The Gemara speaks of executing a non Jew over the theft of less than a perutah, due to the Jew's anguish. Would the Sanhedrin actually do this?
1) If a non-Jew stole the button you were looking for to mend your shirt, 1) would the court execute him?
2) How could this possibly be just?
3) Would you actually agree with this?
4) Why in the gemarah was the nonJew actually executed? It seems that it must be more than a Jew's irritation over the theft of something worth less than a perutah?
Barry Epstein, Dallas, USA
1) Barry, you ask about the logic behind punishing a non-Jew for the theft of an item worth less than a Perutah, such as a bottom. Does this mean that it makes perfect sense to you to execute a non-Jew for the theft of an item worth more than a Perutah, such as three buttons, or your tuna sandwich? For that matter, do you find it logical and just that a Jew should be put to death because he willfully picks up a pen and writes two letters, A and B, on Shabbos? Is that easier to understand than putting to death a non-Jew for stealing from and causing anguish to a Jew? Obviously, then, your question is not just with regard to theft of less than a Perutah. (We will address the general issue below.)
2) What is your standard, your measuring rod, for what is just? We must always be cautious not to impose our subjective Western ideas of "justice" on the Torah, but work towards accepting the Torah's justice as absolute, as transmitted by the penultimate Just King. Questions are to be asked, but only from the standpoint of first accepting the Torah and the words of the Sages as the absolute truth.
To address your question in brief, the fact is that a non-Jew is killed for transgressing any of the Mitzvos which he is obligated to keep. This is not unfair, because he is not commanded to keep very many Mitzvos (only seven, as listed below). In other words, a non-Jew is mortally liable for far less infractions than a Jew is! (Now, I might ask, is that fair?) Don't forget that if a non-Jew steals the tuna sandwich of another non-Jew , he is also Chayav Misah; his Chiyuv Misah has nothing to do with stealing from a Jew. (We will address this point more below in response to your fourth question.) Also, he is Chayav only if he transgresses intentionally , with knowledge that this transgression is prohibited and is punishable.
Also, remember that those Mitzvos that the non-Jew is required to keep are very basic and relatively easy transgressions to avoid doing (do not kill, do not steal, do not commit adultery or incest, do not eat the limb of a live animal, do not blaspheme G-d, do not serve idols, and set up a system of law and order). These few Mitzvos, that you can count on less than two hands, are so basic and vital to the fabric of society that transgressing any one of them is considered such a breach in the natural order that the offender incurs the death penalty. The question now should be, how could any other way possibly be just?
3) In light of the above, of course I neither agree nor disagree, for my opinion is totally insignificant against the wisdom of the Torah. This is borne of the understanding that the Master of all Wisdom is He.
4) The answer to your fourth question is related to what we wrote above in #2. A non-Jew is held liable, and is Chayav Misah for stealing less than a Perutah from another non-Jew. However, for stealing less than a Perutah from a Jew, he is not held liable for the actual theft, but rather for causing anguish. Why is this, you ask. Without getting into a discussion of the essence of being a special nation, chosen by G-d to fulfill His Torah, having an intrinsic value that unfortunately so many Jews today have forgotten, let us answer simply as follows.
The reason the non-Jew is killed is not because he did a sin of tormenting a Jew, but because he did an act of theft. That is, if a non-Jew comes over to a Jew and, for example, calls him a dirty Jew and spits at him, he is not Chayav Misah. Rather, it is his act of theft -- which he is commanded to refrain from transgressing -- for which he is Chayav Misah. Since his theft involved less than a Perutah, it is not the value of the item stolen that determines that a theft was committed, but rather it is the consequence that determines that a theft was committed. The act of theft is measured by the consequence that it bore. (We find the same concept in the laws of theft of a Jew. If a Jew steals with intention to harass the victim and to return the object, he is still Chayav for his act of theft and must pay the relevant penalties of Kefel and Arba'ah v'Chamishah, because an act of theft was perpetuated.)
I hope that this clarifies some of the issues.
D. Zupnik and Y. Shaw