1)

(a)What does our Mishnah say about the Shechitah of someone who Shechts on Shabbos or on Yom Kipur?

(b)What did Rav Huna, quoting Chiya bar Rav in the name of Rav say, that caused the b'nei Yeshivah to establish the Mishnah like Rebbi Yehudah?

(c)Is it not obvious that the meat is Asur for the duration of Shabbos, since there is no way in which he will be permitted to cook it?

(d)From where did Rav derive his statement?

1)

(a)Our Mishnah rules that - although someone who Shechts on Shabbos or on Yom Kipur is Chayav Kareis, his Shechitah is nevertheless Kasher.

(b)Rav Huna, quoting Chiya bar Rav in the name of Rav ruled that - the animal is nevertheless forbidden on that day, causing the b'nei Yeshiva to establish the Mishnah like Rebbi Yehudah.

(c)Even though there is no way in which he will be permitted to cook it, the Tana nevertheless needs to teach us that the animal is forbidden for the duration of Shabbos - where the owner intends to eat it raw.

(d)Rav derived his statement - from the fact that the Tana mentions Yom Kipur together with Shabbos, to teach us that, like Yom Kipur, it may not be eaten for the duration of that day.

2)

(a)Rebbi Aba suggests that Rav is referring to Rebbi Yehudah in the Mishnah in Beitzah, where the Tana Kama permits cutting up a pumpkin for an animal or a carcass for dogs, on Shabbos. What does Rebbi Yehudah say?

(b)How does this tie up with Rav's ruling?

(c)On what grounds does Abaye reject Rebbi Aba's connection? In what way are the pumpkin and the carcass different than the animal in our Mishnah?

(d)How do we try to refute Abaye's distinction? How did we apparently misconstrue the purpose of a live animal?

2)

(a)Rebbi Aba suggests that Rav is referring to Rebbi Yehudah in the Mishnah in Beitzah, where the Tana Kama permits cutting up a pumpkin for an animal or a carcass for dogs, on Shabbos. Rebbi Yehudah - forbids it, unless it died before Shabbos.

(b)This ties up with Rav's ruling - inasmuch as here, like there, the animal is Muktzah because it was not ready for human consumption when Shabbos entered, and therefore remains forbidden the whole Shabbos, just like it is there.

(c)Abaye rejects Rebbi Aba's connection however, in that - whereas there, the pumpkin was originally designated for human consumption, and is now being used for animals, in our Mishnah, the animal was originally designated for human consumption, and that is what it is being used for now.

(d)We try to refute Abaye's distinction - by arguing that an animal in its lifetime stands to be used for rearing babies (and not for eating, as we originally thought), which places it on a par with the pumpkin, in that when Shabbos came in, it was designated for rearing children and is Muktzah because it now became fit for human consumption.

3)

(a)What problem will this present us with, regarding Rebbi Yehudah eating meat on Yom-Tov?

(b)We answer that an animal is designated both for rearing and for eating. How does that explain ...

1. ... Rebbi Yehudah eating meat on Yom-Tov?

2. ... why the animal is Muktzah in our Mishnah, according to Rav?

(c)On what grounds do we reject this answer? What is wrong with applying 'B'reirah' here?

3)

(a)The problem with this is that - if Rebbi Yehudah really holds that an animal is Muktzah because it is designated for rearing babies, then how could he possibly eat meat on Yom-Tov (which is a Mitzvah de'Rabbanan)?

(b)We answer that an animal is designated both for rearing and for eating. That explains ...

1. ... Rebbi Yehudah eating meat on Yom-Tov - since the moment it is Shechted (on Yom-Tov) it becomes clarified retroactively that it was designated to be eaten (Yesh B'reirah).

2. ... why the animal is Muktzah in our Mishnah, according to Rav - because when Shabbos entered without the animal having been Shechted, it became clarified retroactively that it was designated for rearing babies.

(c)We reject this answer however, b that - based on the fact that Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of B'reirah (as we will now prove).

4)

(a)Initially, we try to prove that Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of 'B'reirah', by citing a Beraisa, which discusses someone who purchased a hundred Lugin of wine from Kutim just before Shabbos. How much wine is he obligated to separate for Terumah Gedolah, Ma'aser Rishon and Ma'aser Sheini respectively?

(b)How does Rebbi Meir rule regard the purchaser separating ...

1. ... Terumah and Ma'aser Rishon?

2. ... Ma'aser Sheini?

(c)Why did the Chachamim not allow him to rely on B'reirah with regard to Ma'aser Sheini, like they do by Terumah and Ma'aser Rishon?

