a Machlokes as to whether wherever somebody contravenes a Torah prohibition, his action is effective or not. The reason of the opinion which holds that it is effective - is because otherwise, on what grounds would the Torah sentence him to Malkos? (b) Those who hold that it is not - ascribe the Malkos to the fact that one contravened a Mitzvah of the Torah. click for question(a) The current form of logic of R. Ila'i poses a question on the latter opinion - in that it negates the question 'Nesi'us Chet Lamah'? Perhaps the sin is the mere fact that one contravened a Mitzvah of the Torah (even if the article is not Kadosh)? (b) We answer that even those who hold elsewhere 'Lo Mehani', will concede that here, 'Mehani' (like R. Ila'i) - having said "ba'Harimchem es Chelbo Mimenu ... Kol Chelev Yitzhar ... " (from which we know of the obligation to give the best), why does the Torah need to add the current Pasuk ("ve'Lo Sis'u Alav Chet ba'Harimchem es Chelbo Mimenu"), if not to teach us that one transgresses two sins ... (c) ... 1. Not giving the best as the Torah prescribes; 2. Giving inferior Terumah on superior crops.
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