4)

(a)We try to prove that Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of B'reirah, by citing a Beraisa, which discusses someone who purchases a hundred Lugin of wine from Kutim just before Shabbos. He is obligated to separate - two Lugin for Terumah Gedolah, a fraction less than ten Lugin for Ma'aser Rishon and a little less than ten Lugin for Ma'aser Sheini.

(b)Rebbi Meir rules that - the purchaser is obligated to separate ...

1. ... Terumah and Ma'aser Rishon - after Shabbos. After designating the Terumah and Ma'aser verbally immediately, he may drink from the wine on Shabbos, leaving over sufficient to separate what he designated, after Shabbos.

2. ... Ma'aser Sheini - by transferring the Kedushah of Ma'aser Sheini immediately on to a Ma'aser Sheini coin.

(c)The Chachamim did not allow him to rely on B'reirah with regard to Ma'aser Sheini, like they do by Terumah and Ma'aser Rishon - since it is possible to redeem it immediately.

5)

(a)What do Rebbi Yehudah, Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi Shimon say?

(b)What do we try to prove from here?

(c)How do we counter this proof? What did the three Tana'im say to Rebbi Meir?

(d)And what did Rebbi Meir reply?

5)

(a)Rebbi Yehudah, Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi Shimon - forbid the purchaser to rely on B'reirah (and if he is unable to separate the Ma'asros before Shabbos comes in, then he is not permitted to drink the wine until after Shabbos) ...

(b)... ostensibly because they hold 'Ein B'reirah'.

(c)We counter this proof however, based on the the reason that they themselves gave in the Beraisa - where they asked Rebbi Meir whether he is not afraid that the bottle containing the wine which is left over, will break before the owner has had a chance to separate Terumah (in which case, he will have eaten Tevel [and not because they do not hold of B'reirah]).

(d)Rebbi Meir replied that - he will worry about that when the bottle breaks.

14b----------------------------------------14b

6)

(a)So we quote Rebbi Yehudah in the Beraisa cited by Ayo, with reference to another Beraisa. What do the Chachamim there say about someone who places an Eiruv on the east side of the town and one on the west ...

1. ... because he is not sure on which side the Chacham who will Darshen on Shabbos will arrive?

2. ... in a case where two Chachamim are arriving, and he has not yet decided which D'rashah he will attend?

(b)With which case does Rebbi Yehudah there agree/disagree?

(c)Why is Rebbi Yehudah's distinction difficult to understand?

(d)How does Rebbi Yochanan therefore establish the Beraisa?

(e)How does Rebbi Yochanan's interpretation of the Beraisa refute the proof that Rebbi Yehudah does not hold of B'reirah?

6)

(a)So we quote Rebbi Yehudah in the Beraisa cited by Ayo, with reference to another Beraisa, where someone places an Eiruv on the east side of the town and one on the west ...

1. ... because he is not sure on which side the Chacham who will Darshen on Shabbos will arrive, the Chachamim rule that - based on the principle of B'reirah, the appropriate Eiruv will indeed take effect retroactively, and the same will apply ...

2. ... in a case where two Chachamim are arriving, and he only decides on Shabbos which D'rashah he will attend.

(b)Rebbi Yehudah there disagrees with the latter ruling, but agrees with the former one.

(c)Rebbi Yehudah's distinction is difficult to understand - seeing as the former case involves B'reirah, no less than the latter one.

(d)Rebbi Yochanan therefore establishes the Beraisa where the Chachamim concerned had already arrived when Shabbos came in ...

(e)... a proof that Rebbi Yehudah holds Ein B'reirah, since his ruling in the Seifa has nothing to do with B'reirah.

7)

(a)Rav Yosef connects Rav to a Mishnah in Shabbos, which discusses the Din of broken vessels on Shabbos. Under what condition does the Tana Kama permit the use of the broken pieces?

(b)What does Rebbi Yehudah say?

(c)How will this explain Rav's ruling, forbidding the Shechted animal for the duration of Shabbos?

7)

(a)Rav Yosef bases Rebbi Yehudah on his ruling in a Mishnah in Shabbos, which discusses the Din of broken vessels on Shabbos. The Tana Kama permits the use of such vessels that broke - provided they can still be used (broken pieces of a kneading-trough to cover a barrel, and broken pieces of glass to cover a jar).

(b)According to Rebbi Yehudah - they must be potentially usable for a task similar to the one for which they were originally made (broken pieces of a kneading-trough to contain a stew, and broken pieces of glass, to contain oil.

(c)This will explain Rav's ruling, forbidding the Shechted animal for the duration of Shabbos - since in the same way, the Shechted animal too, which was fit for plowing in its lifetime, becomes fit only for eating once it is Shechted, and is therefore Muktzah.

8)

(a)How does Abaye refute Rav Yosef's explanation? Why are broken pieces of vessel and a Shechted animal not comparable?

(b)So we turn to a Mishnah in Shabbos. What does the Tana Kama there say about ...

1. ... squeezing fruit on Shabbos?

2. ... liquid that seeped out of food by itself on Shabbos?

(c)How does Rebbi Yehudah qualify the Tana Kama's ruling? Under which circumstances is the liquid permitted?

8)

(a)Abaye refutes Rav Yosef's explanation however, on the grounds that - whereas on the one hand, a vessel that breaks on Shabbos and that cannot be used for a similar task to its original one, is Nolad (a new entity); on the other hand, an animal in its lifetime (which is partially designated for eating, as we explained earlier) is already considered a food, and Shechting it is like breaking up a food into pieces (Uchla de'Ifras), which Rebbi Yehudah does not consider Muktzah.

(b)And Abaye proves this from a Mishnah in Perek Chavis, where the Tana Kama rules that ...

1. ... squeezing fruit on Shabbos is prohibited.

2. ... liquid that seeped out of food by itself on Shabbos is forbidden (to prevent the owner from squeezing it Lechatchilah).

(c)Rebbi Yehudah qualifies the Tana Kama's ruling - by confining it to fruit that was designated for its liquid, but juice that seeped from fruit that was designated to eat, is permitted.

9)

(a)We reject this explanation based on the fact that it is Rav's statement that we are attempting to corroborate. What did Rav say about baskets of grapes and olives, according to Rebbi Yehudah?

(b)How does this prove Rav's statement that Rebbi Yehudah is the Tanna of the Mishnah?

(c)Why do we reject this proof?

9)

(a)We reject this refutation however, based on a statement of Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel, who said that - Rebbi Yehudah concedes to the Chachamim that the juice that seeps out from baskets of grapes and olives is forbidden, even if they were designated to eat because most people designate them for their liquid (and we are afraid that this owner too, will change his mind and squeeze them for their liquid).

(b)By the same token, Rebbi Yehudah will forbid the Shechted animal on Shabbos, to prevent the owner from Shechting it Lechatchilah on Shabbos, thereby proving Rav's statement that the author of our Mishnah is Rebbi Yehudah.

(c)We reject this proof however, seeing as we are trying to corroborate Rav's statement, and Rav himself said that - Rebbi Yehudah permits even baskets of olives and grapes.

10)

(a)So Rav Sheishes (perhaps it ought to be Rav Shisha) b'rei de'Rav Idi cites a Beraisa in Shabbos, where Rebbi Yehudah allows moving a new earthenware lamp. What does he say about an old one?

(b)Why the difference?

(c)What does this prove?

(d)How do we refute this proof, too?

(e)And how do we refute the proof (that Rebbi Yehudah is the one who is stringent with regard to Muktzah), from another Beraisa, where he forbids moving a lamp that was lit on that Shabbos (even after it has gone out), because of 'Muktzah Machmas Mitzvah'?

10)

(a)So Rav Sheishes (perhaps it ought to be Rav Shisha) b'rei de'Rav Idi cites a Beraisa in Shabbos, where Rebbi Yehudah allows moving a new earthenware lamp - but not a new one ...

(b)... because it is Muktzah Machmas Miy'us (Muktzah because it is ugly). This is because, on account of its ugliness, people tend to be Maktzeh it (remove it from their minds [the source of Muktzah]).

(c)Likewise, we assume that, according to Rebbi Yehudah, they are also Maktzeh live animals when Shabbos enters, because of the Isur Shechitah.

(d)We refute this proof too, however - by suggesting that it is not because Rebbi Yehudah holds Muktzah Machmas Miy'us, that he must also hold of Muktzah Machmas Isur.

(e)And similarly, we refute the proof (that Rebbi Yehudah is the one who is stringent with regard to Muktzah), from another Beraisa, where he forbids moving a lamp that was lit on that Shabbos (even after it has gone out, because of Muktzah Machmas Mitzvah - by suggesting that Rebbi Yehudah is stringent there only because the owner was physically Maktzeh the lamp, but it does not follow that he is also stringent by an animal, whose Muktzah is automatic.

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